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Abstract
This paper introduces epistemic graphs as a generalization of the epistemic approach to probabilis-
tic argumentation. In these graphs, an argument can be believed or disbelieved up to a given degree,
thus providing a more fine–grained alternative to the standard Dung’s approaches when it comes to de-
termining the status of a given argument. Furthermore, the flexibility of the epistemic approach allows
us to both model the rationale behind the existing semantics as well as completely deviate from them
when required. Epistemic graphs can model both attack and support as well as relations that are neither
support nor attack. The way other arguments influence a given argument is expressed by the epistemic
constraints that can restrict the belief we have in an argument with a varying degree of specificity. The
fact that we can specify the rules under which arguments should be evaluated and we can include con-
straints between unrelated arguments permits the framework to be more context–sensitive. It also allows
for better modelling of imperfect agents, which can be important in multi–agent applications.
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1 Introduction
In real-world situations, argumentation is pervaded by uncertainty. In monological argumentation, we
might be uncertain about how much we believe an argument and how much this belief should influence the
belief in other arguments. These issues are compoundedwhen considering dialogical argumentation,where
each participant might be uncertain about what other agents believe. In addition, there are further notions
important for successful argumentation, such as the ability to take contextual information into account, to
handle different perspectives that various agents can have about a given issue, or to model agents that are
not perfectly rational reasoners or about whom we do not possess complete information.
Our aim in this paper is to present a new formalism for argumentation that takes belief into account
and tackles these challenges. Moreover, we want to have a formalism that will allow us to model how
different agents reason with arguments. A key application we have in mind is an agent modelling another
agent while participating in some form of discussion or debate. Hence, the modeller wants to understand
the degree of belief in arguments by the other agent and reasons for it. He or she may then use the model
to help choose their next move in the discussion or debate.
In order to make our investigation more focused, we assume that we can harness the following key
assumptions for any scenario that we want to handle.
Argument graph We assume we have a set of arguments, and some relationships between these argu-
ments. We will treat the arguments as abstract in this paper, but we can instantiate each argument
with a textual description (and we will have examples of such instantiations) or a logical specification
(for example as a deductive argument [10]). We also assume that the arguments and relationships
between them can be represented by a directed graph, and so each node denotes an argument, and
each arc denotes a relationship between a pair of arguments.
Belief in arguments Belief in an arguments can be conceptualized in a number of ways. In this paper, we
focus on belief in an argument as a combination of the degree to which the premises and claims are
believed to be true, and the degree to which the claim is believed to follow from those premises. Fur-
thermore, we assume that belief in an argument can be modulated or influenced by other arguments.
Additionally, we are interested in applications where we source arguments from the real-world (e.g.
arguments that arise in dialogues or discussions). This means that we will have arguments that are en-
thymemes (i.e. arguments with some of the premises and/or claim being implicit). This in turn means that
different people may have a different belief assignment to an argument because it is an enthymeme and
therefore they can decode it in different ways.
Requirements
In this paper, we will focus on the following requirements for our new formalism. We will briefly delineate
them first, and then motivate them through examples and a discussion of how meeting the requirements
is of use. Some of these requirements have been satisfied by existing proposals in the literature but some
are entirely new (e.g. modelling context-sensitivity, modelling different perspectives, modelling imperfect
agents, and modelling incomplete graphs).
Modelling fine–grained acceptability Typical semantics for argumentation frameworks focus on judg-
ing whether an argument should be accepted or rejected. However, in practical applications, there
might be uncertainty as to the degree an argument is accepted or rejected. Various studies, including
[65, 58], show that a two–valued perspective may be insufficient for modelling people’s beliefs about
arguments. Since the degree to which an argument is accepted (rejected) can be expressed by the de-
gree to which the argument is believed (disbelieved) [58], we can see this requirement as stating that
we should have a many–valued scale for belief in arguments. Recent interest in ranking-based se-
mantics and the notion of argument strength, also points to the need for the fine-grained requirement
(see [13] for an overview).
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Modelling positive and negative relations between arguments The notions of attack and support are
clearly important aspects of argumentation, even though the formalization of the interaction be-
tween these two types of relationship is open to multiple interpretation and subject to some debate
in the research community [22, 15, 61, 53, 58, 18, 45, 67]. Nevertheless, there are various studies
showing the importance of support in real argumentation, such as works on argument mining [18]
or dialogical argumentation [58]. Hence, this requirement is that we need to model how the beliefs
in arguments can have a positive or negative influence on other arguments, and that the belief in an
argument needs to take into account those influences.
Modelling context–sensitivity Consider two argumentation scenarios represented by the same directed
graph, but with arguments instantiated with different textual descriptions. The belief that an indi-
vidual has in these arguments may not be the same in these two scenarios. The way arguments and
influences between them are evaluated can be affected by the actual content of the arguments and
the problem domain in question [23]. Two different instantiations can be interpreted differently by a
single user depending on his or her knowledge or preferences [77]. Hence, this requirement is that
the context (i.e. how arguments are instantiated) can affect the belief in arguments and their influence
on other arguments.
Modelling different perspectives It is common for different people to perceive the same information in
differentways. In argumentation, not only can a given graph be evaluated in various ways by different
agents, but also its structure might not be uniformly perceived [58]. So if we have an argumentation
scenario represented by a single directed graph, different people might have dissimilar beliefs in
the individual arguments and in the influence the belief in one argument has on other arguments.
Partly, this divergence of opinions may occur because of an argument being an enthymeme (i.e. an
argument that only has some of its premises and claim represented explicitly), which every agent can
decode differently [11]. This disparity may also occur because of differing background knowledge
and experience. So this requirement is that the participant (i.e. the agent judging the argument graph)
can have belief in arguments and their influences that is different to other participants.
Modelling imperfect agents People can exhibit a number of imperfections such as errors in their back-
ground knowledge, errors in the way they analyze certain information, and biases in how they process
information in general. So when judging a given argumentation scenario some people might make
inappropriate or irrational judgments. This irrationality could be seen in terms of not adhering to
argumentation semantics as well as in terms of reasoning fallacies or undesirable cognitive biases
[49]. Since we want our formalism to be useful for real-world applications, we need the ability to
model the imperfect agents in their assessment of belief in arguments and in their assessment of the
influence between arguments.
Modelling incomplete situations An argumentation graph might not contain all of the arguments relevant
to a given problem, in particular those that concern the agent(s). For example, a patient might
withhold a certain embarrassing or private piece of information from the doctor, despite the fact that
it can affect the diagnosis. However, this incomplete knowledge might also be a result of how the
graph is obtained or updated. In dialogical argumentation, depending on the used protocol, an agent
might not always be able to put forward all arguments relevant to the discussion. As a result, an
agent may, for example, disbelieve an argument that is perceived by us as unattacked, even though
the agent is privately aware of reasons to doubt the argument. Similarly, an agent can believe an
argument despite it being attacked, simply because the graph does not contain the agent’s supporting
arguments. Such a behaviour would violate the majority of the argumentation semantics available
in the literature. Furthermore, graph incompleteness in combination with fine–grained acceptability
means that we might know that an agent believes or disbelieves a particular argument, but cannot
precisely state to what degree. We therefore need an approach that is more resilient to potential
incompleteness of the possessed information.
In the following examples, we consider simple scenarios where we might use monological argumen-
tation to make sense of a situation, and possibly to make decisions. The examples highlight the value of
implementing the above requirements.
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A = The train will
arrive at 2pm be-
cause it is timetabled
for a 2pm arrival.
B = Normally this
train service arrives
a little bit late.
C = The train appears
to be travelling
slower than normal.
D = The live travel
info app lists the
train being on time.
−
−
(a) Jack’s graph.
A = The train will
arrive at 2pm be-
cause it is timetabled
for a 2pm arrival.
B = Normally this
train service arrives
a little bit late.
C = The train appears
to be travelling
slower than normal.
D = The live travel
info app lists the
train being on time.
−
+
(b) Jill’s graph.
Figure 1: Labelleds graph concerning the arrival time of a train journey. Edges labelled with − represent
attack and edges labelled with + represent support.
Example 1. Imagine we have two passengers on a train, Jack and Jill, travelling to work. Jack is using
this particular connection regularly and has some experience with the vagaries of the service. Jill, however,
uses this connection for the first time, and has an important meeting to attend and wants to be on time. Let
us assume that their knowledge concerning whether the train is going to be late is represented in Figures
1a and 1b.
Let us first focus on Jack. Arguments B, C and D are enthymemes, and so their claims are not explicit
and can be decoded in a number of ways. Since Jack is a regular client we can assume that the missing
claim for B (and C) is “therefore the train will arrive a bit late”. He also has a live travel info app that says
that this service will arrive on time. He has been using this app for a while and does not consider it reliable
at all, and because of this experience he chooses to decode the claim of D as “the live travel info service
predicts the train will be on time”. So, Jack does not decode the claim of D as “therefore the train will arrive
on time”. Hence, he sees arguments B and C as attacking A and disregards the influence of D. Thus, Jack’s
belief in B and C suggests that A should be disbelieved, and the degree to which he disbelieves or believes A
should be primarily affected by C, i.e. his current perception of the service. At the same time, he is certain
of his eyes, i.e. that the info service predicts that the train will be on time, but his belief in that argument
does not affect A.
Let us now focus on Jill, who is new to the service. She heard from a fellow passenger that this
train normally arrives a little bit late and chooses to decode the claim of B as “therefore the timetable is
inaccurate”. This is the first time she has used this particular service, as she had only recently moved from
a different town. She commuted by train before, but the connection she used from her previous town was
a faster one. Therefore, she sees argument C as a comment on the new line when compared to the line she
used before, not as a sign of problems happening right now on the train she has boarded. Thus, her claim
for C is “therefore the tracks on this line must be in a worse condition than on the other line” and for her,
arguments A and C are not particularly related. Finally, the live travel app she has been using has been very
reliable in the past and she trusts it. She decodes the claim of D as “therefore, the train will be on time”.
Therefore, as long as she believes Dmore than she believes the complaints of a random stranger on the train
(i.e. argument B), she will believe A.
The above example indicates how considering arguments, and beliefs in them, can be a useful part of
sense-making and decision-making in monological argumentation. How we model the influence of positive
and negative relations is an important part of this. Furthermore, we can see that there is context-sensitivity,
in that how we interpret arguments (in particular how we decode enthymemes) and the relationships be-
tween them can affect this analysis. We can also see that it is reasonable for different agents having different
views on how to decode a given enthymeme, different views on the influence of one argument on another,
and different views on how to take multiple relationships into account.
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A = Giving up smoking will
be good for your health
B = My appetite will increase and
so I will put on too much weight
C = My anxiety will increase and
so I will lose too much weight
D = My anxiety will in-
crease and so I will have
problems with working
E = You can join a healthy eating
course to help you manage your weight
F = You can join a yoga
class to help you relax, and
thereby manage your anxiety
G = You can use online counseling services
for anxiety associated with smoking
cessation, and thereby manage your anxiety
−−
−
−
−
−
− −− −
Figure 2: Example of argument graph for persuading someone to give up smoking. Edges labelled with
− represent attack. The graph contains the arguments known (but not necessarily believed by) the artificial
agent, and might not contain all arguments of Rachel, Robin or Morgan.
Example 2. Let us now assume that we have an artificial agent attempting to persuade the users Rachel,
Robin and Morgan to stop smoking. The graph of the artificial agent is represented by Figure 2. The
dialogue proceeds in turns and limits the ways the participants can respond. The artificial agent can state
any of the arguments in the graph and the user is allowed to react in two ways. A user (be it Rachel, Robin
or Morgan) can either select his/her counterargument from the list presented by the agent, or state how
much (s)he agrees or disagrees with an argument presented by the agent. The user can end the dialogue
at any time, the agent ends once there are no arguments to put forward or the user agreed to the desired
arguments. After the dialogue is finished by any party, the participant is asked whether he or she agrees or
disagrees with argument A. If the participant agrees, the dialogue is marked as successful.
Let us start with Rachel. The agent presents her with argument A in order to convince her to stop
smoking and allows her to select from B, C and D as her potential arguments. Rachel selects B and D. In
response to B, the agent puts forward E, and Rachel agrees. In response to D, the agent decides to first
put forward F based on the experience with previous users. Unfortunately, Rachel strongly disagrees and
ends the discussion. The dialogue is marked as unsuccessful. The agent was not aware that Rachel uses a
wheelchair and that yoga classes did not suit her requirements, and the conversation ended before G could
have been put forward.
Let us now consider Robin. The agent presents Robin with A and again allows B, C and D to be selected
as counterarguments. Robin is afraid of any weight changes associated with smoking cessation and selects
both B and C despite the fact that they are conflicting. Consequently, any counterarguments put forward by
the artificial agent can be seen as at the same time indirectly conflicting with and promoting A. The agent
puts forward E and F, to which Robin moderately agrees, and the dialogue ends successfully.
Finally, consider Morgan, who similarly to Rachel selects both B and D. However, in reality, Morgan is
more afraid of weight gain than anxiety affecting his work, but wants to discuss both issues. The agent pro-
poses solutions and Morgan moderately agrees with E, but somewhat disagrees with F. The agent decides
to follow up with G, with which Morgan strongly disagrees. Nevertheless, the dialogue ends successfully
due to the fact that Morgan’s more pressing issue was addressed.
The above example indicates how beliefs in arguments and relations between them are important in
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dialogical argumentation. In particular, the same procedures applied to two agents expressing similar con-
cerns can lead to different results based on the beliefs they have in arguments and their private knowledge.
An agent not aware of another agent’s arguments or beliefs can put forward unacceptable arguments and
fail to persuade a given party to do or not to do something. One also has to be ready to put forward ar-
guments that, possibly due to certain behaviours of the other party that can be deemed not rational, might
work against the agents goal.
Example 3 (Adapted from [23, 24]). The work in [23] has investigated the problem of reinstatement in
argumentation using an instantiated theory and preferences. We draw attention to two scenarios considered
in the study, concerning weather forecast and car purchase, where each comes in the basic (without the last
sentence) and extended (full text) version.
The weather forecasting service of the broadcasting company AAA says that it will rain to-
morrow. Meanwhile, the forecast service of the broadcasting company BBB says that it will
be cloudy tomorrow but that it will not rain. It is also well known that the forecasting service
of BBB is more accurate than the one of AAA. However, yesterday the trustworthy newspaper
CCC published an article which said that BBB has cut the resources for its weather forecasting
service in the past months, thus making it less reliable than in the past.
You are planning to buy a second-hand car, and you go to a dealership with BBB, a mechanic
whom has been recommended you by a friend. The salesperson AAA shows you a car and
says that it needs very little work done to it. BBB says it will require quite a lot of work,
because in the past he had to fix several issues in a car of the same model. While you are at the
dealership, your friend calls you to tell you that he knows (beyond a shadow of a doubt) that
BBB made unnecessary repairs to his car last month.
The formal representation of the base (resp. extended) versions of these scenarios is equivalent (we
refer to [23, 24] for more details). However, the findings show that they are not judged in the same way
and suggest that the domain dependent knowledge of the participants has affected their performance of
the tasks. This shows the importance of modelling context–sensitivity and allowing an agent to evaluate
structurally equivalent graphs differently.
State of the Art
There are various approaches that attempt to tackle some of the above requirements, as we will discuss in
more detail in Section 6. However, there does not exist one that would be able to deal with all of them
at the same time. We can find a number of proposals in computational models of argument such as the
postulates for argument weights, strengths or beliefs [20, 21, 46, 1, 5, 3, 2, 64, 13, 4, 6, 73, 36, 44, 29],
which offer a more fine–grained alternative for Dung’s approach. Some of these works also permit certain
forms of support or positive influences on arguments [20, 4, 3, 64, 46]. Nevertheless, due to the way the
influence aggregation methods are defined, it is difficult for these proposals to meet the requirement for
modelling context–sensitivity, different perspectives or incomplete graphs. Certain flexibility is perhaps
possible only with approaches that work with initial scoring assignment such as [64, 46, 4, 6], though
dealing with imperfect agents still poses difficulties in these methods.
In contrast to the above works, there are frameworks that allow us to specify the way one argument
affects another locally, which promotes dealing with context–sensitivity, different perspectives and a wider
range of relations between arguments. In particular, abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) [17, 14, 53] al-
low us to specify various ways the incoming support and attack can affect a given argument. Unfortunately,
this specification has certain restrictions, and dealing with incomplete scenarios and imperfect agents is not
ideal. The semantics of ADFs are also primarily two and three–valued, and while a recent generalizations
allows for considering fine-grained acceptability [16], it still suffers from the previously mentioned issues.
Our Proposal
We therefore believe there is a need to investigate argumentative approaches that would handle both attack
and support relations, allow for fine–grained argument acceptability, and permit context–sensitivity, dif-
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ferent perspectives, agents’ imperfections and incomplete knowledge about agents’ graphs. As a starting
point for our research, we take the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation, which has already
shown to be potentially valuable in modelling agents in persuasion dialogues [37, 39, 40, 33, 34]. In order
to address our requirements, we introduce epistemic graphs a generalization of this approach. In these
graphs, an argument can be believed or disbelieved to a given degree, and the way other arguments influ-
ence a given argument is expressed by the epistemic constraints that can restrict the belief we have in an
argument in a flexible way.
Through the use of degrees of belief, epistemic graphs provide a more fine–grained alternative to clas-
sical Dung’s approaches when it comes to determining the status of a given argument. The flexibility of
the epistemic approach allows us to both model the rationale behind the existing semantics as well as com-
pletely deviate from them, thus giving us a more appropriate formalism for practical situations including
the modelling of imperfect agents. Epistemic graphs can model both attack and support as well as relations
that are neither support nor attack, so far analyzed primarily in the context of abstract dialectical frame-
works [14]. The freedom in defining the constraints allows us to easily express various interpretations of
support at the same time and without the need to transform them, which is usually necessary in other types
of argumentation frameworks [22, 60, 53]. The fact that we can specify the rules under which arguments
should be evaluated and that we can include constraints between unrelated arguments allows the framework
to be more context–sensitive and more accommodating when it comes to dealing with imperfect agents.
Additionally, the ability to leave certain relations unspecified lets us deal with cases when the system has
insufficient knowledge about the situation.
In this paper, we make the following contributions: 1) A syntax and semantics for a logical language
for constraints that is appropriate for argumentation; 2) A proof theory for reasoning with these constraints
so that we can determine whether a set of constraints is consistent, whether a set of constraints is minimal,
and whether one constraint implies another constraint; 3) A definition for epistemic graphs, study of its
properties and an analysis of how it can be used to capture different kinds of argumentation scenarios; and
4) A set of tools for analysing the relationship between the graphical structure and the constraints contained
in the graph and an example of how they can be harnessed in practical applications.
In this paper, we do not consider howwe can obtain the probability distribution or constraints. However,
other works with crowdsourced data show how we can obtain belief in arguments and relations between
them [23, 57, 58]. From this crowdsourced data, we believe that it is entirely feasible to develop machine
learning techniques for generating constraints. However, we leave the learning of constraints from data to
future work.
Outline of the Paper
We proceed as follows: Section 2 reviews the background that we require; Section 3 introduces the syntax
and semantics for the language we require for specifying epistemic graphs; Section 4 presents the proof
theory for reasoning with statements in this language; Section 5 introduces epistemic graphs and considers
how they can be used for analysing different kinds of scenarios; Section 6 compares our work to related
state-of-the-art formalisms; and Section 7 discusses our contribution and considers future work.
2 Preliminaries
In its simplest form, an argument graph is a directed graph in which nodes represent arguments and arcs
represent relations. In conflict–based graphs, such as the ones created by Dung [31], arcs stand for attacks.
In graphs such as those in [3], arcs are supports, while in bipolar graphs they can be either supports or
attacks [22, 12, 50, 48, 60]. In some frameworks, such as abstract dialectical frameworks, an arc may also
represent a dependence relation in case it cannot be strictly classified as neither supporting nor attacking
[17, 14, 53]. Argument graphs can be extended in various ways in order to account for additional prefer-
ences, recursive relations, group relations1 and more. For an overview, we refer the reader to [15]. We will
1Frameworks with recursive relations are represented as generalizations of directed graphs where edges point at other edges.
Frameworks with group relations are often represented by B– graphs, i.e. directed hypergraphs where the head of the edge is a single
node.
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also discuss some of these structures more in Section 6. For now, we will focus on introducing the notation
we will use throughout the text.
By an argument graph we will understand a directed graph and we will use a labelling function that
assigns to every arc a label representing its nature – supporting, attacking, or dependent, where dependency
is understood as a relation that is neither positive nor negative. Hence, unless stated otherwise, we will
assume we are working with a label set Ω = {+,−,∗}, which can be adjusted if needed. Given that many
argumentation graphs allow two arguments to be connected in more ways than one, we allow a single arc
to possess more than just one label:
Definition 2.1. Let G = (V,A), where A ⊆ V × V , be a directed graph. A labelled graph is a tuple
X = (G,L) where L ∶ A→ 2Ω is labelling function and Ω is a set of possible labels. X is fully labelled iff
for every α ∈ A, L(α) ≠ ∅. X is uni-labelled iff for every α ∈ A, ∣L(α)∣ = 1.
Unless stated otherwise, from now on we assume that we are working with fully labelled graphs. With
Nodes(G) we denote the set of nodes V in the graph G and with Arcs(G) we denote the set of arcs A in
G. For a graph G and a node B ∈ Nodes(G), the parents of B are Parent(B) = {A ∣ (A,B) ∈ Arcs(G)}.
With Lx(G) = {α ∈ Arcs(G) ∣ x ∈ L(α)} we denote the set of relations labelled with x by L, where
x ∈ {+,∗,−}. In a similar fashion, by Parentx(B) = {A ∣ (A,B) ∈ Arcs(G) ∧ x ∈ L((A,B))} we will denote
the set of parents of an argument B s.t. the relation between the two is labelled with x by L.
On an arc from a parent to the target, a positive label denotes a positive influence, a negative label
denotes a negative influence, and a star label denotes an influence that is neither strictly positive nor nega-
tive. If L is assigned only the − label to every arc in a graph, then the graph is a conflict–based argument
graph, and if L is assigned + or − (or both) to every arc in a graph, then the graph is a bipolar argument
graph [48, 22, 60]. Following the analysis in [58], a graph making use of all three labels will be referred
to as tripolar. In Figure 2 we can see an example of a conflict–based argument graph, Figure 1a shows an
example of a bipolar argument graph and Figure 3 of a tripolar one. In the last case, we can observe that
while E and F are necessary for A, only one of them can be accepted at a time in order for A to be accepted,
as having both of them would lead to rejecting the argument. This mutual exclusivity requirement for A is
neither an attacking nor a supporting relation, and thus it is classified as a dependency.
A given argument graph is evaluated with the use of semantics, which are meant to represent what
can be considered “reasonable”. The most basic type of semantics – the extension–based ones – associate
a given graph with sets of arguments, called extensions, formed from acceptable arguments. A more
refined version, the labeling–based semantics, tell us whether an argument is accepted, rejected, or neither
[19, 8, 14]. However, when it comes to some applications such as user modelling, these two and three–
valued perspectives can be insufficient to express the extent to which the user agrees or disagrees with a
given argument [65, 58]. Consequently, a variety of weighted, ranking–based and probabilistic approaches
have been proposed [1, 2, 3, 5, 64, 13, 4, 6, 36, 37, 39, 40, 33, 34, 62, 9, 20, 21, 46]. We will discuss some
of these approaches further in Section 6 and refer interested readers to the listed papers for a more in-depth
analysis.
3 Epistemic Language
In the introduction, we have discussed the value of being able to model beliefs in arguments, various
types of relations between arguments, contextsensitivity, and more. Our proposal, capable of meeting the
postulated requirements, comes in the form of epistemic graphs, which can be equipped with particular
formulae specifying the beliefs in arguments and the interplay between them. In this section, we will focus
on providing the language for these formulae. We describe its syntax and semantics as well as introduce
an appropriate proof system later in Section 4.
3.1 Syntax and Semantics
The epistemic language consists of Boolean combinations of inequalities involving statements about proba-
bilities of formulae built out of arguments. Throughout the section, we will assume that we have a directed
graph G. The building block of an epistemic formula is a statement “probability of α”, where α is a
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A = The Red team can be formed
if at least one engineer and exactly
one designer are present and the
Blue team has not been formed.
B = The Blue team can be formed
if at least two engineers and at least
one designer are present and the
Red team has not been formed.
C = Mark is
an engineer
and is present.
D = Emma is
an engineer
and is present.
E = David
is a designer
and is present.
F = Samantha
is a designer
and is present.
+ + ∗ ∗+ + + +
−
−
Figure 3: A tripolar graph example. Edges labelled with −, + and ∗ represent attack, support and depen-
dency respectively. Forming of the Red and Blue teams requires particular specialists. Arguments C, D,
E and F support the creation of the Blue team. However, only C and D strictly support the creation of the
Red team. If we accept E, then acceptance of F leads to the rejection of the Red team, and if we accept F,
then the acceptance of E leads to the rejection of the Red team. At the same time, one of E and F has to be
accepted. Thus, the relations from E and F are in some cases attacking, in some supporting, and hence they
can only be classified as dependent.
propositional formula on arguments (further referred to as terms). We can then speak about additions and
subtractions of probabilities of such terms (further referred to as operational formulae). Comparing them to
actual numerical values through equalities and inequalities forms epistemic atoms, which can then through
negation, disjunction, conjunction etc. be joined into epistemic formulae. Let us now formally introduce
the language:
Definition 3.1. The epistemic language based on G is defined as follows:
• a term is a Boolean combination of arguments. We use ∨, ∧ and ¬ as connectives in the usual way,
and can derive secondary connectives, such as implication →, as usual. Terms(G) denotes all the
terms that can be formed from the arguments in G.
• an operational formula is of the form p(αi) ⋆1 . . . ⋆k−1 p(αk) where all αi ∈ Terms(G) and
⋆j ∈ {+,−}. OFormulae(G) denotes all possible operational formulae of G and we read p(α) as
“probability of α”.
• an epistemic atom is of the form f#xwhere# ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<}, x ∈ [0,1] and f ∈ OFormulae(G).
• an epistemic formula is a Boolean combination of epistemic atoms. EFormulae(G) denotes the set
of all possible epistemic formulae of G.
For α ∈ Terms(G), Args(α) denotes the set of all arguments appearing in α and for a set of terms Γ ⊆
Terms(G), Args(Γ) denotes the set of all arguments appearing in Γ. Given a formula ψ ∈ EFormulae(G),
let FTerms(ψ) denote the set of terms appearing in ψ and let FArgs(ψ) = Args(FTerms(ψ)) be the set of
arguments appearing in ψ. With Num(ψ) we denote the collection of all numerical values x appearing in
ψ. For an operational formula f = p(αi) ⋆1 . . . ⋆k−1 p(αk), AOp(f) = (⋆1,⋆2, . . . ,⋆k−1) denotes the,
possibly empty, sequence of arithmetic operators appearing in f . By abuse of notation, by AOp(ϕ) for an
epistemic atom ϕ we will understand the sequence of operators of the operational formula of ϕ.
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Example 4. Assume a graph G s.t. {A,B,C,D} ⊆ Nodes(G). ψ ∶ p(A ∧ B) − p(C)− p(D) > 0 is an example
of an epistemic formula on G. The terms of that formula are FTerms(ψ) = {A ∧ B,C,D}, the arguments
appearing in them are FArgs(ψ) = {A,B,C,D}. The sequence of operators of ψ is AOp(ψ) = (−,−).
Finally, in this case, Num(ψ) = {0}.
Having defined the syntax of our language, let us now focus on its semantics, which comes in the
form of belief distributions. A belief distribution on arguments is a function P ∶ 2Nodes(G) → [0,1] s.t.
∑Γ⊆Nodes(G) P (Γ) = 1. With Dist(G) we denote the set of all belief distributions on Nodes(G). Each
Γ ⊆ Nodes(G) corresponds to an interpretation of arguments. We say that Γ satisfies an argument A and
write Γ ⊧ A iff A ∈ Γ. Essentially ⊧ is a classical satisfaction relation and can be extended to complex terms
as usual. For instance, Γ ⊧ ¬α iff Γ /⊧ α and Γ ⊧ α ∧ β iff Γ ⊧ α and Γ ⊧ β. For each graph G, we assume
an ordering over the arguments ⟨A1, . . . ,An⟩ so that we can encode each model by a binary number: for a
model X , if the i-th argument is in X , then the i-th digit is 1, otherwise it is 0. For example, for ⟨A,B,C⟩,
the model {A,C} is represented by 101.
The probability of a term is defined as the sum of the probabilities (beliefs) of its models:
P (α) = ∑
Γ⊆Nodes(G) s.t. Γ⊧α
P (Γ).
We say that an agent believes a term α to some degree if P (α) > 0.5, disbelieves α to some degree if
P (α) < 0.5, and neither believes nor disbelieves α when P (α) = 0.5. Please note in this notation, P (A)
stands for the probability of a simple term A (i.e. sum of probabilities of all sets containing A), which is
different from P ({A}), i.e. the probability assigned to set {A}.
Definition 3.2. Let ϕ be an epistemic atom p(αi) ⋆1 . . . ⋆k−1 p(αk)#b. The satisfying distributions of
ϕ are defined as Sat(ϕ) = {P ∈ Dist(G) ∣ P (αi) ⋆1 . . . ⋆k−1 P (αk)#b}.
The set of satisfying distributions for a given epistemic formula is as follows where φ and ψ are epis-
temic formulae:
• Sat(φ ∧ ψ) = Sat(φ) ∩ Sat(ψ);
• Sat(φ ∨ ψ) = Sat(φ) ∪ Sat(ψ); and
• Sat(¬φ) = Sat(⊺) ∖ Sat(φ).
For a set of epistemic formulae Φ = {φ1, . . . , φn}, the set of satisfying distributions is Sat(Φ) = Sat(φ1)∩
. . . ∩ Sat(φn).
Example 5. Consider a graphwith nodes {A,B,C,D} and the formulaeψ ∶ p(A∧B)−p(C)−p(D)>0∧ p(D)>
0. A probability distribution P1 with P1(A∧B) = 0.7, P1(C) = 0.1 and P1(D) = 0.1 is in Sat(ψ). However,
a distribution P2 with P2(A ∧ B) = 0 cannot satisfy ψ and so P2 ∉ Sat(ψ).
3.2 Restricted Language
The full power of the epistemic language, while useful in various scenarios, may be redundant in other. For
instance, one of the most commonly employed tools in opinion surveys is a Likert scale, which typically
admits from 5 to 11 possible answer options. Consequently, we would also like to consider the restricted
epistemic language, i.e. one where the sets of values that the probability function can take on and that can
appear as numerical values in the formulae are fixed and finite.
We start by defining the restricted value set, which has to be closed under addition and subtraction
(assuming the resulting value is still in the [0,1] interval). We can then create subsets of this set according
to a given inequality and “threshold” value, as well as sequences of values that can be seen as satisfying a
given arithmetical formula:
Definition 3.3. A finite set of rational numbers from the unit interval Π is a restricted value set iff for
any x, y ∈ Π it holds that if x + y ≤ 1, then x + y ∈ Π, and if x − y ≥ 0, then x − y ∈ Π. For Π ≠ ∅,
with Πx# = {y ∈ Π ∣ y#x} we denote the subset of Π obtained according to the value x and relationship
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# ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<}. The combination set for a nonempty restricted value set Π and a sequence of
arithmetic operations (∗1, . . . ,∗k) where ∗i ∈ {+,−} and k ≥ 0 is defined as:
Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
=
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{(v) ∣ v ∈ Πx#} k = 0
{(v1, . . . , vk+1) ∣ vi ∈ Π, v1 ∗1 . . . ∗k vk+1#x} otherwise
Example 6. Let Π1 = {0,0.5,0.75,1}. We can observe that it is not a restricted value set, since 0.75 −
0.5 = 0.25 is missing from Π1. Its modification, Π2 = {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}, is a restricted value set.
Similarly, it is easy to show that Π3 = {0,
1
3
, 2
3
, 3
3
} and Π4 = {0,
2
5
, 4
5
} are also restricted value sets. The
subsets of Π2 for x = 0.25 under various inequalities are as follows: Π2
x
> = {0.5,0.75,1}, Π2
x
< = {0},
Π2
x
≥ = {0.25,0.5,0.75,1},Π2
x
≤ = {0,0.25},Π2
x
≠ = {0,0.5,0.75,1}, and Π2
x
= = {0.25}.
Assume we have a restricted value set Π3 = {0,0.5,1}, a sequence of operations (+,−), an operator =
and a value x = 1. In order to find appropriate combination sets, we are simply looking for triples of values
(τ1, τ2, τ3) s.t. x + y − z = 1. By collecting such combinations of values from Π3, we obtain six possible
value sequences, i.e. Π3
1,(+,−)
= = {(0,1,0), (0.5,0.5,0), (0.5,1,0.5), (1,0,0), (1,0.5,0.5), (1,1,1)}.
On the basis of a given restricted value set, we can now constrain our approach both in a syntactic and
in a semantic way:
Definition 3.4. Let Π be a restricted value set. An epistemic formula ψ ∈ EFormulae(G) is restricted
w.r.t. Π iff Num(ψ) ⊆ Π. Let EFormulae(G,Π) denote this set of restricted epistemic formulae.
Definition 3.5. LetΠ be a restricted value set. A probability distribution P ∈ Dist(G) is restrictedw.r.t. Π
iff for everyX ⊆ Nodes(G), P (X) ∈ Π and for every argument A ∈ Nodes(G), P (A) ∈ Π. Let Dist(G,Π)
denote the set of restricted distributions of G.
Definition 3.6. Let Π be a restricted value set. For ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π), the restricted satisfying
distribution w.r.t. Π, denoted Sat(ψ,Π), is
Sat(ψ,Π) = Sat(ψ) ∩Dist(G,Π)
Due to the properties of ∩, ∪ and ∖, we can observe that restricted satisfying distributions can be
manipulated similarly to the unrestricted ones, i.e. the following hold for formulae ψ and φ:
• Sat(φ ∧ ψ,Π) = Sat(φ,Π) ∩ Sat(ψ,Π);
• Sat(φ ∨ ψ,Π) = Sat(φ,Π) ∪ Sat(ψ,Π); and
• Sat(¬φ,Π) = Sat(⊺,Π) ∖ Sat(φ,Π).
Example 7. Let Π = {0,0.5,1}. In the epistemic language restricted w.r.t. Π, we can only have atoms
of the form β#0, β#0.5, and β#1, where β ∈ OFormulae(G) and # ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<}. From these
atoms we compose epistemic formulae using the Boolean connectives. Let us assume we have a formula
p(A)+p(B) ≤ 0.5 on a graph s.t. {A,B} = Nodes(G). We can create three restricted satisfying distributions,
namely P1 s.t. P1(00) = 1, P1(10) = 0, P1(01) = 0 and P1(11) = 0, P2 s.t. P2(00) = 0.5, P2(10) = 0.5,
P2(01) = 0 and P2(11) = 0, and P3 s.t. P3(00) = 0.5, P3(10) = 0, P3(01) = 0.5 and P3(11) = 0.
We can observe that depending on the graph and the restricted value set, it might not be possible to
create a restricted distribution. For example, we can consider the set {0,0.9}. Although it meets the
restricted value set requirements, there is no way to add or subtract 0 and 0.9 such that they add up to 1.
This means that it is not possible to define a distribution with this set. Thus, it makes sense to consider also
a stronger version of Π that prevents such scenarios:
Definition 3.7. Let Π be a restricted value set. Π is reasonable iff for every graph G s.t. Nodes(G) ≠ ∅,
Dist(G,Π) ≠ ∅.
The following simple properties allow us to easily detect reasonable restricted sets:
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Lemma 3.8. The following hold:
• If Π is a nonempty restricted value set, then 0 ∈ Π.
• If Π is a reasonable restricted value set, then 0 ∈ Π.
• A restricted value set Π is reasonable iff 1 ∈ Π.
It can happen that the combination sets or value subsets of Π are empty. However, as we can see, this
occurs only if particular conditions are met:
Proposition 3.9. Let Π be a nonempty restricted value set, x ∈ Π a value, # ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<} an in-
equality, and (∗1, . . . ,∗k) a sequence of operators where ∗i ∈ {+,−} and k ≥ 0. Let max(Π) denote the
maximal value of Π. The following hold:
• Πx# = ∅ if and only if:
1. Π = {0} and# =≠, or
2. # is > and x =max(Π), or
3. # is < and x = 0.
• Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
= ∅ if and only if:
1. k = 0 and Πx# = ∅, or
2. k > 0,# is >, x =max(Π) and for no ∗i, ∗i = +, or
3. k > 0,# is > and Π = {0}, or
4. k > 0,# is <, x = 0 and for no ∗i, ∗i = −, or
5. k > 0,# is < and Π = {0}.
6. k > 0,# is ≠, Π = {0}.
The restricted language is appropriate for applications where a restricted set of belief values are avail-
able. For instance, it could be used when the beliefs in arguments are obtained from surveys using the Likert
scale. When we consider the proof theory for constraints, the restricted language also has advantages if we
want to harness automated reasoning with the logical statements.
3.3 Distribution Disjunctive Normal Form
In propositional logic, we often analyze formulae in various normal forms due to their useful properties.
Traditional forms include the negation normal form NNF, conjunctive normal form CNF and disjunctive
normal form DNF. Given that epistemic formulae extend propositional logic, they can also be transformed
into various normal forms if we look at epistemic atoms as propositions. In principle, for every formula ϕ
we can find at least one formula ϕ′ that is in NNF, CNF or DNF and s.t. Sat(ϕ) = Sat(ϕ′).
However, further notions can be introduced once we take the meaning of the atoms into account. In this
section we introduce a normal form for epistemic formulae from which it is easy to read if and how a given
formula can be satisfied. Let us start by observing that for every probability distribution, we can create an
epistemic formula describing precisely that distribution. As we may remember, a probability distribution
maps sets of arguments to probabilities. For every such set, we can create a term (i.e. a propositional
formula over arguments) describing it, where arguments contained in the set appear as positive literals and
those not in the set appear as negative literals. This brings us to the notion of argument complete terms:
Definition 3.10. Let ⟨A1, . . . ,An⟩ be the order of arguments in G and ϕ ∈ Terms(G) a term. Then ϕ is
argument complete iff it is of the form α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn, where αi = Ai or αi = ¬Ai. With AComplete(G) =
{c1, . . . , cj} we denote the set of all complete terms on G, where j = 2
n.
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Example 8. Let us consider a graph with arguments A, B and C and ordering ⟨A,B,C⟩. We can create the
following argument complete terms: ¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C, A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C, ¬A ∧ B ∧ ¬C, ¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ C, A ∧ B ∧ ¬C,
¬A ∧ B ∧ C, A ∧ ¬B ∧ C, and A ∧ B ∧ C.
By using atoms containing only complete terms, we can create a formula describing precisely one
distribution:
Definition 3.11. Let P ∈ Dist(G) be a probability distribution and AComplete(G) = {c1, . . . , cj} the
collection of all argument complete terms for G. The epistemic formula associated with P is ϕP =
p(c1) = x1 ∧ p(c2) = x2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = xj , where xi = P (ci).
Proposition 3.12. Let P ∈ Dist(G) be a probability distribution and ϕP its associated epistemic formula.
Then {P} = Sat(ϕP ).
Example 9. Assume we a have a graph s.t. {A,B} = Nodes(G). Below we have tabulated some of the
possible distributions for our graph and their associated formulae.
∅ {A} {B} {A,B} ϕPi
P1 0 1 0 0 p(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ ¬B) = 1 ∧ p(¬A ∧ B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ B) = 0
P2 0 0 1 0 p(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(¬A ∧ B) = 1 ∧ p(A ∧ B) = 0
P3 0 0 0 1 p(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(¬A ∧ B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ B) = 1
P4 0 0.5 0 0.5 p(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ ¬B) = 0.5 ∧ p(¬A ∧ B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ B) = 0.5
P5 0 0 0.5 0.5 p(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(¬A ∧ B) = 0.5 ∧ p(A ∧ B) = 0.5
P6 0 0.5 0.5 0 p(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 0 ∧ p(A ∧ ¬B) = 0.5 ∧ p(¬A ∧ B) = 0.5 ∧ p(A ∧ B) = 0
P7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 p(¬A ∧ ¬B) = 0.1 ∧ p(A ∧ ¬B) = 0.3 ∧ p(¬A ∧ B) = 0.2 ∧ p(A ∧ B) = 0.4
Consequently, for every epistemic formula ϕ, we can create a semantically equivalent formula ϕ′ that
is built from the formulae associated with the distributions satisfying ϕ. We refer to this new formula as the
distribution disjunctive normal form. Given the fact that an epistemic formula can potentially be satisfied
by infinitely many distributions, we only consider this form in the context of restricted reasoning.
Definition 3.13. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set, ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π) be a restricted epistemic
formula and {P1, . . . , Pn} = Sat(ψ,Π) the set of distributions satisfying ψ under Π. The distribution
disjunctive normal form (abbreviated DDNF) of ψ is  iff Sat(ψ,Π) = ∅, and ϕP1 ∨ ϕP2 . . . ∨ ϕPn
otherwise, where ϕPi is the epistemic formula associated with Pi.
Proposition 3.14. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set, ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π) be a restricted epis-
temic formula and ϕ its distribution disjunctive normal form. Then Sat(ψ,Π) = Sat(ϕ,Π).
Example 10. Let us continue Example 9 and assume we have an epistemic atom p(A∨ B) > 0.5 and a rea-
sonable restricted value set Π = {0,0.5,1}. Distributions P1 to P6 are the restricted satisfying distributions
of our formula and the DDNF associated with p(A ∨ B) > 0.5 is ϕP1 ∨ ϕP2 ∨ϕP3 ∨ϕP4 ∨ ϕP5 ∨ϕP6 .
We will harness the DDNF when we provide correctness results for the consequence relation for the
epistemic language in Section 4.2.
4 Reasoning with the Epistemic Language
Previously, we have considered the syntax and semantics of our epistemic language. However, we have not
yet explained how two epistemic formulae can be related based on their satisfying distributions, or what can
be logically inferred from a given formula. We would like to address this here by first introducing the notion
of epistemic entailment and then by providing a consequence relation, with the latter primarily focused on
the restricted language. From now on, unless stated otherwise, we will assume that the argumentation
framework we are dealing with is finite and nonempty (i.e. the set of arguments in the graph is finite and
nonempty).
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4.1 Epistemic Entailment
Let us start with the unrestricted epistemic entailment relation, which is defined in the following manner:
Definition 4.1. Let {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ EFormulae(G) be a set of epistemic formulae, and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G)
be an epistemic formula. The epistemic entailment relation, denoted⊫, is defined as follows.
{φ1, . . . , φn}⊫ ψ iff Sat({φ1, . . . , φn}) ⊆ Sat(ψ)
Example 11. The following are some instances of epistemic entailment.
• {p(A) < 0.2}⊫ p(A) < 0.3
• {p(A) < 0.2}⊫ p(A ∧ B) < 0.2
• {p(A) < 0.9, p(A) > 0.7}⊫ p(A) ≥ 0.7 ∧ ¬(p(A) > 0.9)
Let us now focus on reasoning in the restricted scenario, which can be defined similarly to the standard
epistemic entailment through the use of restricted satisfying distributions:
Definition 4.2. Let Π be a restricted value set, {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π) a set of epistemic formu-
lae, and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G) an epistemic formula. The restricted epistemic entailment relation w.r.t. Π,
denoted⊫Π, is defined as follows.
{φ1, . . . , φn}⊫Π ψ iff Sat({φ1, . . . , φn},Π) ⊆ Sat(ψ,Π)
Example 12. Consider Π = {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1} and restricted epistemic formulae p(A)+ p(¬B) ≤ 1 and
p(A) + p(¬B) ≤ 0.75. It holds that
{p(A)+ p(¬B) ≤ 0.75}⊫Π p(A)+ p(¬B) ≤ 1
Let us now discuss how the restricted satisfying distributions and the restricted entailment are related to
the unrestricted versions. First of all, by Definition 3.6, we can observe that every restricted satisfying dis-
tribution for an epistemic formula is also a satisfying distribution. Thus, we can easily show that epistemic
entailment implies restricted entailment:
Proposition 4.3. Let Π be a restricted value set, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π) a set of epistemic formulae, and
ψ ∈ EFormulae(G) an epistemic formula. If Φ ⊫ ψ then Φ⊫Π ψ.
In principle, we can observe that a “less” restricted entailment implies a “more” restricted one:
Proposition 4.4. Let Π1 ⊆ Π2 be restricted value sets, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π1) a set of epistemic formulae,
and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G) an epistemic formula. If Φ⊫Π2 ψ then Φ⊫Π1 ψ.
Note, it does not necessarily hold that if one formula follows from another in a restricted manner, then
it also follows in the unrestricted one as illustrated below:
Example 13. Consider two formulae ϕ1 ∶ p(A) ≠ 0.5 and ϕ2 ∶ p(A) = 0 ∨ p(A) = 1 and a reasonable
restricted set Π = {0,0.5,1}. We can observe that Sat(ϕ1,Π) = Sat(ϕ2,Π) and therefore {ϕ1} ⊫Π ϕ2.
However, in the unrestricted case we can consider a probability distribution P s.t. P (A) = 0.9 in order
to show that Sat(ϕ1) ⊈ Sat(ϕ2). We can observe that this issue would have been bypassed if, instead of
Π, we considered the set Π2 = {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}, for which {ϕ1} ⊯Π2 ϕ2. Consequently, although
restricted entailment does not in general imply unrestricted entailment, for a given set of formulae it is
possible to find such a Π for which this property holds.
The reason that an inference from the restricted entailment relation is not necessarily an inference from
the unrestricted entailment relation is that the restricted case contains more information. The set Π is
extra information that restricts the possible assignments for the probability distribution. Indeed, it could
equivalently be represented as a set of formulae that could be added to the left-hand side of the unrestricted
entailment relation. This is analogous to the use of explicit formulae on the domain in order to formalise
the closed world assumption in predicate logic [66].
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4.2 Consequence Relation
In order to provide a proof theoretic counterpart to the entailment relation, we present a consequence
relation in this subsection. For this, we will focus on the restricted language.
The advantage of having a consequence relation is that we can now obtain inferences from a set of
epistemic formulae. This means we can for instance determine if one constraint is implied by another, and
whether there is redundancy in a set of constraints (i.e. whether the set is not minimal). More generally,
we will see that both the entailment and consequence relations are important in examining properties of
epistemic graphs as covered in Section 5.
Before we present the epistemic proof system, we introduce some subsidiary definitions associated with
the arithmetic nature of operational formulae. Although they are not limited to restricted formulae only,
we prefer to have them at hand due to the fact that we will be using them in our epistemic proof system:
Definition 4.5. Let f1 ∶ p(α1) ∗1 p(α2) ∗2 . . . ∗m−1 p(αm), and f2 ∶ p(β1) ⋆1 p(β2) ⋆2 . . . ⋆l−1 p(βl),
where αi, βi ∈ Terms(G) and ∗i,⋆i ∈ {+,−}, be operational formulae. f1 ⪰su f2 denotes the subject
inequality relation that holds when f2 is obtained from f1 by logical weakening of an element p(αi) of
f1 to p(α
′
i) where {αi} ⊢ α
′
i, and all other elements are the same in f1 and f2. Additionally:
• with f1 ⪰
+
su f2 we denote the case where f1 ⪰su f2 and either i = 1 or ∗i−1 = +
• with f1 ⪰
−
su f2 we denote the case where f1 ⪰su f2, i > 1 and ∗i−1 = −
Let ϕ1 = f1#x and ϕ2 = f2#x, where# ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<} and x ∈ [0,1], be epistemic atoms. We say
that ϕ1 ⪰su ϕ2 iff f1 ⪰su f2 and with ϕ1 ⪰
+
su ϕ2 (resp. ϕ1 ⪰
−
su ϕ2) we denote the case where f1 ⪰
+
su f2
(resp. f1 ⪰
−
su f2).
Example 14. The following illustrate the subject inequality relation.
p(B)− p(A ∧ C) > x ⪰+su p(B ∨ D) − p(A ∧ C) > x
p(B)− p(A ∧ C ∧ E) < x ⪰−su p(B)− p(A ∧ C) < x
Proposition 4.6. For epistemic atoms ϕ1 = f1#x and ϕ2 = f2#x in EFormulae(G,Π), the following
hold:
• if ϕ1 ⪰
+
su ϕ2 and# ∈ {>,≥} then Sat(ϕ1) ⊆ Sat(ϕ2), and if # ∈ {<,≤}, then Sat(ϕ2) ⊆ Sat(ϕ1)
• if ϕ1 ⪰
−
su ϕ2 and# ∈ {<,≤} then Sat(ϕ1) ⊆ Sat(ϕ2), and if # ∈ {>,≥}, then Sat(ϕ2) ⊆ Sat(ϕ1)
We can now introduce the proof rule system for the epistemic formulae. The basic rules grasp the
primitive properties of probabilities, i.e. that any probability is in the unit interval, and that probabilities of
⊺ and  are respectively 1 and 0. The probabilistic rule allows us to express the probability of conjunction
(disjunction) of two argument terms through the probabilities of these terms. The subject rules capture the
behaviour of epistemic formulae that are connected through the subject inequality relation. The enumera-
tion rules allow us to transform any inequality into a formula using only equality under the given restricted
set Π. However, given the results of Proposition 3.9, in some cases it can happen that the appropriate sub-
sets of Π are empty. Thus, wherever applicable, we make it clear that the resulting formula should be seen
as falsity. Finally, the propositional rules capture how the reasoning extends classical propositional logic.
Definition 4.7. Let# ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<} and x ∈ [0,1]. Let Π be a restricted value set, andΠ
x,(∗1,...,∗m−1)
#
be the combination set of Π obtained according to the value x, relationship# and the sequence arithmetic
operations of arithmetic operations (∗1, . . . ,∗m−1). Also let f1 ∶ p(α1) ∗1 p(α2) ∗2 . . . ∗k−1 p(αk) and
f2 ∶ p(β1) ⋆1 p(β2) ⋆2 . . . ⋆l−1 p(βl), where k, l ≥ 1, αi, βi ∈ Terms(G) and ⋆j ,∗i ∈ {+,−} be operational
formulae. The restricted epistemic consequence relation, denoted ⊩Π, is defined as follows, where ⊢ is
propositional consequence relation, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π), and φ,ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π).
The following proof rules are the basic rules:
(B1) Φ ⊩Π p(α) ≥ 0 iff Φ ⊩Π ⊺ (B2) Φ ⊩Π p(α) ≤ 1 iff Φ ⊩Π ⊺
(B3) Φ ⊩Π p(⊺) = 1 iff Φ ⊩Π ⊺ (B4) Φ ⊩Π p() = 0 iff Φ ⊩Π ⊺
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The following rule is the probabilistic rule:
(PR1) Φ ⊩Π p(α ∨ β) − p(α) − p(β) + p(α ∧ β) = 0
The following proof rules are the subject rules.
(S1) Φ ⊩Π f1 > x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 > x
(S2) Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 ≥ x
(S3) Φ ⊩Π f1 < x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 < x
(S4) Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 ≤ x
(S5) Φ ⊩Π f2 < x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 < x
(S6) Φ ⊩Π f2 ≤ x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x
(S7) Φ ⊩Π f2 > x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 > x
(S8) Φ ⊩Π f2 ≥ x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x
The next rules are the enumeration rules.
(E1) Φ ⊩Π f1#x iff (Φ ⊩Π ⋁
(v1,...,vk)∈Π
x,AOp(f1)
#
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk)
if Π
x,AOp(f1)
#
≠ ∅ and Φ ⊩Π  otherwise)
(E2) Φ ⊩Π f1 > x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬( ⋁
(v1,...,vk)∈Π
x,AOp(f1)
≤
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk))
(E3) Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x iff (Φ ⊩Π ¬( ⋁
(v1,...,vk)∈Π
x,AOp(f1)
<
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk))
if Π
x,AOp(f1)
< ≠ ∅ and Φ ⊩Π ¬() otherwise)
(E4) Φ ⊩Π f1 < x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬( ⋁
(v1,...,vk)∈Π
x,AOp(f1)
≥
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk))
(E5) Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x iff (Φ ⊩Π ¬( ⋁
(v1,...,vk)∈Π
x,AOp(f1)
>
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk))
if Π
x,AOp(f1)
> ≠ ∅ and Φ ⊩Π ¬() otherwise)
The following proof rules are the propositional rules.
(P1) Φ ⊩Π φ1 and . . . and Φ ⊩Π φn and n ≥ 1 and {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊢ ψ implies Φ ⊩Π ψ
(P2) if Φ ⊢ ϕ then Φ ⊩Π ϕ
Example 15. For Π = {0,0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8,1.0}, the following illustrate the restricted epistemic conse-
quence relation.
• {p(A)+ p(B) ≤ 1, p(A) − p(B) ≥ 1} ⊩Π p(A) + p(B) = 1
• {p(A) > 0.8, p(A) > 0.5→ p(B) > 0.5} ⊩Π p(B) > 0.5
• {p(C) > 0.5→ p(B) > 0.5 ∧ p(A) > 0.5, p(B) > 0.5→ p(A) ≤ 0.5} ⊩Π 
• {p(A) > 0.6} ⊩Π p(A) = 0.8 ∨ p(A) = 1
We can use the epistemic consequence relation to infer relationships between unconnected nodes as
illustrated next.
Example 16. For the following graph, consider the formulae C = {p(C) > 0.5→ p(B) > 0.5, p(B) > 0.5→
p(A) ≤ 0.5}. From C, we can infer p(C) > 0.5→ p(A) ≤ 0.5.
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The following is a correctness result showing that the restricted epistemic consequence relation is sound
with respect to the restricted epistemic entailment relation.
Proposition 4.8. Let Π be a restricted value set. For Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π), and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π), if
Φ ⊩Π ψ then Φ ⊫Π ψ.
However, as it is often the case, the completeness is somewhat more difficult to show. We may recall
that for every probability distribution, we can create an epistemic formula describing precisely that distri-
bution. From the disjunction of such formulae, we have created the distribution disjunctive normal form
(DDNF) of every formula, the models of which were identical with the original formula. The challenge of
the completeness proof is therefore to show that the DDNF of a given formula is equivalent to it not only
semantically, but also syntactically.
This can be achieved by first transforming every term into a disjunction of argument complete terms,
then separating this epistemic atom into further atoms s.t. every one of them contains precisely one com-
plete term through the use of probabilistic rules. The probabilities of the complete terms that are not present
yet can be inferred from the ones that are, and we can use all of this to show the syntactical equivalence of
the epistemic formula and its DDNF:
Proposition 4.9. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π) a set of epistemic
formulae and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π) an epistemic formula. Then Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ϕ, where ϕ is the
distribution disjunctive normal form of ψ
The ability to transform any formula into its DDNF both semantically and syntactically, along with the
previous soundness results, brings us to the final correctness result for our system:
Proposition 4.10. Let Π be a restricted value set. For Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π), and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π),
Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊫Π ψ.
In addition, the following property can be shown, which indicates that we can develop algorithms for
automated reasoning based on proof by contradiction:
Proposition 4.11. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set. For Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π) and ψ ∈
EFormulae(G,Π), Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ∪ {¬ψ} ⊩Π .
We can also observe that for a finite set of rational numbers from the unit interval Π, representing and
reasoning with the restricted epistemic language w.r.t. Π is equivalent to propositional logic. We show this
via the next two lemmas.
Lemma 4.12. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set. There is a set of propositional formulae Ω with
Λ ⊆ Ω, and there is a function f ∶ EFormulae(G,Π) → Ω s.t. for each {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π),
and for each ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π),
{φ1, . . . , φn} ⊩Π ψ iff {f(φ1), . . . , f(φn)} ∪Λ ⊢ f(ψ)
Lemma 4.13. LetΩ be a propositional language composed from a set of atoms and the usual definitions for
the Boolean connectives. There is a restricted epistemic language EFormulae(G,Π) where Π = {0,1} and
there is a function g ∶ Ω → EFormulae(G,Π) s.t. for each set of propositional formulae {α1, . . . , αn} ⊆ Ω
and for each propositional formula β ∈ Ω,
{α1, . . . , αn} ⊢ β iff {g(α1), . . . , g(αn)} ⊩Π g(β)
From Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.13, we obtain the following result. This means that whatever can be
represented or inferred in the restricted epistemic language can be represented or inferred in the classical
propositional language and vice versa.
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Proposition 4.14. The restricted epistemic language with the restricted epistemic consequence relation is
equivalent to the classical propositional language with the classical propositional consequence relation.
The restricted language (where the values for the inequalities are restricted to a finite set of values from
the unit interval) allows for inequalities to be rewritten as a disjunction of equalities. This then allows for
an epistemic consequence relation to be defined as a conservative extension of the classical propositional
consequence relation. The advantage of this restricted version is that it can be easily implemented using
constraint satisfaction techniques [30, 68, 75]. These allow for a declarative representation of constraints
and provide sophisticated methods for determining solutions. For some applications, such as user mod-
elling in persuasion dialogues, having a restricted set of values (such as corresponding to a Likert scale)
would offer a sufficiently rich framework.
4.3 Closure
Last, but not the least, we define the notion of an epistemic closure, which will become particularly useful in
the analysis of relation coverage and labelings in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2. To put it simply, closure produces
the set of all formulae derivable from a given set:
Definition 4.15. Let Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G). The epistemic closure function is defined as follows.
Closure(Φ) = {ψ ∣ Φ ⊫ ψ}
We can observe that closure can produce infinitely many formulae that, depending on how we intend to
use it, can be seen as redundant. For example, from a formula p(A) > 0.5 we can derive p(A) > y for every
real number y ∈ [0,0.5]. Consequently, in many cases it makes sense to focus on closure w.r.t. a given
reasonable restricted set of values Π:
Definition 4.16. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set, and let Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π). The restricted
epistemic closure function is defined as follows.
Closure(Φ,Π) = {ψ ∣ Φ⊫Π ψ}
Given the soundness and completeness results for our proof systems, we can observe that closure can
also be defined using ⊩Π. The closure function is monotonic on both of its arguments (i.e. if Φ ⊆ Φ′ and
Π ⊆ Π′, then Closure(Φ,Π) ⊆ Closure(Φ,Π)).
Example 17. Let us consider the reasonable restricted value set Π = {0,0.1,0.2, . . . ,0.9,1} and the set
of formulae Φ = {p(A) < 0.5, (p(B) > 0.5 ∧ p(A) > 0.4) → p(C) > 0.6, p(C) = 1 → p(B) = 0.9}.
We can observe that Φ ⊫Π p(A) ≤ x for x ∈ {0.5,0.6, . . . ,1}, thus these formulae belong to the (both
restricted and standard) closure of Φ. On the other hand, the formula p(A) = 0.7 does not. The formula
p(A) < 0.5 ∧ (p(B) ≤ 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.6)∧ (p(C) < 1 ∨ p(B) = 0.9) also belongs to the closure. The formula
p(B) = 0.8 ∧ p(C) = 0.2 does not.
We will use the closure function in the next section when we consider properties of epistemic graphs in
terms of their constraints.
5 Epistemic Graphs
In the introduction, we have discussed the value of being able to model beliefs in arguments, various
types of relations between arguments, context–sensitivity, and more. Our proposal, capable of meeting the
postulated requirements, comes in the form of epistemic graphs, which are labelled graphs equipped with
particular formulae specifying the beliefs in arguments and the interplay between them. In this section we
formalize the idea of epistemic graphs: we explain how constraints can be specified and interpreted, define
epistemic semantics and provide an example of how our proposal can be used in practical applications.
Our aim in this section is to provide a general representation formalism for epistemic probabilistic
argumentation. Although we will, at times, discuss reasoning methods and introduce concepts that may
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help in implementing a working system based on our formalism, our focus will be on the conceptual level.
In general, reasoning with epistemic constraints can be seen as a special case of constraint satisfaction
problems [30, 68, 75] (CSP, as mentioned earlier) and CSP software could be used to implement our
proposal. We will point to general concepts from the CSP literature when appropriate, but leave a deeper
discussion of the implementation issues for future work.
An epistemic graph is, to put it simply, a labelled graph equipped with a set of epistemic constraints,
which are defined as epistemic formulae that contain at least one argument. This restriction is to exclude
constraints that operate only on truth values and are simply redundant. Nevertheless, we note that it is
optional and can be lifted if desired.
Definition 5.1. An epistemic constraint is an epistemic formula ψ ∈ EFormulae(G) s.t. FArgs(ψ) ≠ ∅.
An epistemic graph is a tuple (G,L,C) where (G,L) is a labelled graph, and C ⊆ EFormulae(G) is a set
of epistemic constraints associated with the graph.
We will say that an epistemic graph is consistent iff its set of constraints is consistent. Please note
that the graph (and its labelling, which we will discuss in Section 5.2) is not necessarily induced by the
constraints and therefore it contains additional information. The actual direction of the edges in the graph
is also not derivable from C. For example, if we had two arguments A and B connected by an edge, a
constraint of the form p(A) < 0.5 ∨ p(B) < 0.5 would not tell us the direction of this edge. While for the
sake of readability, we may use implications that reflect the directions of the edges, the syntactical features
of the constraints should in general not be treated as cues for the graph structure. The constraints may
also involve unrelated arguments, similarly as in [28]. We will now consider some examples of epistemic
graphs.
A = Throw a party
B = Buy fizzy drinks C = Buy fruit juices
D = Buy chips
and salty snacks
E = Constrained budget
F = Found forgotten stash
+ + +
− − −
−
Figure 4: Party organization graph. The + labels denote support and − denote attack.
Example 18. Let us consider an example in which Mary and Jane are organizing a small party at the
student dormitory. Although the guests will bring some beer, Mary and Jane need to buy some non–
alcoholic drinks and snacks. This can be represented with arguments A, B, C and D as seen in Figure 4 and
expressed with the following constraints:
• ϕ1 ∶ (p(B) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.5)∧ p(D) > 0.5→ p(A) > 0.5
• ϕ2 ∶ (p(B) < 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5)∨ p(D) < 0.5→ p(A) < 0.5
We can observe that B, C and D are supporters of A in the sense that the acceptance of A requires the
acceptance of D and B or C.
Let us assume that Mary and Jane realize that their budget is somewhat limited. We could create a
constraint stating that at least one of the items has to be rejected:
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• ϕ3 ∶ p(B) < 0.5 ∨ p(C) < 0.5 ∨ p(D) < 0.5
However, instead of this, we can also decide to represent the budget limitations as an argument E and
replace ϕ3 with ϕ
′
3:
• ϕ′3 ∶ p(E) > 0.5→ p(B) < 0.5 ∨ p(C) < 0.5 ∨ p(D) < 0.5
• ϕ′4 ∶ p(E) > 0.5
We can observe that in this case, the relation between E and B, C and D is more attacking, in the sense
that acceptance of E leads to the rejection of at least one of B, C and D.
Although the former solution is more concise, the latter also has its benefits. Let us assume that Mary
now finds some spare money in her backpack and they can afford to buy all of the items. Thus, we add
argument F, and the constraint ϕ′4 will need to be replaced:
• ϕ′′4 = p(F) > 0.5→ p(E) < 0.5
• ϕ′′5 = p(F) > 0.5
Clearly, the relation between F and E is conflicting.
A = Mark got good
grades at matura exam
B = Mark applies to
1st choice university
C = Mark applies to
2nd choice university
D = Mark applies to
3rd choice university
E = Mark applies to
4th choice university
+ + ∗ −
Figure 5: Mark’s university choice graph. The + labels denote support, − attack, and ∗ dependency.
Example 19. Let us consider the graph depicted in Figure 5. Given the rules in his country, Mark has
written the matura exam (national exam after high school allowing a person to apply to a university) and
can now register for up to two universities that interest him. He will be accepted or rejected once the exam
results are in. We create the following constraints expressing what Mark plans to do:
• If Mark strongly disbelieves that he will get good grades, he will apply only to his 4th choice univer-
sity:
p(A) ≤ 0.2→ p(B) < 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5 ∧ p(D) < 0.5 ∧ p(E) > 0.5
• If Mark moderately does not believe that he will get good grades, he will apply only to his 3rd and
4th choice universities:
p(A) > 0.2 ∧ p(A) ≤ 0.5→ p(B) < 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5 ∧ p(D) > 0.5 ∧ p(E) > 0.5
• If Mark moderately believes his grades will be good, he will apply only to his 2nd and 3rd choice
universities:
p(A) > 0.5 ∧ p(A) < 0.8→ p(B) < 0.5 ∧ p(C) > 0.5 ∧ p(D) > 0.5 ∧ p(E) < 0.5
• If Mark strongly believes he will get good grades, he will apply only to his 1st and 2nd choice
universities:
p(A) ≥ 0.8→ p(B) > 0.5 ∧ p(C) > 0.5 ∧ p(D) < 0.5 ∧ p(E) < 0.5
We can consider the relation between A and E to be conflicting, as once A is believed we disbelieve E. Given
that believing A (to a sufficiently high degree) also leads to believing B and C, the relations between these
arguments can be seen as supporting. However, the interaction between A and D cannot be clearly classified
as supporting or attacking, given that as the belief in A increases, D can be disbelieved, believed, and then
disbelieved again.
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Epistemic graphs are therefore quite flexible in representing various restrictions on beliefs. However,
given the freedom we have in defining constraints, we can create epistemic graphs in which the constraints
do not really reflect the structure of the graph and vice versa. Moreover, a probability distribution satisfying
our requirements may be further refined in various ways, independently of the graph in question. Thus,
in the next section we would like to explore testing if and how the graph structure can be reflected by the
constraints and introduce various types of epistemic semantics.
5.1 Coverage
Previously, we have stated that it is not necessary for the constraints to account for all arguments and all
the relations between them. While the ability to operate a not fully defined framework is valuable from
the practical point of view, for example when dealing with limited knowledge about an opponent during a
dialogue, having a graph in which the constraints cover all possible scenarios has undeniable benefits. In
this section we will therefore focus on notions that can be used to measure if, and to what degree, arguments
and relations between them are accounted for by the constraints. We will consider possible means of using
this information in Section 5.3.
The general idea of verifying coverage relies on modulating beliefs in certain arguments and observing
whether it results in particular behaviours in the arguments we are interested in. Key notion in this is a
constraint combination, which we will use as a “modulating” component:
Definition 5.2. Let F = {A1, . . . ,Am} ⊆ Nodes(G) be a set of arguments. An exact constraint combi-
nation for F is a set CCF = {p(A1) = x1, p(A2) = x2, . . . , p(Am) = xm}, where x1, . . . , xm ∈ [0,1]. A
soft constraint combination for F is a set CCF = {p(A1)#1x1, p(A2)#2x2, . . . , p(fm)#mxm}, where
x1, . . . , xm ∈ [0,1] and #1, . . . ,#m ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<}. With CCF ∣G for G ⊆ Nodes(G) we denote the
subset of CCF that consists of all and only constraints of CCF that are on arguments contained in F ∩G.
Verifying if and how the belief in an argument changes given the beliefs in other arguments can possess
certain challenges depending on how the set of constraints is defined. Amending the set of constraints
with the above combinations might lead to inconsistencies coming from the fact that the arguments in the
combinations themselves are interrelated or because the set of constraints already affects the belief in one
of the arguments in the combination by default. Furthermore, we need to take into account the fact that the
set of constraints associated with the graph might not be consistent to start with. In the following sections
we will work under the assumption that we are dealing with a graph s.t. the associated set of constraints is
satisfiable, and for a discussion on inconsistent constraints refer to [42].
5.1.1 Argument Coverage
On its own, an argument can be assigned any probability value from [0,1]. One of the purposes of the
constraints is - as the name suggest - to constrain the range of values that an argument may take, for
example by the values assigned to its parents. Coverage means that there is at least one value for the
degree of belief of an argument cannot be assigned, be it straight from the constraints or under certain
assumptions concerning the beliefs in other arguments, cf. general constraint propagation to restrict the
domain of variables [30]. The most basic form of coverage is the default coverage, where we can find a
degree of belief that an argument cannot take straightforwardly from the constraints and without imposing
additional assumptions:
Definition 5.3. LetX = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph. We say that an argument A ∈ Nodes(G)
is default covered in X if there is a value x ∈ [0,1] s.t. C ⊫ p(A) ≠ x.
Example 20. Let us consider the graph depicted in Figure 6 and the associated set of constraints C:
{p(A) > 0.5, p(A) > 0.5→ p(B) < 0.5, (p(B) < 0.5 ∧ p(C) > 0.5)→ p(D) ≤ 0.5, p(C) ≤ 0.5→ p(D) > 0.5}
In this case, we can observe that both A and B are covered by default. For example, C ⊫ p(A) ≠ 0.5
and C ⊫ p(B) ≠ 0.5. This comes from the fact that the belief in A is restricted from the very beginning and
from it we can derive the restrictions for B. However, arguments C and D are not default covered. Although
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they are constrained and, for example, it cannot be the case that they are both believed or both disbelieved
at the same time, for every belief value x ∈ [0,1] we can still find a probability distribution P s.t. P (C) = x
(resp. P (D) = x).
A B C D
−
+
−
−
Figure 6: An argument graph
A
BC
−
−
−
Figure 7: A conflict–based argument graph
The above example also shows that in some cases, the default coveragemay be too restrictive. Although
neither C nor D are default covered, the belief we have in one restricts the belief we have in the other. Thus,
our intuition is that some form of coverage should exist. In our case, every level of belief we had in C had
constrained D and vice versa. However, even weaker forms may be considered:
Example 21. Let us consider the framework depicted in Figure 7 and the following set of constraints C:
{ϕ1 ∶ p(B) > 0.5→ p(C) ≤ 0.5, ϕ2 ∶ (p(B) > 0.5 ∧ p(C) ≥ 0.5)→ p(A) < 0.5}
Let us analyze how the belief in A is constrained in the graph. Our intuition is that some coverage does
exist. In particular, we can observe that if B is believed and C is not disbelieved, then A is disbelieved and
thus there are some probabilities it cannot take in this context. However, if this condition is not satisfied,
then A can take on any probability. Thus, the coverage is, in a sense, “partial”.
We therefore introduce the additional notions of coverage below. Given the fact that the constraints
can occur between unrelated arguments and that for certain types of relations the belief in an argument is
more affected by the arguments it is targeting rather than by those that are its parents, we allow for testing
coverage against an arbitrary set of arguments. We say that an argument is partially covered by a set of
arguments F if we can find a belief assignment for F that respects the existing constraints and leads to
our argument not being able to take on some values. Full coverage states that every appropriate belief
assignment for F should lead to the argument not taking on some values.
Definition 5.4. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, A ∈ Nodes(G) an argument and F ⊆
Nodes(G) ∖ {A} a set of arguments. We say that A is:
• partially covered by F in X if there exists a constraint combination CCF and a value x ∈ [0,1] s.t.
CCF ∪ C /⊫  and CCF ∪ C ⊫ p(A) ≠ x
• fully covered by F in X if for every constraint combination CCF s.t. CCF ∪ C /⊫ , there exists a
value x ∈ [0,1] s.t. CCF ∪ C ⊫ p(A) ≠ x
We note that for a graph that possesses a consistent set of constraints, for every set of arguments F we
can find a constraint combination CCF for F s.t. CCF ∪ C is consistent (see also Definition 5.2). It is also
worth noting that for F = ∅, the definitions of partial, full and default coverage coincide. The set CCF is
also called an eliminating explanation [76].
We can observe that in the above definition, we exclude the effect an argument may have on itself
(i.e. the set F cannot contain the argument in question). While it has clear technical benefits, we also
observe that constraints representing directly self–attacking and self–supporting arguments either provide
default coverage or no coverage at all. Let us consider a simple graph with an argument A s.t A is a self–
attacker, which can be represented with constraints p(A) > 0.5 → p(A) < 0.5 (i.e. if A is believed, then
A is disbelieved) and p(A) < 0.5 → p(A) > 0.5 (i.e. if A is disbelieved, then its attackee (and/or attacker)
A is believed). From this we can infer that p(A) = 0.5 which provides default coverage. Performing a
similar analysis for a self–supporter (i.e. if A is believed, then A is believed and if A is disbelieved, then A
is disbelieved) leads to a tautology constraint and provides no coverage at all.
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Example 22. Let us consider the graph from Example 20 and look at arguments C and D. We can start
by analyzing whether arguments A and B provide any coverage for them. We can see that any constraint
combination {p(A) = x, p(B) = y} for these two arguments that is consistent with the existing formulae
is such that x ∈ (0.5,1] and y ∈ [0,0.5). Nevertheless, there is no value z ∈ [0,1] s.t. the union of our
constraint combination and the original set of constraints entails p(C) ≠ z or p(D) ≠ z. Consequently, these
arguments provide no coverage (be it full or partial), which is in accordance with our intuition.
Let us therefore consider constraint combinations on C and analyze the argument D. We can observe
that any set {p(C) = v} for v ∈ [0,1] is consistent with C. For v ∈ [0,0.5], we can observe that C ∪ {p(C) =
v} ⊫ p(D) > 0.5. Thus, for example, C ∪ {p(C) = v} ⊫ p(D) ≠ 0. For v ∈ (0.5,1], we can observe
that C ∪ {p(C) = v} ⊫ p(D) ≤ 0.5. Therefore, for example, C ∪ {p(C) = v} ⊫ p(D) ≠ 1. Hence, we can
argue that D is both partially and fully covered by {C} (and, as a result, also by sets containing C). Similar
arguments can be made for showing that C is partially and fully covered by {D}.
Example 23. Let us come back to Example 21 and check whether argument A is covered by the set {B,C}.
We can observe that all constraint combinations {p(B) = x, p(C) = y} are consistent with C as long as
either x ≤ 0.5 or y ≤ 0.5. We can observe that {p(B) = 1, p(C) = 0.5}∪C ⊫ p(A) < 0.5. Thus, for example,
{p(B) = 1, p(C) = 0.5} ∪ C ⊫ p(A) ≠ 1, and we have at least partial coverage. However, if we consider
{p(B) = 0.5, p(C) = 0.5}, then A can be assigned any belief from [0,1]. In other words, there is no value
z ∈ [0,1] s.t. {p(B) = 0.5, p(C) = 0.5} ∪ C ⊫ p(A) ≠ z. Thus, the coverage is not full.
In the above partial and full versions of the coverage, we needed to select the arguments against which
we wanted to check whether the belief in an argument is restricted or not. For some applications, this
extra information might be unnecessary, and thus we can consider the arbitrary versions of partial and full
coverage, i.e. ones in which the actual set F is not important as long as at least one exists.
Definition 5.5. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph. An argument A ∈ Nodes(G) has
arbitrary full/partial coverage iff there exists a set of arguments F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {A} s.t. A is fully or
partially covered w.r.t. F .
The following relationships between the various forms of coverage can be shown straightforwardly:
Proposition 5.6. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, A ∈ Nodes(G) be an argument and
F = Nodes(G) ∖ {A} be a set of arguments. The following hold:
• If A is default covered in X , then it is partially and fully covered w.r.t. any set of arguments G ⊆
Nodes(G) ∖ {A}, but not necessarily vice versa
• If A is fully covered in X w.r.t. F , then it is partially covered in X w.r.t. F , but not necessarily vice
versa
Finally, we can observe that for epistemic graphs whose constraints have the same satisfying distribu-
tions, the coverage analysis leads to the same results:
Proposition 5.7. Let X = (G,L,C) and X ′ = (G′,L′,C′) be consistent epistemic graphs s.t. Sat(C) =
Sat(C′). An argument A ∈ Nodes(G) is default (partially, fully) covered in X (and w.r.t. F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖
{A}) iff it is default (partially, fully) covered inX ′ (w.r.t. F ).
This result further highlights the need of contrasting information in the graph with the information in
the constraints, which we will address in Section 5.3.
5.1.2 Relation Coverage
In the previous section we have discussed properties concerning whether an argument is sufficiently cov-
ered by the constraints. However, it also makes sense to check whether every relation is covered by the
constraints as well. For example, we can consider an argument A and its parents B and C. It is possible
that the constraints are defined in a way that only B has an actual effect on A. Thus, the relation between C
and A might have no real impact, despite the fact that A may be fully covered in the graph. Hence, we also
test for the effectiveness of a given relation, which is understood as the ability of the source to change the
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belief restrictions on the target argument. We therefore introduce the following definition, which simply
states that there is a point at which changing the belief of the source of a relation will lead to a change in
the belief we have in the target. In order to be able to look at effectiveness of explicit as well as implicit
relations, we do not limit ourselves only to those mentioned in Arcs(G):
Definition 5.8. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {B} andG = F ∖ {A}
be sets of arguments. The relation represented by (A,B) ∈ Nodes(G) ×Nodes(G) is:
• effective w.r.t. F if there exists a constraint combination CCF and values x, y ∈ [0,1] s.t.
– C ∪ CCF ⊯ , and
– C ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯ , and
– at least one of the following conditions holds:
* C ∪ CC
F ⊯ p(B) ≠ x and C ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y}⊫ p(B) ≠ x, or
* C ∪ CC
F ⊫ p(B) ≠ x and C ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯ p(B) ≠ x.
• strongly effective w.r.t. F if for every constraint combination CCF s.t. C ∪ CCF ⊯ , there exist
values x, y ∈ [0,1] s.t. C ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯ , and at least one of the following conditions
holds:
– C ∪ CCF ⊯ p(B) ≠ x and C ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y}⊫ p(B) ≠ x, or
– C ∪ CCF ⊫ p(B) ≠ x and C ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯ p(B) ≠ x.
Example 24. Let us consider a simple set of constraints C = {p(A) > 0.5 → p(B) ≤ 0.5} and analyze the
impact A has on B. For this analysis, we assume F = {A} and G = ∅. Consequently, we will focus on
analyzing what we can conclude from C ∪ {p(A) = z} for selected values of z ∈ [0,1]. We can observe that
for every value of z, C ∪ {p(A) = z} /⊫ . Consequently, the first two conditions of effectiveness are easily
satisfied. Let z = 1 and CCF = {p(A) = 1}. It holds that C ∪ {p(A) = 1} ⊫ p(B) ≤ 0.5. Thus, for example,
C ∪ {p(A) = 1} ⊫ p(B) ≠ 1. However, if we set the probability of A to 0, then B is allowed to take on any
probability. Since CCG = ∅, it suffices to show that C ∪ ∅ ∪ {p(A) = 0} /⊫ p(B) ≠ 1. Consequently, the
third condition of effectiveness is also satisfied, and the (A,B) relation is effective. In a similar fashion, we
can show that it is strongly effective.
Example 25. Let us now consider the following set of constraints C:
{ϕ1 ∶ p(A) > 0.5→ p(B) > 0.5, ϕ2 ∶ p(C) > 0.5→ p(B) > 0.9}
We can analyze how A and C affect B and consider the constraint combinations on F = {A,C}. We
observe that both (A,B) and (C,B) are effective w.r.t. {A,C}. For instance, in case of A, we can take the
constraint combinations CCF = {p(A) = 0, p(C) = 0} and CCG = {p(C) = 0} to see that C ∪ CCF ⊯ p(B) ≠
0.4 and C ∪ CCG ∪ {p(A) = 0.7}⊫ p(B) ≠ 0.4. Similar analysis can be carried out for C.
We can also observe that (C,B) is strongly effective w.r.t. F . Let CCF = {p(A) = x, p(C) = y} be
an arbitrary constraint combination. If x ∈ [0,1] and y ≤ 0.5, then we can take CCG = {p(A) = x} and
{p(C) = 1} to observe that observe that CCF ∪ C /⊫ p(B) ≠ 0.9 and CCG ∪ {p(C) = 1}∪ C ⊫ p(B) ≠ 0.9. If
x ∈ [0,1] and y > 0.5, then we can take {p(C) = 0} to show that CCF ∪C ⊫ p(B) ≠ 0.9 and CCG ∪ {p(C) =
0} ∪ C /⊫ p(B) ≠ 0.9. Hence, in all cases, modifying the belief associated with C changes the restrictions
on B.
We note that unlike (C,B), (A,B) is not strongly effective w.r.t. F . For example, we can consider the
combination CCF = {p(A) = 0.6, p(C) = 0.6} for A. In this case, CCG = {p(C) = 0.6}. We can observe that
CCG ∪ C ⊫ p(B) > 0.9 and no matter the value of x ∈ [0,1], adding {p(A) = x} to our premises will not
change the restrictions on B.
The above definition of effectiveness is in fact a rather demanding one in the sense that even though
there might exist a constraint fromwhich we can see how two arguments are connected, other constraints in
the graph might make it impossible for it to ever become “active”, so to speak. For example, coverage such
as default, can interfere with detecting the effectiveness of a given relation. Let us consider the following
scenario:
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Example 26. Let us look at the following set of constraints C and assume that {(B,A), (C,A)} = Arcs(G):
{ϕ1 ∶ p(B) ≤ 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5, ϕ2 ∶ (p(B) ≤ 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5)→ p(A) < 0.5}
We can observe that even though B and C are not default covered, A is. In particular, C ⊫ p(A) < 0.5. In
other words, no constraint combination on {B,C} that is consistent with C will affect the restrictions on the
probability of A. Hence, the (B,A) and (C,A) relations will not be considered effective.
Given this, we can consider a weaker form of effectiveness, where the impact of other constraints may
be disregarded. To achieve this, we test effectiveness not against the set of constraints C, but against any
consistent set of constraints derivable from it:
Definition 5.9. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, Z ⊆ Closure(C) be a consistent set
of epistemic constraints, F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {B} and G = F ∖ {A} be sets of arguments. Then (A,B) ∈
Nodes(G) ×Nodes(G) is:
• semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ) if there exist a constraint combination CCF and values x, y ∈ [0,1] s.t.
– Z ∪ CCF ⊯ , and
– Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯ , and
– at least one of the following conditions holds:
* Z ∪ CC
F ⊯ p(B) ≠ x and Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y}⊫ p(B) ≠ x, or
* Z ∪ CC
F ⊫ p(B) ≠ x and Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯ p(B) ≠ x.
• strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ) if for every constraint combination CCF s.t. Z ∪ CCF ⊯ ,
there exist values x, y ∈ [0,1] s.t. Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯  and at least one of the following
conditions holds:
– Z ∪ CCF ⊯ p(B) ≠ x and Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y}⊫ p(B) ≠ x, or
– Z ∪ CCF ⊫ p(B) ≠ x and Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) = y} ⊯ p(B) ≠ x.
Example 27. Let us come back to Example 26. We could have observed that the (B,A) and (C,A) relations
were not effective. Let us take Z = {(p(B) ≤ 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5) → p(A) < 0.5} and F = {B,C}. It is easy
to verify that Z ⊆ Closure(C). We observe that any constraint combination on the set {B,C} is consistent
with Z , i.e. for any x, y ∈ [0,1], {p(B) = x, p(C) = y} ∪ Z /⊫ . We observe that if x ≤ 0.5 and y < 0.5,
then {p(B) = x, p(C) = y} ∪Z ⊫ p(A) < 0.5. Hence, for example, {p(B) = x, p(C) = y} ∪Z ⊫ p(A) ≠ 1.
If we change either x or y in a way that x > 0.5 or y ≥ 0.5, then A can take on any probability. Thus, for
such new x′ or y′, {p(B) = x′, p(C) = y} ∪ Z /⊫ p(A) ≠ 1 and {p(B) = x, p(C) = y′} ∪ Z /⊫ p(A) ≠ 1.
Hence, the relations are semi–effective w.r.t (Z,F ), even though they were not effective w.r.t. F . They are
unfortunately not strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ). For example, if we took a constraint combination
{p(B) = 1, p(C) = 1}, altering the assignment for B (C respectively) would not change the restrictions on A.
Similarly as we did in case of arbitrary argument coverage, we can speak of arbitrary (semi-) effective-
ness as long as a suitable (Z,F ) pair exists. The following connections can be drawn between all of these
forms of effectiveness:
Proposition 5.10. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, Z ⊆ Closure(C) be a consistent
set of epistemic constraints, F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {B} and G = F ∖ {A} be sets of arguments. Let (A,B) ∈
Nodes(G) ×Nodes(G). The following hold:
• If (A,B) is strongly effective w.r.t. F , then it is effective w.r.t. F , but not necessarily vice versa
• If (A,B) is strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), then it is semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), but not neces-
sarily and vice versa
• If (A,B) is effective w.r.t. F , then it is semi–effective w.r.t. (C, F ) and vice versa
• If (A,B) is strongly effective w.r.t. F , then it is strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (C, F ) and vice versa
• If Z ≠ C and (A,B) is semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), then it is not necessarily effective w.r.t. F
• IfZ ≠ C and (A,B) is strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), then it is not necessarily strongly effective
w.r.t. F
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5.2 Relation Types
Labellings are useful for indicating the kind of influence one argument has on another. In epistemic graphs,
the labels can be either provided during the instantiation process or, similarly as in the bipolar abstract
dialectical frameworks, derived from the constraints2. This however begs the question whether the way
a relation is labelled is really consistent with the way it is described by the constraints. While taking the
labelling as input has the benefit of being informed by the method that has instantiated the graph from
a given knowledge base, the derivation approach offers more understanding of the real impact a given
relation has on the arguments connected to it. By this we understand that determining edge types during
instantiation is typically a very “local” process in which, for instance, we check whether the conclusions
of two arguments are contradictory or not, or if conclusion of one is a premise of another. This often
ignores the presence of other arguments. For example, it is perfectly possible for an argument A that is
locally a supporter of B to also support an attacker C of B, and thus have a negative influence on B from a
more “global” standpoint. In this section we will focus on analyzing what constraints are telling us about
relations between arguments.
Inferring the type of a relation we are dealing with based on how the parent affects the target is not as
trivial as one may think. For instance, even in the case of attack relations, we have binary attack, group
attack, attacks as defined in ADFs or attacks as weakening relations, to list a few [31, 21, 19, 14, 15].
Acceptance of an attacker can lead to disbelieving the target, decreasing the belief in the target, or - in
the presence of e.g. overpowering supporters as in ADFs - have no effect at all. While there is a general
consensus among argumentation formalisms that an attack should not have positive effects, the notion of
a negative effect is still very broad. Since epistemic graphs are expressive enough to model all of these
behaviours, it is therefore valuable to study them in this setting.
Therefore, as we can observe, even a simple attack can lead to various behaviours, and some of them
may overlap with possible behaviours of supporting relations, one has to be careful when judging a relation
by the effect it has. Additionally, even though two arguments can appear to be positively or negatively
related on their own, taking into account the effects of other arguments in the graph might also bring to
light other behaviours. Certain works on argument frameworks introduce the notions of indirect relations
[27, 26, 22]. For example, one argument can support another, but at the same time attack another of its
supporters, thus serving as an indirect attacker. It can therefore happen that depending on the context in
which we look at two arguments, the perception of the relation between them changes:
Example 28. Let us consider the following scenario with arguments A, B, C and D where B and C group
support A s.t. at least one of B and C needs to be believed in order to believe A, B supports D s.t. believing
B implies believing D, and D attacks A. This can be depicted with the graph in Figure 8 and expressed with
the following set of constraints C:
• ϕ1 ∶ p(A) > 0.5→ p(B) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.5
• ϕ2 ∶ (p(D) < 0.5 ∧ (p(B) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.5))→ p(A) > 0.5
• ϕ3 ∶ p(B) > 0.5→ p(D) > 0.5
• ϕ4 ∶ p(D) > 0.5→ p(A) < 0.5
If we were to decide on the nature of the B–A relation only from the constraint concerning both of them
(i.e. constraints ϕ1 and ϕ2), then the supporting relation becomes quite apparent. However, if we were to
take into account the interactions expressed in constraints ϕ1 to ϕ4, then we would observe that believing
B implies believing D and thus disbelieving A, which is hardly a positive influence.
Example 29. Let us consider the following scenario with the graph from Figure 9 and where we know
that if A is believed, then unless C is believed, B is disbelieved. Thus, A carries out an attack that can be
2We note that we refer only to edge labels here, not edges in general. Epistemic graphs are structurally different from ADFs
and deriving the graph from the constraints is generally not possible (we refer to the beginning of Section 5 and to Section 6.2 for
additional details).
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Figure 8: A bipolar labelled graph for Example 28
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Figure 9: A bipolar labelled graph for Example
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overruled by the support from C3. We can create the constraint p(A) > 0.5 ∧ p(C) ≤ 0.5 → p(B) < 0.5 to
reflect this. The interplay between A and C shows that despite the fact A has primarily a negative effect on
B, believing A might not always imply disbelieving B due to the presence of other arguments.
Therefore, as we can see, both negative and positive relations can be interpreted in various ways, and
their actual influence can change depending on the context in which they are analyzed. Hence, rather
than forcing an attack to have a negative effect, we interpret it as a relation not having a positive effect
and support as not having a negative effect. In this respect, our approach is similar to the one in abstract
dialectical frameworks [14], which as seen in [53] subsumes a wide range of existing methods. However,
as motivated by Example 28, we should additionally distinguish between local and global influence, the
difference between them being whether all or some (parts of) constraints are taken into account.
What we would also like to observe is that selecting the constraints against which the relations should
be tested, is not necessarily an objective process. Let us again look at Example 28:
Example 30. Let us come back to the graph depicted in Figure 8 and analyzed in Example 28. In order
to test for local impact that B has on A, our intuition would be to focus on constraints ϕ1 and ϕ2. Let us
however consider replacing ϕ3 and ϕ4 with an equivalent constraint (p(B) > 0.5→ p(D) > 0.5) ∧ (p(D) >
0.5 → p(A) < 0.5). We observe that this replacement does not affect the satisfiability of our set. From the
new constraint we can also infer another constraint ϕ′ ∶ p(B) > 0.5 ∧ p(D) > 0.5 → p(A) < 0.5. Again,
adding it to the constraint set in no way affects the satisfying distributions. However, this constraint can be
interpreted as a group attack on A by B and D, and if we were to check the local impact that B has on A, the
intuition would be to take it under consideration. Consequently, despite the logical equivalence of both the
original and the modified sets of constraints, the perception of the relations stemming from them might not
be the same.
Thus, similarly as in the case of relation coverage, determining the nature of a given relation depends
on the constraints that we choose to analyze. Likewise, we will focus on graphs with consistent constraints,
and refer to [42] for discussion on handling the inconsistent ones.
Let us first consider a simplified approach, which primarily focuses on arguments being believed, dis-
believed or neither. We assume that a relation we want to investigate is at least semi-effective; ones that
are not we will refer to as unspecified. Semi-effective relations can later be deemed attacking, supporting,
dependent or subtle. Attack means that a target argument that is not believed remains as such when the
source is believed. In other words, we want to avoid situations when believing the source would lead to
believing the target. Support can be defined in a similar fashion. A dependent relation is seen as neither
supporting nor attacking, and one that is both is referred to as subtle4:
Definition 5.11. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph. Let Z ⊆ Closure(C) be a consistent
set of epistemic constraints, F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {B} and G = F ∖ {A} be sets of arguments. The relation
represented by (A,B) ∈ Nodes(G) ×Nodes(G) is:
• attacking w.r.t. (Z,F ) if it is semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ) and for every constraint combination
CCF s.t. Z ∪ CCF /⊫  and Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) > 0.5} /⊫ , if Z ∪ CCF ⊫ p(B) ≤ 0.5 then
Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) > 0.5}⊫ p(B) ≤ 0.5.
3This is an example of how extended argumentation frameworks can be modelled [55]
4In frameworks such as ADFs [14], a relation that is both attacking and supporting is redundant and can be safely removed from
the graph [55]. In our case, this more closely corresponds to unspecified ones due to their lack of effectiveness. Epistemic graphs are
more fine-grained than ADFs and relations that are both positive and negative might not be redundant.
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• supporting w.r.t. (Z,F ) if it is semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ) and for every constraint combination
CCF s.t. Z ∪ CCF /⊫  and Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) > 0.5} /⊫ , if Z ∪ CCF ⊫ p(B) ≥ 0.5 then
Z ∪ CCF ∣G ∪ {p(A) > 0.5}⊫ p(B) ≥ 0.5.
• dependent w.r.t. (Z,F ) if it is semi–effective but neither attacking nor supporting w.r.t. (Z,F )
• subtle w.r.t. (Z,F ) if it is semi–effective and both attacking and supporting w.r.t. (Z,F )
• unspecified w.r.t. (Z,F ) if it is not semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F )
Depending on the choice of constraints and arguments that we use for testing, it can happen that a rela-
tion is seen as supporting or attacking due to vacuous truth. For example, we may never find an appropriate
combination s.t. Z∪CCF ⊫ p(B) ≥ 0.5 (Z∪CCF ⊫ p(B) ≤ 0.5), or we cannot find constraint combinations
that would be consistent with Z . Consequently, we can also consider the following strengthening:
Definition 5.12. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, Z ⊆ Closure(C) be a consistent set
of epistemic constraints, F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {B} and G = F ∖ {A} be sets of arguments. Then a supporting
(resp. attacking, dependent, subtle) w.r.t. (Z,F ) relation (A,B) is strong w.r.t. (Z,F ) if:
• for every constraint combination CCF it holds that Z ∪CCF /⊫  and Z ∪CCF ∣G ∪{p(A) > 0.5} /⊫ 
• and there is at least one constraint combination CCF s.t. Z ∪ CCF ⊫ p(B) ≥ 0.5 (resp. Z ∪ CCF ⊫
p(B) ≤ 0.5 or both).
Example 31. Let us consider relation (B,A). We can observe that C ⊫ ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 and {ϕ1 ∧ϕ2}⊫ (p(A) ≤
0.5∨p(B) > 0.5∨p(C) > 0.5)∧(p(A) > 0.5∨p(B) ≤ 0.5∨p(D) ≥ 0.5). Let us therefore take Z = {(p(A) ≤
0.5∨p(B) > 0.5∨p(C) > 0.5)∧(p(A) > 0.5∨p(B) ≤ 0.5∨p(D) ≥ 0.5)} and F = {B,C,D} as our parameters
for testing the nature of (B,A). We can observe that if we take the setsW = {p(B) = 0, p(C) = 0, p(D) = 0}
and W ′ = {p(B) = 1, p(C) = 0, p(D) = 0}, then Z ∪W ⊫ p(A) ≠ 1 and Z ∪W ′ /⊫ p(A) ≠ 1. Thus, the
(B,A) relation is semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ). Furthermore, for all value y1, y2, y3 ∈ [0,1], Z ∪ {p(B) =
y1, p(C) = y2, p(D) = y3} /⊫  and Z ∪ {p(C) = y2, p(D) = y3} ∪ {p(B) > 0.5} /⊫ . We can also observe
that if y1 > 0.5 and y3 < 0.5, then Z ∪ {p(B) = y1, p(C) = y2, p(D) = y3} ⊫ p(A) > 0.5, and if y1 ≤ 0.5
and y2 ≤ 0.5, then Z ∪ {p(B) = y1, p(C) = y2, p(D) = y3} ⊫ p(A) ≤ 0.5. Otherwise, any probability
can be assigned to A. Hence, for support, we only need to consider the first case, and amending the set of
constraints with p(B) > 0.5 will not change the outcome. Thus, the (B,A) relation is strongly supporting
w.r.t. (Z,F ). We can consider the second case and amend the constraints in the same way to see that the
relation is not attacking.
Let us now take into account all of the constraints and assume Z = C. We can observe that if F left
the way it is, the (B,A) relation is in fact unspecified. This is due to the fact that once the values for C
and D are set, modifying the value of B leads either to inconsistency (caused by ϕ3) or does not change
anything anymore. We can therefore reduce the set F to {B,C}. At this point, we observe that for every
y1, y2 ∈ [0,1], the set W = {p(B) = y1, p(C) = y2} is consistent with Z . Furthermore, for y1 > 0.5,
Z ∪W ⊫ p(A) < 0.5, for y1 ≤ 0.5 and y2 ≤ 0.5, Z ∪W ⊫ p(A) ≤ 0.5, and for y1 ≤ 0.5 and y2 > 0.5 A can
take any probability. We can therefore show that (B,A) is strongly attacking w.r.t. (Z,F ). However, since
we cannot derive p(A) ≥ 0.5, it is also supporting and subtle, even though not strongly. Summary of our
analysis, as well as for some other relations, can be seen in Table 1.
In the previous definition we have dealt with positive and negative relations in a more ternary manner,
i.e. it only mattered whether the parent and the target were believed, and not up to what degree. Thus, we
can also use more refined methods, coming in the form of positive and negative monotony. In other words,
assuming beliefs in order relevant arguments remain unchanged, a higher belief in one argument node will
ensure that there is a higher (resp. lower) belief in the other argument.
Definition 5.13. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph. Let Z ⊆ Closure(C) be a consistent
set of epistemic constraints and F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {B} be a set of arguments. The relation represented by
(A,B) ∈ Nodes(G) ×Nodes(G) is:
• positive monotonic w.r.t. (Z,F ) if for every P,P ′ ∈ Sat(Z) s.t.
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Relation Label Z F Type
(B,A) +
{(p(A) ≤ 0.5 ∨ p(B) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.5) ∧
(p(A) > 0.5 ∨ p(B) ≤ 0.5 ∨ p(D) ≥ 0.5)}
{B,C,D} (strongly) supporting
C
{B,C,D} unspecified
{B,C}
(strongly) attacking
supporting
subtle
(C,A) +
{(p(A) ≤ 0.5 ∨ p(B) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.5) ∧
(p(A) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) ≤ 0.5 ∨ p(D) ≥ 0.5)}
{B,C,D} (strongly) supporting
(D,A) -
{(p(D) < 0.5 ∧ (p(B) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) >
0.5))→ p(A) > 0.5, p(D) > 0.5→ p(A) <
0.5}
{B,C,D} (strongly) attacking
(B,D) + {p(B) > 0.5→ p(D) > 0.5} {B}
(strongly) supporting
attacking
subtle
Table 1: Analysis of relations for epistemic graph from Examples 28 and 31.
– P (A) > P ′(A), and
– for all C ∈ F , if C ≠ A and C ≠ B then P (C) = P ′(C),
it holds that P (B) > P ′(B).
• negative monotonic w.r.t. (Z,F ) if for every P,P ′ ∈ Sat(Z) s.t.
– P (A) > P ′(A), and
– for all C ∈ F , if C ≠ A and C ≠ B then P (C) = P ′(C),
it holds that P (B) < P ′(B).
• non–monotonic dependent w.r.t. (Z,F ) if it is neither positive nor negative monotonic
Similarly as previously, we will call a relation arbitrary positive (negative)monotonic or non-monotonic
dependent if a suitable pair (Z,F ) can be found.
Example 32. If we look at Example 31 once more, we can observe that w.r.t. to the previously analyzed
(Z,F ) pairs, all of the relations are non–monotonic dependent. The constraints, while they can specify
whether the target argument should be believed or not, are not specific enough to state the precise degree
of this belief. Instead, let us now consider a simple graph ({A,B,C},{(B,A), (C,A)} where the (B,A)
relation is labelled with + and the (C,A) relation is labelled with −, and we have a single constraint ϕ ∶
p(C)+ p(A)− p(B) = 1. Let us focus on the (B,A) relation and assume an arbitrary probability distribution
P satisfying our constraint. Let P (C) = x. Then, P (A) = y + P (B) for y = 1 − x. We can thus show that
any increase in the belief in B will result in a proportional increase in the belief in A and that this relation is
positive monotonic w.r.t. ({ϕ},{B,C}). In a similar fashion we can show (C,A) to be negative monotonic
under the same parameters.
We would like to stress that while epistemic graphs are standard directed graphs and not hypergraphs
(i.e. edges join only two arguments), the relations between arguments do not need to be binary. By this
we understand that it can happen that only the presence of more than one argument can start to impact
another argument. This is reflected in the way our relation-specific notions are defined. For instance,
Definition 5.9 demands that certain conditions are met at least once, not that they are met all the time,
and Definition 5.11 distinguishes attacking and supporting relations as not having a given effect instead of
having one. To exemplify, forcing a supporting relation to always have an explicit positive effect would
mean that it can impact a target argument on its own, without the presence of other arguments. This is the
binary interpretation that is not demanded here. Our notions reflect similar concepts from ADFs, which
have been shown to subsume a wide range of non-binary relations despite the fact that link type analysis is
done between pairs of arguments [53].
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5.3 Internal Graph Coherence
In the previous sections we have considered what information about arguments and relations between them
we can extract from the constraints associated with the graph. Comparing this information with what is
presented in the graph can provide us with insight into the completeness and internal coherence of the
graph. There are many ways in which we could determine whether the coverage and labeling consistency
of the graph are “good” and we intend to explore this more in the future. Currently, we focus on the
following notions, though please note that the list is by no means exhaustive:
Definition 5.14. Let X = (G,L,C) be an epistemic graph. Let DirectRels(A) = {B ∣ B ∈ Parent(A)
or A ∈ Parent(B)} be the set of arguments directly connected to an argument A ∈ Nodes(G) in G. Let
Arcs∗(G) = {(A,B) ∣ there exists undirected path from A to B in G} denote the set of pairs of all arguments
connected in the graph. We say thatX is:
• bounded if every argument is default or arbitrary fully covered
• entry-bounded if every argument is default or arbitrary fully covered apart from possibly arguments
A s.t. Parent(A) = ∅
• directly connected if every relation in Arcs(G) is arbitrary semi-effective
• indirectly connected if every relation (A,B) ∈ Arcs∗(G) is arbitrary semi-effective
• hidden connected if there exists an arbitrary semi-effective relation (A,B) ∉ Arcs∗(G)
• locally connected if for every A, there exists a consistent set Z ⊆ Closure(C) s.t. A is fully covered
w.r.t. (Z,DirectRels(A) ∖ {A}) and for every B ∈ DirectRels(A) ∖ {A}, (B,A) or (A,B) is semi–
effective w.r.t. (Z,DirectRels(A) ∖ {A}).
A bounded graph is an epistemic graph we would expect to obtain through translating various existing
argumentation frameworks under their standard semantics (see also Section 6). The purpose of an entry-
bounded graph is to represent situations in which the internal reasoning of the graph is stated, but the actual
resulting beliefs in a distribution depend on the “input” beliefs provided by the user. Connectedness of a
graph contrasts the relation coverage deduced from constraints with the existence of connections within
the graph. In particular, we can distinguish hidden connections, which may reflect a user that is providing
constraints that are not reflected by the structure of the graph.
Let us now focus on comparing the nature of a relation induced from the constraints and the nature
defined by the labeling. The presented definitions could be used to verify whether the relation labels are in
some way reflected by the constraints or, if possible, to assign labels to relations when they are missing. A
possible - though not the only - way to do so is shown in the definition below.
Definition 5.15. LetX = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph. We say that L is (strongly) consistent
if for every (A,B) ∈ Arcs(G), the following holds:
• if + ∈ L((A,B)), then (A,B) is arbitrary (strongly) supporting
• if − ∈ L((A,B)), then (A,B) is arbitrary (strongly) attacking
• if ∗ ∈ L((A,B)), then (A,B) is arbitrary (strongly) dependent
• if L((A,B)) = ∅, then (A,B) is arbitrary unspecified
We say that L ismonotonic consistent if for every (A,B) ∈ Arcs(G), the following holds:
• if + ∈ L((A,B)), then (A,B) is arbitrary positive monotonic
• if − ∈ L((A,B)), then (A,B) is arbitrary negative monotonic
• if ∗ ∈ L((A,B)), then (A,B) is arbitrary non–monotonic dependent
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In this case, we could either use the set {+,−} to denote subtle relations, or introduce a new label in
order to avoid ambiguity. We also observe that in practice, every relation can be arbitrary unspecified, given
that one can decide to test relations against the empty set of constraints.
These approaches can be further refined in the future by putting restrictions on how the Z and F sets are
chosen, imposing certain ranking on the relations (for example, if a relation is seen as strongly supporting
and not strongly attacking, strong support could take precedence) and/or making the label conditions even
stronger (for example, we can demand that L((A,B)) = ∅ iff it (A,B) unspecified w.r.t. every (Z,F ) pair).
Example 33. We can consider the analysis performed in Example 31 to show that the labeling proposed for
the graph from Example 28 is strongly consistent with the analyzed set of constraints. The same analysis
also shows that it is not the only possible consistent labeling. Following the analysis in Example 32, we can
also argue that a labeling that assigns ∗ to every relation would be more adequate based on the monotonicity
analysis. We can observe that the labeling for the graph from Example 32 is monotonic consistent with the
assumed constraint.
The “quality” of our epistemic graph, particularly in terms of boundedness, can affect our choice of
how the graph is evaluated. For instance, the less we know about the graph, the more risky credulous rea-
soning becomes. In turn, connectedness can affect choice of arguments in applications, such as persuasive
dialogues. It can be used to both highlight ineffective relations that should not be taken into consideration
as system moves as well as incomplete relations that, if used by the user, could lead to situations in which
the system cannot decide what to do next. We will come back to this in Section 5.5.
Unfortunately, there is also the issue of inconsistent relations labelings. Natural language arguments are
often enthymemes and the labels we would obtain through instantiating the graph are not necessarily the
ones that the users would recognize. The fact that the personal views or knowledge of a given agent affects
their decoding of the graph has already been observed in [58]. Recovering consistency of the relation
labelings is, however, not trivial.
While one can investigate the constraints and override the graph labeling to force consistency, it is
unclear what methods would be optimal for allowing information in the graph to override or delete the
information in the constraints. Furthermore, one could also consider cases where both parts of the graph
and the constraints are sacrificed, as well as where neither, and the existence of inconsistency becomes an
additional piece of information that we take advantage of. The actual chosen strategy, as well as the criteria
by which it is judged, can depend on the application and the methods with which epistemic graphs are
combined.
We can consider criteria such as accuracy or popularity when determining whether the graph or con-
straints (or possibly both) should be adjusted. For instance, argument and relation mining methods are of
varying accuracy, and we can expect that the epistemic constraint mining methods will perform differently
depending on the quality and amount of available data. Given conflicting graphs and constraints, one can
therefore select which one to prioritize and which one to adjust depending on how much we can trust them
to be an accurate representation of, for example, the reasoning patterns and knowledge of (sets of) agents.
Concerning popularity, we observe that the graphs and the constraints extracted from a single source of
knowledge can differ between agents performing the extraction. One can therefore sacrifice parts of graphs
or constraints leading to inconsistency depending on how unpopular or unlikely they are w.r.t. the given
population.
There are also situations in which keeping both the graph and the constraints, despite the issues be-
tween them, could be informative. An argument graph instantiated with a given structured argumentation
approach from, for instance, a legal text, can be viewed as a normative representation of a given problem. It
can later be augmented with the constraints of a given agent, which offer a more subjective representation.
The dichotomy between the two could be a source of information of its own and, for instance, serve as a
measure of how reliable or reasonable a given agent is. Favouring either of the perspectives could also be
used as guidance as to whether the graph or the constraints should be sacrificed in the face of contradiction.
These are only few possible scenarios, and we leave investigating consistency retrieving strategies for
future work.
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5.4 Epistemic Semantics
Epistemic graphs offer us a number of ways in which we can decide how much a given argument should
be believed or disbelieved depending on the remaining arguments. Evaluating the graph and deciding what
probabilities should be assigned to (sets of) arguments is the role of the epistemic semantics:
Definition 5.16. Let X = (G,L,C) be an epistemic graph. An epistemic semantics associates X with a
setR ⊆ Dist(G), where Dist(G) is the set of all belief distributions over G.
Although the main aim of the epistemic semantics is to select those probability distributions that satisfy
our requirements, one can also enforce additional restrictions for refining the sets of acceptable distribu-
tions, on which we will focus in this section. First of all, the simplest possible semantics is the one that
associates a given graph with the set of distributions satisfying its constraints:
Definition 5.17. For an epistemic graph (G,L,C), a distribution P ∈ Dist(G) meets the satisfaction
semantics iff P ∈ Sat(C).
Given that an inconsistent graph is not particularly interesting, we will aim at specifying epistemic
graphs that have consistent constraints. However, we would like to note that this may not always be
possible and that inconsistency does not necessarily mean that the constraints are not rational. For example,
the stable semantics [25] for argumentation graphs does not always produce any extensions, and this is a
result of the restrictive nature of this semantics. We can therefore expect that epistemic graphs aiming to
emulate this may have inconsistent sets of constraints.
Various properties which can be quite useful concern minimizing or maximizing certain aspects of a
distribution. Similarly as in other types of argumentation semantics, we can aim to maximize or minimize
the set of arguments that are believed up to any degree, disbelieved up to any degree or undecided. We can
also consider the information ordering, such as the one used in [14], which maximizes or minimizes belief
and disbelief together. We can therefore introduce the following means of comparing distributions:
Definition 5.18. LetX = (G,L,C) be an epistemic graph and P,P ′ ∈ Dist(G) be probability distributions.
We say that:
• P ≲A P
′ iff {A ∣ P (A) > 0.5} ⊆ {A ∣ P ′(A) > 0.5}
• P ≲R P
′ iff {A ∣ P (A) < 0.5} ⊆ {A ∣ P ′(A) < 0.5}
• P ≲U P
′ iff {A ∣ P (A) = 0.5} ⊆ {A ∣ P ′(A) = 0.5}
• P ≲I P
′ iff {A ∣ P (A) > 0.5} ⊆ {A ∣ P ′(A) > 0.5} and {A ∣ P (A) < 0.5} ⊆ {A ∣ P ′(A) < 0.5}
We will refer to these orderings as acceptance, rejection, undecided and information orderings.
These approaches can be further refined to take the actual degrees into account as well. For example,
in some scenarios a distribution s.t. P (A) = P (B) = 1 and P (C) = 0.49 might be preferable to one s.t.
P (A) = P (B) = P (C) = 0.51, even if the actual number of believed arguments is smaller. Thus, we also
consider the belief maximizing and minimizing approaches, based on the notion of entropy:
Definition 5.19. For a probability distribution P , the entropyH(P ) of P is defined as
H(P ) = − ∑
Γ⊆Nodes(G)
P (Γ)logP (Γ)
with 0 log 0 = 0.
The entropy measures the amount of indeterminateness of a probability distribution P . A probabil-
ity function P1 that describes absolute certain knowledge, i. e. P1(Γ) = 1 for some Γ ⊆ Nodes(G) and
P1(Γ
′) = 0 for every other Γ′ ⊆ Nodes(G), yields minimal entropy H(P1) = 0. The uniform prob-
ability function P0 with P0(Γ) =
1
∣2Nodes(G) ∣
for every Γ ⊆ Nodes(G) yields maximal entropy H(P0) =
− log 1/∣2Nodes(G)∣. Hence, entropy is minimal when we are completely certain about the possible world, and
entropy is maximal when we are completely uncertain about the possible world.
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Definition 5.20. LetX = (G,L,C) be an epistemic graph and P,P ′ ∈ Dist(G) be probability distributions.
We say that P ≲B P
′ iffH(P ′) ≤H(P ).
We will refer to the above as belief ordering.
Given that the purpose of an epistemic semantics is to grasp various optional properties whenever and
however they are needed, a new semantics can be defined “on top” of a previous semantics, such as the
satisfaction semantics. We can therefore propose the following, parameterized definition:
Definition 5.21. Let (G,L,C) be an epistemic graph and R the set of distributions associated with it
according to a given semantics σ. Let v ∈ {A,R,U, I,B} denote acceptance, rejection, undecided, infor-
mation or belief. A distribution P ∈ Dist(G)meets the σ-v maximizing (minimizing) semantics iff P ∈ R
and P is maximal (minimal) w.r.t. ≲v among the elements ofR.
There are, of course, additional properties we may want to impose in order to refine the distributions
produced by the constraints associated with a framework. In particular, we may want to limit the values that
the distribution may take. With some exceptions, most of these restrictions can be expressed as straightfor-
ward constraints in the epistemic graphs. However, one has to observe that in a sense, they are completely
independent of the underlying structure of the graph. Thus, we believe it is more appropriate to view them
as additional, optional properties:
Definition 5.22. A distribution P is:
• minimal iff for every A ∈ Nodes(G), P (A) = 0
• maximal iff for every A ∈ Nodes(G), P (A) = 1
• neutral iff for every A ∈ Nodes(G), P (A) = 0.5
• ternary iff for every A ∈ Nodes(G), P (A) ∈ {0,0.5,1}
• non–neutral5 iff for every A ∈ Nodes(G), P (A) ≠ 0.5
• n–valued iff ∣{x ∣ ∃A ∈ Nodes(G), P (A) = x}∣ = n
We can therefore observe that there are various ways of refining probability distributions. We have
proposed a number of ways we can minimize or maximize different aspects of the distributions, and it is
possible that on certain epistemic graphs they will coincide. However, as the following examples will show,
all of the methods are in principle distinct.
A B C D E
− − −
+
−
−
Figure 10: A labelled graph
Example 34. Let us consider the graph depicted in Figure 10 and the following set of constraints C:
{p(A) > 0.5, p(B)+ p(A) ≤ 1 ∧ p(B)+ p(C) ≤ 1, p(C) ≠ 0.5,
p(C) + p(D) = 1, (p(C) > 0.5 ∧ p(D) < 0.5)→ p(E) = 0.5}
The types of ternary satisfying distributions of our graph are listed in Table 2. We also include an
analysis of which of them are additionally maximizing or minimizing according to a given criterion. We
observe that while only belief in arguments are listed, we only have single distributions producing them.
The patterns set out by P2 and P4 describe distributions that assign probability 1 to the set of formed of
arguments believed with degree 1 and 0 to the rest (e.g. in P2, the probability of {A,D} would be 1 and 0
for everything else). In turn, for P1 and P3, we would assign probability 0.5 to the set of arguments that
are not disbelieved, and additional 0.5 to the set of arguments that are believed (e.g. for P1, {A,C,E} and
{A,C} would be assigned 0.5 and all other sets would be assigned 0). This allows us to easily verify belief
maximizing and minimizing patterns.
5Please note that this property was previously referred to as binary [58].
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Maximizing Minimizing
A B C D E ≲A ≲R ≲I ≲U ≲B ≲A ≲R ≲I ≲U ≲B
P1 1 0 1 0 0.5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × ✓ ✓ ✓ × ✓
P2 1 0 0 1 0 × ✓ ✓ × ✓ ✓ × × ✓ ×
P3 1 0 0 1 0.5 × × × ✓ × ✓ ✓ ✓ × ✓
P4 1 0 0 1 1 ✓ × ✓ × ✓ × ✓ × ✓ ×
Table 2: Types of probability distributions meeting the ternary and satisfaction semantics from Example 34
and their conformity to given maximizing and minimizing semantics.
A B C D E
− − −
−
−
−
Figure 11: A conflict–based argument graph
Example 35. Consider the graph from Figure 11 and the following set of constraints C:
• ϕ1 ∶ p(A) > 0.5
• ϕ2 ∶ (p(B) > 0.5↔ (p(A) < 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5))∧ (p(B) < 0.5↔ (p(A) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.5))
• ϕ3 ∶ (p(C) > 0.5↔ p(D) < 0.5)∧ (p(C) < 0.5↔ p(D) > 0.5)
• ϕ4 ∶ (p(E) > 0.5↔ (p(E) < 0.5 ∧ p(D) < 0.5))∧ (p(E) < 0.5↔ (p(E) > 0.5 ∨ p(D) > 0.5))
• ϕ5 ∶ p(C) > 0.5 ∨ p(D) > 0.5
We obtain two patterns for ternary satisfying distributions, namely P1 s.t. P1(A) = P (C) = 1, P1(B) =
P1(D) = 0, P1(E) = 0.5, and P2 s.t. P2(A) = P2(D) = 1, P2(B) = P2(C) = P2(E) = 0. Both describe
distributions that are also informationminimizing, but onlyP1 fits the undecidedmaximizing requirements.
A B −
Figure 12: A labelled graph showing the distinction between undecided minimizing and belief maximizing
Example 36. Consider the graph depicted in Figure 12 and the following set of constraints C = {p(A) ≥ 0.5,
p(B) + p(¬B) = 1}. For this graph, the distribution P ′1 defined via:
P ′1(∅) = 0 P
′
1({A}) = 0.5 P
′
1({B}) = 0 P
′
1({A,B}) = 0.5
satisfies the constraints and is both undecided minimizing (only B is undecided) and belief maximizing.
However, the distribution P ′2 defined via:
P ′2(∅) = 0.5 P
′
2({A}) = 0 P
′
2({B}) = 0 P
′
2({A,B}) = 0.5
is belief maximizing but not undecided minimizing (both A and B are undecided).
5.5 Case Study
In order to illustrate how epistemic graphs could be acquired for an application, we consider using them as
domain models in persuasive dialogue systems. Recent developments in computational argumentation are
leading to a new generation of persuasion technologies [38]. An automated persuasion system (APS) is a
system that can engage in a dialogue with a user (the persuadee) in order to convince the persuadee to do (or
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A = I should book
regular dental check-ups.
B = Having a regular
check-up will help me
keep my teeth healthy.
E = It is daily brushing
and flossing that really
keeps the teeth healthy.
F = I like to be healthy.
C = I don’t have the
money to pay for a dentist.
G = Dental care is free if
you have a low income.
D = I find having den-
tal check-ups painful.
H = If I let a dental prob-
lem develop, it will be
much more painful.
I = The checkups are painful
because the teeth and gums are
in a bad shape, which is even
more a reason to go to the dentist.
+
−
−
−
+
−
−
−
Figure 13: Epistemic graph for the domain model for a case study on encouraging people to take regular
dental check-ups.
not do) some action or to believe (or not believe) something. The system achieves this by putting forward
arguments that have a high chance of influencing the persuadee. In real-world persuasion, in particular in
applications such as behaviour change, presenting convincing arguments, and presenting counterarguments
to the user’s arguments, is critically important. For example, for a doctor to persuade a patient to drink less
alcohol, that doctor has to give good arguments why it is better for the patient to drink less, and how (s)he
can achieve this.
Two important features of an APS are the domain model and the user model, which are closely related,
and together are harnessed by the APS strategy for optimizing the choice of move in a persuasion dialogue.
Domain model This contains the arguments that can be presented in the dialogue by the system, and it also
contains the arguments that the user may entertain. Some arguments will attack other arguments, and
some arguments will support other arguments. As we will see, the domain model can be represented
by an epistemic graph.
User model This contains information about the user that can be utilized by the system in order to choose
the most beneficial actions. The information in the user model is what the system believes is true
about that user. A key dimension that we consider in the user model are the beliefs that the user may
have in the arguments, and as the dialogue proceeds, the model can be updated [37] based on the
results of the queries and of the arguments posited.
By using an epistemic graph to represent the domain model, and a probability distribution over argu-
ments to represent the user model, we can have a tight coupling of the two kinds of model. Furthermore, the
probability distribution can be harnessed directly in a decision-theoretic approach to optimize the choice
of move [34].
To illustrate the use of epistemic graphs for domain/user modelling, we consider a case study in be-
haviour change. The aim of this behaviour change application is to persuade users to book a regular dental
check-up.
Example 37. Assume we have the graph presented in Figure 13 and that through, for instance, crowdsourc-
ing data, we have learned which constraints should be associated with a given user profile. The obtained
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domain model(s) can now be used in automated persuasion systems, and we assume we are now dealing
with a user of such a system whose profile lead to the selection of the following constraints in order to
describe his or her behaviour:
1. This constraint states that if B is believed or C is disbelieved or D is disbelieved, then A is believed
and vice versa:
(p(B) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) < 0.5 ∨ p(D) < 0.5)↔ p(A) > 0.5
2. This constraint states that if B is at least moderately believed then A is strongly believed, and if B is
at least strongly believed then A is completely believed:
(p(B) > 0.65→ p(A) > 0.8)∧ (p(B) > 0.8→ p(A) = 1)
3. This constraint states that if D is strongly disbelieved then A is at least moderately believed
p(D) < 0.2→ p(A) > 0.65
4. This constraint states that if F is believed then B is at least moderately believed and if F is disbelieved,
then so is B
(p(F) > 0.5→ p(B) > 0.65)∧ (p(F) < 0.5→ p(B) < 0.5)
5. This constraint states that disbelief in C is proportional to belief in G
p(G)+ p(C) ≤ 1
We can use these constraints together with the epistemic graph and probability distribution over the
subsets of arguments to model the agent in a persuasion dialogue. We assume that we want to persuade the
agent to believe argument A, the more the better. The initial belief distribution for such applications can
be obtained through crowdsourcing data about various participants, and for the purpose of our example we
assume that a suitable distribution P0 denoting the initial belief that we think the agent has in the arguments
has been obtained.
Given P0, and the need to get a change in belief in A so that it is believed, we can use constraints 1, 2
and 3 as a guide. In other words, we can either increase the belief in B or decrease the belief in C or D. We
observe that using B can lead to the biggest increase in belief in A. The effect of using Dmay be smaller and
C the smallest. We observe that none of these arguments (and none of their parents) are default covered.
We can thus see this user as being flexible and open to a discussion. If, for instance, F had been default
covered by a constraint p(F) < 0.5, then B would have been default covered as well and putting forward B
could be seen as an ineffective move.
We therefore have three options to explore, and analyzing them is valuable due to the fact that pro-
longed argument exchanges significantly decrease the chances of changing an opinion [72]. Consequently,
exhausting all possible routes may yield negative results, and a persuasion system will need to be able to
optimize the choice of dialogue moves.
Option B By looking at the graph and the labels, we may expect that the increase in belief in B may be
achieved by increasing the belief in F and/or decreasing the belief in E. However, we observe that
even though E is stated to be an attacker of B, analysis of the constraints tells us that it cannot be
anything else than unspecified and that the labeling is inconsistent. This can potentially be the result
of how the user was profiled and what constraints for the graph have been created for the profile (s)he
fitted. By analyzing the constraints, we can observe that increasing the belief in B can only be done
by using argument F (constraint 4).
We can therefore choose to rely on the information in the graph or the information in the constraints.
An optimistic system, which selects the easier and more favourable options, would in this case as-
sume that the learned constraints accurately describe the user. It could, for instance, take Popt as the
predicted probability distribution and determine that using F is a good move6. A more pessimistic
6We note that Popt is one of many possible distributions that could be picked to satisfy the assumed constraints.
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system, which is convinced that if something can go wrong, it will, can consider the learned data to
be incomplete. Thus, E can be seen as a potential attacker, despite being unspecified. The system
could take Ppes as the predicted distribution and decide not to proceed with F due to the potential
chance of failure7.
A B C D E F G H I
P0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.45 0.2 0.4 0.3
Popt 0.85 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.3
Ppes 0.3 0.45 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.3
Option D Making argument D disbelieved will cause A to be believed and based on the information in the
graph, we can suspect that it can be done through increasing the belief in H and/or I. However, once
more we can observe that the graph labeling is not consistent with the constraints and the impact of
H and I on D is in fact unspecified.
We can therefore again choose to rely either on the graph or on the constraints. In a similar fashion
as before, an optimistic system could decide to carry on with presenting either H or I and hope to
observe a decrease in D. A possible predicted distribution Popt associated with presenting I is seen
in the table below. A pessimistic system may choose to abandon this dialogue line due to its potential
ineffectiveness (see predicted distribution Ppes).
A B C D E F G H I
P0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.45 0.2 0.4 0.3
Popt 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.45 0.2 0.4 0.9
Ppes 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.45 0.2 0.4 0.9
Option C We can observe that G is an attacker of C both in the graph and in the constraints. While increas-
ing the belief in G (and thus decreasing the belief in C) yields the smallest gain in A, it may be seen
as the safest way to go given the contrast between the constraints and the graph. Consequently, both
the optimistic and the pessimistic systems can have similar predictions on this route.
A B C D E F G H I
P0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.45 0.2 0.4 0.3
Popt 0.55 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.45 0.6 0.4 0.3
Ppes 0.55 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.45 0.6 0.4 0.3
Note, we do not consider here how the precise value is picked for the update in the belief in each
argument. We direct the interested reader to our work on updates in epistemic graphs [41] and other
relevant materials [37, 43]. We also do not explicitly consider the issue of verifying predicted distributions,
but note that it can be done by, for instance, querying the user during a dialogue [37].
The above case study illustrates how the framework in this paper can be incorporated in a user model,
and then used to guide the choice of moves in a persuasion dialogue.
6 Related Work
The constraints in epistemic graphs quite naturally generalize the epistemic postulates [73, 36, 44, 58].
Given the fact that in the epistemic graphs we can decide whether a given property should hold for a
particular argument or not, the desired postulate needs to be repeated for every element of the framework.
Nevertheless, the general method is straightforward, and using our approach we can elevate the classical
postulates for conflict–based frameworks to a much more general setting. In this section we will focus on
describing in more detail further argumentation approaches which satisfy at least some of the requirements
we have stated in the introduction, and consider some other relevant works.
7We note that Ppes is one of many possible distributions that could be picked to satisfy the assumed constraints.
38
6.1 Weighted and Ranking–Based Semantics
There is a wide array of computational models of argument that allow for modelling argument weights or
strengths [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 20, 21, 46, 64, 29], which offer a more fine–grained alternative for Dung’s
approach. Some of these works also permit certain forms of support or positive influences on arguments
[20, 4, 3, 64, 46]. Given certain structural similarities between these approaches and epistemic semantics,
it is therefore natural to compare them.
Although in both cases what we receive can be seen as “assigning numbers from [0,1]” to arguments
(either as side or end product), probabilities in the epistemic approach are interpreted as belief, while
weights remain abstract and open to a number of possible instantiations. Themeaning that is assigned to the
values is derived from the structure of the graph and comparing weightings or rankings between different
graphs can distort the picture. For instance, given one dense and one sparse graph, it is possible that the
highest grade achieved by any argument in the former graph is the same as the lowest grade achieved in
the latter graph. Given the comparative grades w.r.t. other arguments in the graph, we can therefore make
different judgments about the arguments, which has both its negative as well as positive aspects. In turn,
the belief and disbelief interpretation of probabilities would more uniformly point to a decision.
We also need to note that many of the postulates set out in the weighted and ranking–based methods
are, by design, counter–intuitive in the epistemic approach, even though they can be perfectly applicable
in other scenarios. We can for instance consider the principles from [4]. (Bi-variate) Independence states
that ranking between two arguments should be independent of any other argument that is not connected
to either of them, and any hidden connected epistemic graph would violate this. The same holds for (Bi-
variate) Directionality, which forces the rank of a given argument to depend only on arguments connected
to it through a directed path. (Bi-variate) Equivalence would tell us that the strength of the argument
depends only on the strength of its parents and not arguments that it attacks or supports. This is also clearly
not something we intend to force in epistemic graphs. All further postulates, such as how an increase or
decrease in beliefs in attackers (or supporters) should be matched with an appropriate decrease or increase
in the belief of the target argument, can, but do not have to, be satisfied a given graph. This can be caused
either by the constraints themselves simply not adhering to a given axiom on purpose, or by the constraints
being possibly not very specific. Already a simple formula such as p(A) > 0.5 → p(B) ≤ 0.5, which
embodies one of the core concepts of the classical epistemic approach [73, 36, 44], violates what is referred
to asWeakening and Strengthening. The list continues, however, it should not be taken as a criticism of the
weighted or epistemic approaches, but only as a highlight of striking conceptual differences.
Another major difference between the epistemic graphs and the weighted or ranking semantics is that in
the latter, the patterns set out by the semantics have to be global, which leads to side effects not desirable in
the epistemic approach. In particular, two arguments supported and attacked by the same sets of arguments
will need to be assigned the same value (assuming their initial weights or weights assigned to relations are
similar, if applicable). In other words, it would be contrary to the intuitions of the weighted approach to
have e.g. an attack relation (A,B) described with a constraint p(A)+ p(B) = 1 to co-exist in the same graph
with another attack relation (C,D) described through p(C) > 0.5↔ p(D) ≤ 0.5. The first constraint is more
specific than the second one and describes the attack relation more closely. Although this is generally a
desirable thing, it might not be realistic. For instance, when sourcing epistemic graphs and their constraints
from participants, we have no guarantees that every argument and relation in the graph will be described
with the same quality and consistency. Forcing a uniform modelling would make us either create specific
constraints even for parts of the graph for which the data does not support this, or create general constraints
even for parts where a better description is available. Epistemic graphs aim to bypass this by allowing
varying quality of constraints to be used.
Another property of the weighted and ranking semantics (and that is not enforced in the epistemic
approach) is that given the values of the parents, a single value of the target is returned. This may be a
restriction if we want the flexibility to express a margin of error or vagueness. Depending on how the
constraints are defined in the epistemic approach, we can force the target to take on a single probability
as well as allow it any value from a given range. Consequently, we have a certain form of control over
specificity in the epistemic graphs. A more relaxed approach can be useful in modelling imperfect agents
or incomplete situations, and such tasks can pose certain difficulties to the weighted semantics.
In conclusion, we can observe that despite certain high–level similarities, there are significant dif-
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ferences between the weighted and epistemic approaches. Although one can argue that it is possible to
represent certain weighting functions as constraints and the other way around, particularly if multiplica-
tion or division were allowed in the latter, we would either obtain constraints that violate the meaning of
epistemic probabilities or semantics that do not conform to the required axioms.
6.2 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
Epistemic graphs share certain similarities with abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) [69, 70, 14, 71, 54,
53, 63], particularly when it comes to their ability to express a wide range of relations between arguments.
Before we compare the two approaches, we briefly review ADFs and some of their semantics8.
Definition 6.1. An abstract dialectical framework (ADF) is a tuple (G,L,AC), where (G,L) is a la-
belled graph and AC = {ACA ∣ ACA is a propositional formula over Parent(A)}A∈Nodes(G) is a set of
acceptance conditions.
In the labeling–based semantics for ADFs, we use three–valued interpretations which assign truth val-
ues {t, f ,u} to arguments that are compared according to precision (information) ordering: u ≤i t and
u ≤i f . The pair ({t, f,u},≤i) forms a complete meet–semilattice with the meet operation ⊓ assigning
values in the following way: t ⊓ t = t, f ⊓ f = f and u in all other cases. These notions can be easily
extended to interpretations. For two interpretations v and v′ on Nodes(G), v ≤i v′ iff for every argument
A ∈ Nodes(G), v(A) ≤i v′(A). In the case v is three and v′ two–valued (i.e. contains no u mappings), we
say that v′ extends v9. The set of all two–valued interpretations extending v is denoted [v]2. Given an
acceptance condition ACA for an argument A ∈ Nodes(G) and an interpretation v, we define a shorthand
v(ACA) as value of ACA for vt ∩ Parent(A).
Definition 6.2. Let D = (G,L,AC) be an ADF and v a three-valued interpretation on Nodes(G). The
three–valued characteristic operator of D is a function s.t. Γ(v) = v′ where v′(A) = ⊓w∈[v]2 w(ACA)
for A ∈ Nodes(G). An interpretation v is:
• a complete labeling iff v = Γ(v).
• a preferred labeling iff it is ≤i–maximal admissible labeling.
• a grounded labeling iff it is the least fixpoint of Γ.
E
A
B
C
DE
D ∨ (¬C ∧ E)
¬E
¬A ∨ ¬E
A ∧ B
−
−
+ +
−
+
−
+
+
(a) Example of an ADF
A B C D E CMP PREF GRD
v1 u u u u u ✓ × ✓
v2 t t f f t ✓ ✓ ×
v3 f t t t f ✓ ✓ ×
(b) Labelings of the presented ADF
Figure 14: Example ADF and its complete (CMP), preferred (PREF) and grounded (GRD) labelings.
8We note we use the propositional representation of ADFs [14].
9This means that the elements mapped originally to u are now assigned either t or f .
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Example 38. The admissible, complete, preferred and grounded labelings of the ADF depicted in Figure
14a are visible in Table 14b.
Having an acceptance condition for each node is similar in spirit to having constraints for epistemic
graphs. Furthermore, both frameworks can handle relations that are positive, negative, or neither. However,
there are some fundamental differences between ADFs and epistemic graphs.
The acceptance conditions can tell us whether an argument is accepted or rejected based on the accep-
tance of its parents. In contrast, the epistemic constraints can produce probability assignments in the unit
interval that depend on the degrees of belief in other arguments, which offers a much more fine–grained
perspective. It also allows epistemic graph to easily handle some forms of support, such as the abstract
or deductive supports, which are normally too weak to be expressed in ADFs or require certain transla-
tions [53, 55]. The constraints also allow us to define a range of values that an argument may take on
in given circumstances as well as a single particular value, and thus offers more flexibility in modelling
the acceptability of an argument. Furthermore, in epistemic graphs the constraints are assigned per graph,
not per argument. We can handle situations where the belief in one argument might depend not just on
its parents, but also on other arguments for reasons known only to the agent, without necessarily forcing
edges in the graph to be modified. Additionally, the completeness of acceptance conditions is obligatory in
ADFs, while the completeness of epistemic constraints is optional and requiring it should be motivated by
a given application. This control may be useful in user modelling, where we are not yet sure how a given
argument and its associated relations are perceived by the user.
These differences show that epistemic graphs are quite distinct from ADFs. Nevertheless, it is possible
for epistemic graphs to model ADFs. We will show how this can be achieved based on an example.
Example 39. Let us come back to the ADF from Example 38 and Figure 14a. We will now show how
acceptance conditions can be transformed into constraints s.t. the labelings extracted from the probabilistic
distributions correspond to the ADF labelings under a given semantics.
Let us focus on argument E. If we were to create a truth table for its condition A∧ B, we would observe
that if E is to be accepted, then A and B have to be true, and if E is to be rejected, then A or B has to be
false. Taking into account the nature of the complete semantics, this rather straightforwardly translates to
the following constraints: argument E is believed iff A and B are believed; and, argument E is disbelieved
iff either A or B is disbelieved.
What is therefore happening is that for every (propositional) acceptance condition we create two con-
straints that are the epistemic adaptations of the formulas X ↔ ACX and ¬X ↔ ¬ACX, where, assuming
that the consequent is in a form without nested negations, a positive literal Z is transformed into an epis-
temic atom p(Z) > 0.5 and a negative literal ¬Z becomes p(Z) < 0.5.
We can gather such constraints for all arguments into a set C:
• (p(A) > 0.5↔ p(E) > 0.5) ∧ (p(A) < 0.5↔ p(E) < 0.5)
• (p(B) > 0.5 ↔ p(D) > 0.5 ∨ (p(C) < 0.5 ∧ p(E) > 0.5)) ∧ (p(B) < 0.5 ↔ p(D) < 0.5 ∧ (p(C) >
0.5 ∨ p(E) < 0.5))
• (p(C) > 0.5↔ p(E) < 0.5) ∧ (p(C) < 0.5↔ p(E) > 0.5)
• (p(D) > 0.5↔ p(A) < 0.5 ∨ p(E) < 0.5) ∧ (p(D) < 0.5↔ p(A) > 0.5 ∧ p(E) > 0.5)
• (p(E) > 0.5↔ p(A) > 0.5 ∧ p(B) > 0.5) ∧ (p(E) < 0.5↔ p(A) < 0.5 ∨ p(B) < 0.5)
The ternary satisfying distributions of this set are visible in Table 3. We observe that by transforming
the distributions into labelings that map to t arguments that are believed, f that are disbelieved and u that
are neither, we retrieve the complete labelings of our ADF. By considering distribution maximal or minimal
w.r.t. ≲I we can retrieve the preferred or grounded labelings.
This example shows us that it is possible for the epistemic graphs to handle ADFs under the labeling–
based semantics, even though providing a full translation for any type of condition may be more involved
than the presented approach. Given the fact that ADFs can subsume a number of different frameworks
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P (A) P (B) P (C) P (D) P (E) Sat(C) Max. ≲I Min. ≲I
P1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 ✓ × ✓
P2 1 1 0 0 1 ✓ ✓ ×
P3 0 1 1 1 0 ✓ ✓ ×
Table 3: Ternary satisfying and information maximizing/minimizing distributions for the epistemic graph
from Example 39.
[55], it is also possible for the epistemic graphs to express many more approaches to argumentation than
we recall here.
There are certain generalizations of ADFs that are relevant in the context of our work. In [56], a prob-
abilistic version of ADFs has been introduced. However, this work follows the constellation interpretation
of a probability, not the epistemic one, which leads to significantly different modelling [36, 59]. In a recent
work [16], a new version of weighted ADFs has been proposed, in which conditions no longer map subsets
of parents of a given argument to in or out, but take values assigned to the parents and state a specific
value that should be assigned to the target. These values can be abstract entities with some form of or-
dering between them as well as numbers from the [0,1] interval. The information ordering present in the
original ADFs is then adopted accordingly and then the definition of the existing operator–based semantics
(admissible, grounded, preferred, complete) remains unchanged.
Despite certain possible overlaps, weighted ADFs are incomparable to epistemic graphs. On the one
hand, similarly as in original ADFs, condition completeness and limiting the conditions to depend only
on the parents of a given argument is enforced. Furthermore, unlike epistemic constraints, weighted ac-
ceptance conditions are very specific in the sense that a given combination of values assigned to a given
argument leads to a precise, defined outcome. Therefore, a constraint stating that if the attacker is believed,
then the attackee should be disbelieved (we can formalize it e.g. as p(A) > 0.5 → p(B) < 0.5), cannot
be conveniently expressed in weighted ADFs. This is due to the fact that the belief in the target is meant
to be a function of beliefs of the source, while in epistemic graphs a more general relation is permitted.
Consequently, there are properties expressible with epistemic graphs, but not with weighted ADFs. On
the other hand, weighted ADFs are not specialized for handling probabilities, and therefore can take as
input further unspecified values, not only numbers. Thus, we can construct scenarios handled by weighted
ADFs, but not by epistemic graphs. Additionally, even if values from the [0,1] interval are considered, for
computational reasons they are amended with a special element indicating that a given value is undefined
and the interpretation of this element is different than the one of neither agreeing nor disagreeing in the
epistemic proposal.
6.3 Constrained Argumentation Frameworks
Our proposal shares certain similarities with the constrained argumentation frameworks [28], which permits
external requirements among unrelated arguments to be imposed in the framework. This constraint would
represent certain restrictions that (for reasons unknown to the abstract system) are considered desirable
by, for example, the user, and which are not necessarily reflected by the structure of the graph. Although
this approach has only been analyzed in the context of attack–based graphs, certain positive relationships
between arguments could potentially be simulated through the use of propositional formulae representing
the external requirements. Nevertheless, this modelling is targeted mainly at two–valued semantics, and
thus the framework does not deal with fine–grained acceptability.
Definition 6.3. Let PROPS be a propositional language defined in the usual inductive way from a set S
of propositional symbols, boolean constants ⊺,  and the connectives ¬,∧,∨,↔ and →. A constrained
argumentation framework is a tuple (G,L,PC) where (G,L) is a labelled graph s.t. L assigns only − to
all edges, and PC is a propositional formula from PROPNodes(G).
Semantics of the graph are primarily defined in terms of sets of arguments that, along with meeting
the classical extension-based semantics [31], satisfy the external constraint. Such classical semantics can
be easily retrieved by the epistemic postulates [58, 8], which themselves are straightforwardly generalized
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by epistemic graphs. The propositional formula PC can also be straightforwardly mapped to an epistemic
constraint. We will therefore consider an example showing how constrained argumentation frameworks
can be expressed within epistemic graphs.
A B C D E
− − −
−
−
−
Figure 15: A conflict–based argument graph
Example 40. Consider the graph depicted in Figure 15 and augmented with the constraint PC = ¬A ∨ D.
The admissible extensions (i.e. extensions in which no arguments attack each other and every argument
attacking an argument in the set is itself attacked by an element of the set) of the graph (without the
constraint) are {A,C},{A,D}, {A}, {C}, {D} and ∅. Once the constraint is applied, the sets {A,C} and {A}
have to be removed. The preferred extensions (i.e. maximal admissible extensions) of the graph are initially
{A,C} and {A,D}. However, if we take the constraint into account, we in fact receive {C} and {A,D}.
Following the method from [58], we now create the following set of constraints C:
• p(A) ≥ 0.5
• (p(B) > 0.5→ (p(A) < 0.5 ∧ p(C) < 0.5)) ∧ (p(B) < 0.5→ (p(A) > 0.5 ∨ p(C) > 0.5))
• (p(C) > 0.5↔ p(D) < 0.5) ∧ (p(C) < 0.5↔ p(D) > 0.5)
• (p(E) > 0.5→ (p(D) < 0.5 ∧ p(E) < 0.5)) ∧ (p(E) < 0.5→ (p(D) > 0.5 ∨ p(E) > 0.5))
In Table 4 we have listed all the ternary distributions satisfying C. It is easy to see that the sets of be-
lieved arguments obtained from these distributions coincide with the admissible extensions of our labelled
graph. The epistemic representation of the PC constraint is p(A) ≤ 0.5 ∨ p(D) > 0.5. By adding it to the
set C, we obtain the constraint set C′, which excludes distributions P2, P3, P8 and P9 that corresponded
to extensions {A} and {A,C}. By enforcing information maximality along with the C and C′ constraints,
we obtain either distributions P9 and P13 or P4 and P13, which are associated with the desired preferred
extensions.
Max. w.r.t. ≲I
P (A) P (B) P (C) P (D) P (E) C C′ C C′
P1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 ✓ ✓ × ×
P2 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 ✓ × × ×
P3 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 ✓ × × ×
P4 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 ✓ ✓ × ✓
P5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 ✓ ✓ × ×
P6 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 ✓ ✓ × ×
P7 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 ✓ ✓ × ×
P8 1 0.5 1 0 0.5 ✓ × × ×
P9 1 0 1 0 0.5 ✓ × ✓ ×
P10 1 0.5 0 1 0.5 ✓ ✓ × ×
P11 1 0.5 0 1 0 ✓ ✓ × ×
P12 1 0 0 1 0.5 ✓ ✓ × ×
P13 1 0 0 1 0 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 4: Ternary satisfying and information maximizing distributions associated with the sets of constraints
C and C′ from Example 40.
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6.4 Other Approaches
We conclude our comparison with related work by considering two general approaches in knowledge rep-
resentation and reasoning.
6.4.1 Constraint Satisfaction Problem
Constraint programming [30, 68, 75] is a general problem solving paradigm for modelling and solving hard
search problems. In essence, our approach comprises of a series of constraints that take both probabilistic
and argumentative aspects into account. Thus, the problems we discussed can be captured as constraint
satisfaction problems and existing constraint programming solvers can be used to solve these problems.
Constraint programming is a general approach and we already noted that there are some general notions
in the constraint programming literature that subsume some of our specific notions (such as eliminating
explanations, cf. Definition 5.4). However, our work provides the first proposal for how to turn some
aspects of representing and reasoning with beliefs in arguments into a constraint satisfaction problem. We
provide the language for constraints over belief in arguments, the entailment and consequence relations,
and epistemic semantics.
A concrete formalisation and implementation of our approach using constraint programming technol-
ogy is part of current work. As a first step in this direction, we have considered performing updates in
sub-classes of epistemic graphs as linear optimization problems [41].
6.4.2 Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network (or a causal probabilistic network) is an acyclic directed graph in which each node
denotes a random variable (a variable that can be instantiated with an element from some set of events)
and each arc denotes causal influence of one random variable on another [52, 7]. Random variables can
be used to represent propositions that are either “true” or “false”. For example, if the random variable is
car-battery-is-flat, then it can be instantiated with the event car-battery-is-flat, or the
event ¬car-battery-is-flat.
A key advantage of a Bayesian network is the use of independence assumptions that can be derived
from the graph structure. These independence assumptions allow for the joint probability distribution for
the random variables in a graph to be decomposed into a number of smaller joint probability distributions.
This makes the acquisition and use of probabilistic information much more efficient.
Superficially, there are some similarities between Bayesian networks and epistemic graphs. Both have
a graphical representation of the influence of one node on another where the nodes can be used to represent
statements. Furthermore, the influences by one node on another can change the belief in the target node,
and this change can be either positive or negative.
However, Bayesian networks and epistemic graphs are significantly different in their underlying repre-
sentation and in the way they work as we clarify here:
1. A Bayesian network is used with a single probability distribution whereas the constraints associated
with an epistemic graph allow for multiple probability distributions that satisfy the constraints;
2. A Bayesian network updates a random variable by taking on a specific instantiation, and that there
is no longer any doubt about that instantiation (e.g. in the case of a random variable being updated
by taking on the value “true”, then there is no longer any doubt or uncertainty about the value of the
random variable being “true”), whereas with epistemic graphs, if the belief in a node is updated, it
can be of any value in the unit interval (e.g. for an argument A, that is current believed to degree 0.7,
we may choose to update it to degree 0.3), and so this means epistemic graphs can reflect uncertainty
in updating; and
3. A Bayesian network propagates updates by conditioning, which is a specific kind of constraint (e.g.
for a graph with two variables α and β, after updating α, the propagated belief in β is P (β ∣ α)),
whereas the framework for epistemic graphs provides a rich language for specifying a wide variety
of constraints between the two variables.
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The motivations for Bayesian networks and epistemic graphs are also different. Bayesian networks are
for modelling normative reasoning (i.e. they model how we should reason with a set of random variables
with given set of influences between them). In contrast, epistemic graphs are for modelling non-normative
reasoning, and intended to reflect how people may choose to reason with the uncertainty concerning argu-
ments. So with epistemic graphs, we may model how some people may regard the relative belief in a set
of arguments, but it does not mean that they are correct in any normative sense, rather it is just a way of
modelling their perspective or behaviour.
There are also some proposals for capturing aspects of Bayesian networks in argumentation such as
qualitative probabilistic reasoning [51] and [74]. As with Bayesian networks, they are also concerned with
capturing aspects of normative reasoning, and so have a different aim to epistemic graphs.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have generalized the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation by introducing the
notion of epistemic graphs which define how arguments influence each other through the use of epistemic
constraints. We provided an extensive study of properties of graphs and exemplified their potential use in
practical applications. We have also created a proof theory for reasoning with the constraints that is both
sound and complete, and analyzed various ways in which the constraints can affect arguments and relations
between them. We have also compared our research to other relevant works in argumentation, CSP and
Bayesian networks. Our proposal meets the requirements postulated in the introduction:
Modelling fine–grained acceptability Epistemic graphs can express varying degrees of belief we have
in arguments and these beliefs can be harnessed and restricted through the use of epistemic con-
straints, as seen in Section 5. The beliefs can be easily associated with the traditional notions of
acceptance and rejection of arguments [58] and, in contrast to more abstract forms of scoring and
ranking arguments, provide a clearer meaning of the values associated with arguments.
Modelling positive and negative relations between arguments With epistemic graphs, we can model
various types of relations between arguments, including positive, negative or mixed, as studied in
Section 5.2. Furthermore, they can also handle relations marked as group or binary (for example,
two attackers need to be believed in order for the target to be disbelieved versus at least one attacker
needs to be believed for the target to be disbelieved). Finally, in our analysis of the nature of various
relations, we have also discussed how the views on the influence one argument has over another
change depending on whether local or global perspective is taken into account.
Modelling context–sensitivity Two structurally similar graphs can be assigned different sets of epistemic
constraints. An agent is allowed to have different opinions on similar graphs and adopt them accord-
ing to his or her needs, be it caused by the actual content of the arguments, agent’s preferences or
knowledge, or the way an agent understands the arguments. Thus, there is no requirement for the
same graphs being evaluated in the same fashion under the same epistemic semantics. For example,
we can easily create two different sets of constraints for the two scenarios considered in Example 3
despite the fact that their formal representations are equivalent. Epistemic graphs can also deal with
restrictions that are not necessarily reflected in the structure of the graph.
Modelling different perspectives Agents do not need to adhere to a uniform perspective on a given prob-
lem. They can perceive arguments and relations between them differently, and thus find different
arguments believable or not, such as seen in Examples 1. Furthermore, even arguments sharing some
similarities in their views can respond differently when put in the same situation. Such behaviour
could have been observed in Example 2, and it would not be problematic to create constraints that
handle rejecting certain arguments differently.
Modelling imperfect agents The freedom in defining constraints and beliefs in arguments allows agents
to express their views freely, independently of whether they are deemed rational or not or are strongly
affected by cognitive biases. For example, two logically conflicting arguments do not need to be
accompanied by constraints reflecting this conflict. Furthermore, agents do not necessarily need to
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adhere to various types of semantics [58], and epistemic constraints could be used to grasp their
views more accurately.
Modelling incomplete graphs An argument graph might not reflect all the knowledge an agent has and
that is relevant to a given problem, as seen in Example 2. Consequently, a given argument can be
believed or disbelieved without any apparent justification, as seen in Section 5.5. It is however not
difficult to create constraints stating that a given argument should be assigned a particular score. It is
also possible to not create any constraints at all if it is not known how an agent views the interactions
between arguments, and thus provide no coverage to arguments or relations, as seen in Section 5.1.
Although our analysis of epistemic graphs is extensive, there are still various topics to be considered.
The currently proposed epistemic graph semantics can be further refined in order to take the additional
information contained in the structure of the graph, but not in the constraints, into account. We could, for
example, consider a coverage–based family of semantics, where the status assigned to a given argument
can depend on the level of coverage it possesses.
Another issue we want to explore concerns how the constraints can be obtained. Crowdsourcing opin-
ions on arguments is a popular method for obtaining data [23, 57, 58]. Such data concerning beliefs in
arguments and whether arguments are seen as related could be analyzed with, for example, machine learn-
ing techniques, in order to construct appropriate constraints.
In the future we would like to explore the use of epistemic graphs for practical applications, in particular
for computational persuasion. Applying the existing epistemic approach to modelling persuadee’s beliefs in
arguments has producedmethods for updating beliefs during a dialogue [37, 39, 43], efficient representation
and reasoning with the probabilistic user model [33], modelling uncertainty in belief distributions [40], for
learning belief distributions [35], and harnessing decision rules for optimizing the choice of arguments
based on the user model [34]. These methods can be further developed in the context of epistemic graphs
in order to provide a well understood theoretical and computationally viable framework for applications
such as behaviour change. For a preliminary investigation on how to update beliefs in epistemic graphs,
please see [41].
The epistemic approach is not the only form of probabilistic argumentation. Another popular method
relies on constellation probabilities [47, 36, 32] in which we can consider a number of argument graphs,
each one having a probability of being the “real graph”. Incorporating constellation probabilities in epis-
temic graphs would, for example, allow for a more refined handling of agents whose argument graphs are
not complete but have a chance of containing certain arguments. Furthermore, it is also possible to allow
epistemic constraints to express beliefs in arguments as well as in the relations between them, similarly as
done in [59]. Consequently, further developments of the epistemic graphs are an interesting topic for future
work.
Finally, we will also investigate algorithms and implementations aimed at handling epistemic graphs.
This can be done through devising dedicated solutions as well as by introducing appropriate translations
to, for example, propositional logic, as indicated by the results in Sections 4. Further possibilities concern
employing SMT solvers or constraint logic programming.
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9 Proof Appendix
Lemma 3.8. The following hold:
• If Π is a nonempty restricted value set, then 0 ∈ Π.
• If Π is a reasonable restricted value set, then 0 ∈ Π.
• A restricted value set Π is reasonable iff 1 ∈ Π.
Proof. • If Π is nonempty, then there exists x ∈ [0,1] s.t. x ∈ Π. By the definition of the restricted
value set, x − x ∈ Π. Hence, 0 ∈ Π.
• Let Nodes(G) ≠ ∅. Since Π is reasonable, then Dist(G,Π) ≠ ∅. Hence, there exists P ∈ Dist(G,Π)
and for every X ⊆ Nodes(G), there exist a value y ∈ [0,1] s.t. P (X) = y. Hence, y ∈ Π and Π is
nonempty. Thus, based on the previous part of this proof, 0 ∈ Π.
• If Π is a reasonable restricted value set, then for any nonempty graph, Dist(G,Π) ≠ ∅. Hence, we
can find x1, . . . , xn ∈ Π s.t. ∑ni=1 xi = 1. Since Π is a restricted value set, then x1 + x2 = y1 ∈ Π,
y1 + x3 = y2 ∈ Π, . . . , yn−2 + xn = 1 ∈ Π.
Let Π be a nonempty restricted value set s.t. 1 ∈ Π. By the previous parts of this proof, 0 ∈ Π.
Thus, for any graph G s.t. Nodes(G) ≠ ∅, we can create a trivial distribution P s.t. P (∅) = 1 and
∀X ⊆ Nodes(G) s.t X ≠ ∅, P (X) = 0. Consequently, Dist(G,Π) ≠ ∅ and Π is reasonable.
Proposition 3.9. Let Π be a nonempty restricted value set, x ∈ Π a value, # ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<} an in-
equality, and (∗1, . . . ,∗k) a sequence of operators where ∗i ∈ {+,−} and k ≥ 0. Let max(Π) denote the
maximal value of Π. The following hold:
• Πx# = ∅ if and only if:
1. Π = {0} and# =≠, or
2. # is > and x =max(Π), or
3. # is < and x = 0.
• Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
= ∅ if and only if:
1. k = 0 and Πx
#
= ∅, or
2. k > 0,# is >, x =max(Π) and for no ∗i, ∗i = +, or
3. k > 0,# is > and Π = {0}, or
4. k > 0,# is <, x = 0 and for no ∗i, ∗i = −, or
5. k > 0,# is < and Π = {0}.
6. k > 0,# is ≠, Π = {0}.
Proof. Let us focus on the first case. It is easy to see that if any of the conditions are met, then Πx# = ∅.
What remains to be shown is that if Πx# = ∅, then one of these conditions has to be satisfied. Assume it is
not the case, i.e. Πx# = ∅, but none of the conditions is satisfied.
Let# be <. Then, Πx< = ∅ iff x is equal to the minimal value in the set, which given the nature of Π is
0. We reach a contradiction (option 3). If# is >, we can repeat similar reasoning and reach a contradiction
with option 2. Let # be ≠. Πx≠ = ∅ iff ∣Π∣ = 1. Given the nature of Π, this is only possible when Π = {0}.
We reach a contradiction with option 1. It is easy to see that for# ∈ {=,≥,≤}, Πx
#
≠ ∅.
This proves that Πx
#
= ∅ if and only if one of the listed conditions is met.
Let us now analyze the combination sets. It is easy to verify that if any of the conditions is met, then the
resulting combination set is indeed empty. Let us therefore show that if the combination set is empty, then
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one of the conditions is met. Let us assume that it is not the case, i.e. Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
= ∅ but no condition is
satisfied.
Let Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
= ∅ and assume that k = 0. This means that Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
= {(v) ∣ v ∈ Πx#}. Thus,
Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
is empty iff Πx# is empty. However, this means that we satisfy the first condition and thus
reach a contradiction with our assumptions.
Let Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
= ∅ and assume that k > 0. Since Π is nonempty, then by Lemma 3.8, 0 ∈ Π.
Thus, for any x, any k and any sequence (∗1, . . . ,∗k), we can create a trivial tuple (v1, . . . , vk+1) s.t.
v1 ∗1 v2 . . . vk ∗k vk+1 = x. This is simply achieved by setting v1 = x and vi = 0, where i > 1. Hence, for
# ∈ {≥,≤,=}, clearly Π
x,(∗1,...,∗k)
#
≠ ∅. Let us therefore focus on # ∈ {>,<,≠} and start with >. Let y =
max(Π). If x ≠ y, then y > x, and we can create a sequence (v1, . . . , vk+1) s.t. v1 ∗1 v2 . . . vk ∗k vk+1 > x
by setting v1 = y and vi = 0, where i > 1. Hence, we reach a contradiction for this case. If x = y, then
if y ≠ 0 (recall that values from Π belong in the unit interval), then y + y > x. Consequently, if there is
at least one j s.t. ∗j = +, we can create a sequence (v1, . . . , vk+1) s.t. v1 ∗1 v2 . . . vk ∗k vk+1 > x by
setting v1 = vj = y and vi = 0, where i > 1 and i ≠ j. If there is no addition present (i.e. we only have
subtractions), then it is easy to see that the maximal value we can obtain from our formula is when v1 = y
and the remaining values are set to 0. Thus, in this case, v1 ∗1 v2 . . . vk ∗k vk+1 = y and since x = y, then
our combination set is empty. However, this scenario coincides with one of our conditions that was not
supposed to be satisfied, and we reach a contradiction. We are therefore left with the case where x = y = 0.
Since y = max(Π), then clearly Π = {0} and independently of the used arithmetic operators and values,
every formula will always amount to 0. Since 0 /> 0, our combination set is empty. However, this scenario
is again covered by one of our conditions and we reach a contradiction.
Let us now focus on <. It is easy to see that since 0 ∈ Π, then as long as x ≠ 0, we can observe that
v1 ∗1 v2 . . . vk ∗k vk+1 < x for vi = 0. Hence, in such a case, the combination set would never be empty.
Thus, consider the case where x = 0. IfΠ = {0}, then the smallest value obtainable by v1∗1v2 . . . vk∗kvk+1
is 0, and the combination set is therefore empty. However, this is already covered by one of our conditions,
and we reach a contradiction. If Π ≠ {0}, then as long as there is at least one ∗j s.t. ∗j = −, we can
obtain a formula producing a value smaller than 0 and the combination set is nonempty. If the sequence of
operations does not contain any subtractions, then the smallest value obtainable by v1 ∗1 v2 . . . vk ∗k vk+1
is again 0, and the combination set is empty. However, this again is covered by one of our conditions and
we reach a contradiction.
Finally, we can consider ≠. Let y =max(Π). If y ≠ 0 and x ≠ y, then a tuple s.t. the first position is y
and every other value is 0 will be in the combination set irrespective of the sequence of operators. If y ≠ 0
and x = y, then a tuple of 0’s will be in the combination set irrespective of the sequence of operators. If
y = 0 then Π = {0} and therefore x = 0 as well. In this case, independently of the sequence of operators,
every possible formula will evaluate to 0 and the combination set will be empty. However, this case is
covered by one of our conditions, and we reach a contradiction.
Therefore, we have shown that the combination set is empty iff one of our conditions is met.
Proposition 3.12. Let P ∈ Dist(G) be a probability distribution and ϕP its associated epistemic formula.
Then {P} = Sat(ϕP ).
Proof. Let us assume that the arguments in G are ordered according to some ordering. LetAComplete(G) =
{c1, . . . , cj} be the collection of all argument complete propositional formulae for G and ϕP = p(c1) =
x1 ∧ p(c2) = x2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = xj , where xi = P (ci), the epistemic formula associated with P .
By definition, P is an assignment, where the elements of the powerset of arguments are mapped to
numerical values s.t. these values add up to 1. Every set of arguments in the powerset can be described
with a binary number, where if an i-th digit is 1, then the i-th argument is in the set, and it if its 0, then
it is not in the set. We can observe that every argument complete formula has precisely one model which
is trivially constructed – if the i-th argument appears as a positive literal in the formula, then it is in the
model, if it appears as a negative literal, then it is not in the model.
We can therefore observe that a given complete formula encodes precisely one set of arguments from
the powerset and the epistemic atom involving it demands that the value assigned to the formula is the same
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as the value assigned to the corresponding set by the probability distribution. It is therefore easy to see that
ϕP is satisfied only by P . Hence, {P} = Sat(ϕP ).
Proposition 3.14. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set, ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π) be a restricted epis-
temic formula and ϕ its distribution disjunctive normal form. Then Sat(ψ,Π) = Sat(ϕ,Π).
Proof. Assume Sat(ψ,Π) = ∅. Then, ϕ ∶  and Sat(,Π) = ∅. Hence, Sat(ψ,Π) = Sat(ϕ,Π).
Assume Sat(ψ,Π) ≠ ∅. Let ϕ ∶ ϕP1 ∨ϕP2 . . .∨ϕPn . Then, Sat(ϕ,Π) = Sat(ϕP1 ,Π)∪Sat(ϕP2 ,Π)∪
. . . ∪ Sat(ϕPn ,Π). Since Pi ∈ Sat(ψ,Π), then Pi ∈ Dist(G,Π) as well. Thus, based on Proposition 3.12,
Sat(ϕPi ,Π) = {Pi}. We can therefore show that Sat(ϕ,Π) = {P1, . . . , Pn} = Sat(ψ,Π).
Proposition 4.3. Let Π be a restricted value set, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π) a set of epistemic formulae, and
ψ ∈ EFormulae(G) an epistemic formula. If Φ ⊫ ψ then Φ⊫Π ψ.
Proof. Assume Φ ⊫ ψ. Therefore, Sat(Φ) ⊆ Sat(ψ). Therefore, Sat(Φ) ∩ Dist(G,Π) ⊆ Sat(ψ) ∩
Dist(G,Π). Therefore, Sat(Φ,Π) ⊆ Sat(ψ,Π). Therefore, Φ⊫Π ψ.
Proposition 4.4. Let Π1 ⊆ Π2 be restricted value sets, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π1) a set of epistemic formulae,
and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G) an epistemic formula. If Φ⊫Π2 ψ then Φ⊫Π1 ψ.
Proof. Let X,Y,W,Z be sets of elements s.t. W ⊆ Z . It is easy to show that if X ∩ Z ⊆ Y ∩ Z , then
X ∩ Z ∩W ⊆ Y ∩ Z ∩W . Since, W ⊆ Z , then X ∩ Z ∩W = X ∩W and Y ∩ Z ∩W = Y ∩W . Thus,
X ∩Z ⊆ Y ∩Z impliesX ∩W ⊆ Y ∩W whenW ⊆ Z .
We can show that if Π1 ⊆ Π2, then Dist(Π1) ⊆ Dist(Π2). Hence, using the above analysis, it is easy
to prove that if Sat(Φ) ∩Dist(Π2) ⊆ Sat(ψ) ∩Dist(Π2) then Sat(Φ) ∩Dist(Π1) ⊆ Sat(ψ) ∩Dist(Π1).
Thus, Φ⊫Π2 ψ then Φ⊫Π1 ψ.
Proposition 4.6. For epistemic atoms ϕ1 = f1#x and ϕ2 = f2#x in EFormulae(G,Π), the following
hold:
• if ϕ1 ⪰
+
su ϕ2 and# ∈ {>,≥} then Sat(ϕ1) ⊆ Sat(ϕ2), and if # ∈ {<,≤}, then Sat(ϕ2) ⊆ Sat(ϕ1)
• if ϕ1 ⪰
−
su ϕ2 and# ∈ {<,≤} then Sat(ϕ1) ⊆ Sat(ϕ2), and if # ∈ {>,≥}, then Sat(ϕ2) ⊆ Sat(ϕ1)
Proof. Let f1 ∶ p(α1) ∗1 p(α2) ∗2 . . . ∗m−1 p(αm), and f2 ∶ p(β1) ⋆1 p(β2) ⋆2 . . . ⋆l−1 p(βl), where
αi, βi ∈ Terms(G) and ∗i,⋆i ∈ {+,−}, be operational formulae. Let ϕ1 = f1#x and ϕ2 = f2#x, where
# ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<} and x ∈ [0,1].
• Let p(αi) be the element that became weakened to p(α
′
i) (i.e. βi = α
′
i). Since {αi} ⊢ α
′
i, then
for any probability distribution P it holds that P (αi) ≤ P (α
′
i). Therefore, for any probability
distribution P , P (α1)∗1P (α2)∗2 . . .+P (αi)∗i . . .∗m−1P (αm) ≤ P (α1)∗1P (α2) . . .+P (α
′
i)∗i
. . . ∗m−1 P (αm). Consequently, if P (α1) ∗1 P (α2) ∗2 . . . +P (αi) ∗i . . . ∗m−1 P (αm)#x, where
# ∈ {>,≥}, then P (α1) ∗1 P (α2) . . . + P (α
′
i) ∗i . . . ∗m−1 P (αm)#x as well. Hence, for every
P ′ ∈ Sat(ϕ1), P
′ ∈ Sat(ϕ2) as well, and it holds that Sat(ϕ1) ⊆ Sat(ϕ2). Furthermore, if P (α1)∗1
P (α2)∗2 . . .+P (α
′
i)∗i . . .∗m−1P (αm)#x, where# ∈ {<,≤}, then P (α1)∗1P (α2) . . .+P (αi)∗i
. . .∗m−1 P (αm)#x as well. Hence, for every P
′ ∈ Sat(ϕ2), P
′ ∈ Sat(ϕ1) as well, and it holds that
Sat(ϕ2) ⊆ Sat(ϕ1).
• Let p(αi) be the element that becameweakened to p(α
′
i) (i.e. βi = α
′
i). Since {αi} ⊢ α
′
i, then for any
probability distribution P it holds that P (αi) ≤ P (α
′
i). Therefore, for any probability distributionP ,
P (α1)∗1P (α2)∗2 . . .−P (αi)∗i . . .∗m−1P (αm) ≥ P (α1)∗1P (α2) . . .−P (α
′
i)∗i . . .∗m−1P (αm).
Therefore, if P (α1) ∗1 P (α2) ∗2 . . . − P (αi) ∗i . . . ∗m−1 P (αm)#x, where # ∈ {<,≤}, then
P (α1) ∗1 P (α2) . . . − P (α
′
i) ∗i . . . ∗m−1 P (αm)#x as well. Hence, for every P
′ ∈ Sat(ϕ1), P
′ ∈
Sat(ϕ2) as well, and it holds that Sat(ϕ1) ⊆ Sat(ϕ2). Furthermore, ifP (α1)∗1P (α2) . . .−P (α
′
i)∗i
. . .∗m−1P (αm)#x, where# ∈ {>,≥} then P (α1)∗1P (α2)∗2 . . .−P (αi)∗i . . .∗m−1P (αm)#x
as well. Hence, for every P ′ ∈ Sat(ϕ2), P
′ ∈ Sat(ϕ1) as well, and it holds that Sat(ϕ2) ⊆ Sat(ϕ1).
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Tomake certain proofsmore readable, we also introduce the following derivable rules (a more extensive
set can be found in [42]).
Proposition 9.1. Let # ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<} be the set of inequality relationships, let Π be a reasonable
restricted value set, and let Πx# = {y ∈ Π ∣ y#x} be the subset obtained according to the value x and
relationship#. Let f1 ∶ p(α1)∗1 p(α2)∗2 . . .∗k−1 p(αk) and f2 ∶ p(β1)⋆1 p(β2)⋆2 . . .⋆l−1 p(βl), where
k, l ≥ 1, αi, βi ∈ Terms(G) and ⋆j ,∗i ∈ {+,−} be operational formulae. The following hold, where ⊢ is
propositional consequence relation, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π), φ,ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π) and x ∈ Π.
1. Φ ⊩Π p(α) ≥ 0
2. Φ ⊩Π p(α) ≤ 1
3. Φ ⊩Π p(⊺) = 1
4. Φ ⊩Π p() = 0
5. Φ ⊩Π f1 > x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 ≤ x)
6. Φ ⊩Π f1 < x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 ≥ x)
7. Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 > x)
8. Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 < x)
9. Φ ⊩Π f1 = x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 ≠ x)
10. Φ ⊩Π f1 ≠ x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 = x)
11. Φ ⊩Π f1 = x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 ≥ x
12. Φ ⊩Π f1 = x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 ≤ x
13. Φ ⊩Π f2 = x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x
14. Φ ⊩Π f2 = x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x
15. if f1 ⪰
+
su f2 and f2 ⪰
+
su f1, then Φ ⊩Π f1 = x iff Φ ⊩Π f2 = x
16. if f1 ⪰
−
su f2 and f2 ⪰
−
su f1, then Φ ⊩Π f1 = x iff Φ ⊩Π f2 = x
17. Φ ⊩Π f1 = x ∧ f1 = y where x ≠ y iff Φ ⊩Π 
18. Φ ⊩Π p(α ∨ β) = x iff Φ ⊩Π p(α) + p(β) − p(α ∧ β) = x
19. Φ ⊩Π p(α ∧ β) = x iff Φ ⊩Π p(α) + p(β) − p(α ∨ β) = x
Proof. 1. We prove that Φ ⊩Π p(α) ≥ 0. We can observe that Φ ⊩Π ⊺ by propositional rule P2. Thus,
by combining the propositional rules and the basic rule B1, Φ ⊩Π p(α) ≥ 0.
2. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π p(α) ≤ 1 similarly to previous point.
3. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π p(⊺) = 1 similarly to previous points.
4. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π p() = 0 similarly to previous points.
5. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 > x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 ≤ x) using enumeration rules E1 and E2.
6. We prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 < x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 ≥ x) using enumeration rules E1 and E4.
7. We prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 > x) using enumeration rules E1 and E3.
8. We prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 < x) using enumeration rules E1 and E5.
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9. We prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 = x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 ≠ x). Using the propositional rules we can show that
Φ ⊩Π f1 = x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(¬(f1 = x)). We can use enumeration and propositional rules to show that
Φ ⊩Π ¬(¬(f1 = x)) iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(¬(f1 ≥ x ∧ f1 ≤ x)). This, by the propositional rules and previous
parts of this proof, is equivalent to Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 < x ∨ f1 > x)), which through the enumeration rule
is the same as Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 ≠ x).
10. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 ≠ x iff Φ ⊩Π ¬(f1 = x) using the previous point and the propositional
rules.
11. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 = x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 ≥ x using the previously proved
rule Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x iff Φ ⊩Π f1 > x ∨ f1 = x, subject rule S2 and the propositional rules.
12. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π f1 = x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f2 ≤ x using the previously proved
rule Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x iff Φ ⊩Π f1 < x ∨ f1 = x, subject rule S4 and the propositional rules.
13. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π f2 = x and f1 ⪰+su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 ≤ x using the previously proved
rule Φ ⊩Π f2 ≤ x iff Φ ⊩Π f2 < x ∨ f2 = x, subject rule S6 and the propositional rules.
14. We can prove that Φ ⊩Π f2 = x and f1 ⪰−su f2 implies Φ ⊩Π f1 ≥ x using the previously proved
rule Φ ⊩Π f2 ≥ x iff Φ ⊩Π f2 > x ∨ f2 = x, subject rule S8 and the propositional rules.
15. We now prove that if f1 ⪰
+
su f2 and f2 ⪰
+
su f1, then Φ ⊩Π f1 = x iff Φ ⊩Π f2 = x. Using
the previous points of this proof and the propositional rule P1, we can show that if f1 ⪰
+
su f2 and
f2 ⪰
+
su f1, then Φ ⊩Π f2 ≥ x ∧ f2 ≤ x. We can use propositional and enumeration rules to show that
this is equivalent Φ ⊩Π f2 = x. The right to left direction can be proved in a similar fashion.
16. We can show that if f1 ⪰
−
su f2 and f2 ⪰
−
su f1, then Φ ⊩Π f1 = x iff Φ ⊩Π f2 = x, similarly as the
previous point.
17. We now prove thatΦ ⊫Π f1 = x∧f1 = y where x ≠ y iffΦ ⊫Π . Assume thatΠ = {z1, . . . , zm} and
that x = zi and y = zj where i ≠ j. Through repeated use of enumeration rule E1 and propositional
rules, we can show that if Φ⊫Π f1 = x∧f1 = y then Φ⊫Π f1 = zi∧(f1 = z1∨ . . .∨f1 = zi−1∨f1 =
zi+1∨ . . .∨f1 = zm), which is equivalent to Φ ⊫Π f1 = zi ∧f1 ≠ zi. This, through derivable rule 10,
is equivalent to Φ ⊫Π f1 = zi ∧ ¬f1 = zi and, through the propositional rule, to Φ ⊫Π . The right
to left direction can be easily proved from the propositional rules. Therefore, Φ ⊫Π f1 = x ∧ f1 = y
where x ≠ y iff Φ ⊫Π .
18. We show that Φ ⊩Π p(α ∨ β) = x iff Φ ⊩Π p(α) + p(β) − p(α ∧ β) = x. Let us consider the
left to right direction and assume that Φ ⊩Π p(α ∨ β) = x. Based on the probabilistic rule PR1,
Φ ⊩Π p(α ∨ β) − p(α) − p(β) + p(α ∧ β) = 0, which using enumeration rule E1 can be written
as Φ ⊩Π ⋁(v1,v2,v3,v4)∈Π0,(−,−,+)= (p(α ∨ β) = v1 ∧ p(α) = v2 ∧ p(β) = v3 ∧ p(α ∧ β) = v4) (we
observe that based on Proposition 3.9, Π
0,(−,−,+)
= ≠ ∅). Through the use of propositional rule P1,
Φ ⊩Π p(α∨β) = x∧⋁(v1,v2,v3,v4)∈Π0,(−,−,+)= (p(α∨β) = v1∧p(α) = v2∧p(β) = v3∧p(α∧β) = v4).
Through the use of propositional rule (in particular, distributive and identity laws) and derivable rule
17, we can observe that the above formula is equivalent to Φ ⊩Π ⋁(x,v2,v3,v4)∈Π0,(−,−,+)= (p(α ∨ β) =
x ∧ p(α) = v2 ∧ p(β) = v3 ∧ p(α ∧ β) = v4). This can be further shown to be equivalent to
Φ ⊩Π p(α ∨ β) = x ∧⋁(v1,v2,v3)∈Πx,(+,−)= (p(α) = v1 ∧ p(β) = v2 ∧ p(α ∧ β) = v3) and therefore to
Φ ⊩Π p(α∨β) = x∧ (p(α) + p(β) − p(α∧β) = x) through the use of enumeration rule E1. Hence,
by P1, Φ ⊩Π p(α) + p(β) − p(α ∧ β) = x. The right to left direction can be proved in a similar
fashion.
19. We can show that Φ ⊩Π p(α ∧ β) = x iff Φ ⊩Π p(α) + p(β) − p(α ∨ β) = x in the same way as the
previous point of this proof.
Proposition 4.8. Let Π be a restricted value set. For Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π), and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π), if
Φ ⊩Π ψ then Φ ⊫Π ψ.
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Proof. We can show that each proof rule is sound. We first consider the basic rules:
• Consider proof rule 1. We need to show that Φ ⊫Π p(α) ≥ 0 iff Φ ⊫Π ⊺. We can observe that
Sat(⊺,Π) = Dist(Π). Furthermore, by definition, Sat(p(α) ≥ 0,Π) = {P ′ ∈ Dist(G) ∣ P ′(α) ≥
0} ∩ Dist(Π). It is easy to see that {P ′ ∈ Dist(G) ∣ P ′(α) ≥ 0} = Dist(G) for any α. Since
Dist(Π) ⊆ Dist(G), Sat(p(α) ≥ 0,Π) = Dist(Π) = Sat(⊺,Π). Thus, we can show that Φ ⊫Π
p(α) ≥ 0 iff Φ ⊫Π ⊺.
• Proof rules 2 to 4 can be proved in a similar fashion.
We now consider the enumeration rules:
• Consider proof rule 1. We need to show that Φ ⊫Π f1#x iff Φ ⊫Π ⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)#
(p(α1) =
v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk) if Π
x,AOp(f1)
#
≠ ∅ and Φ ⊫Π  otherwise. We first consider
# being > and start with the case where Π
x,AOp(f1)
> = ∅. Based on Proposition 3.9 and the fact that
{0,1} ⊆ Π (note that Π is a reasonable restricted value set), it therefore holds that x = 1 and either
AOp(f1) = () or for no ∗i, ∗i = +. If AOp(f1) = (), then f1 ∶ p(α1) > 1 and it is easy to see that
Sat(p(α1) > 1,Π) = ∅ = Sat(,Π). If for every ∗i, ∗i = −, then based on the fact that probabilities
belong to the unit interval, p(α1) − p(α2) − . . . − p(αk) ≤ p(α1). Hence, if Sat(p(α1) > 1,Π) = ∅,
then Sat(f1 > 1,Π) = ∅ as well. Thus, if Π
x,AOp(f1)
> = ∅, Φ ⊫Π f1#x iff Φ⊫Π .
Now consider the case whereΠ
x,AOp(f1)
#
≠ ∅. For every P ′ ∈ Sat(f1 > x,Π), P
′(α1)∗1P
′(α2)∗2
. . . ∗k−1 P
′(αk) > x. Consequently, (P
′(α1), . . . , P
′(αk)) ∈ Π
x,AOp(f1)
> . We can therefore show
that Sat(f1 > x,Π) ⊆ Sat(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)> (p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk),Π).
Let now P ′ ∈ Sat(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)>
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . .∧ p(αk) = vk),Π). Based on
the properties of Sat, it means that there is (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ Π
x,AOp(f1)
> s.t. P
′ ∈ Sat((p(α1) = v1 ∧
p(α2) = v2∧. . .∧p(αk) = vk),Π). Since v1∗1v2∗2. . .∗k−1vk > x, thenP
′(α1)∗1P
′(α2)∗2. . .∗k−1
P ′(αk) > x. Hence, P
′ ∈ Sat(f1 > x,Π), and we can show that Sat(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)>
(p(α1) =
v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk),Π) ⊆ Sat(f1 > x,Π). Given the previous result, Sat(f1 >
x,Π) = Sat(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)> (p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk),Π) and therefore
Φ ⊫Π f1 > x iff Φ ⊫Π ⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)> (p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk). The
results for other operators can be obtained in a similar fashion.
• Consider proof rule 2. We need to show thatΦ⊫Π f1 > x iffΦ⊫Π ¬(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)≤
(p(α1) =
v1∧p(α2) = v2∧. . .∧p(αk) = vk)). For everyP
′ ∈ Sat(f1 > x,Π), it holds thatP
′(α1)∗1P
′(α2)∗2
. . . ∗k−1 P
′(αk) > x. Consequently, we can observe that (P
′(α1), . . . , P
′(αk)) ∈ Π
x,AOp(f1)
> and
(P ′(α1), . . . , P
′(αk)) ∉ Π
x,AOp(f1)
≤ . Hence, it holds that
Sat(f1 > x,Π) ⊆ Sat(⊺,Π)∖Sat( ⋁
(v1,...,vk)∈Π
x,AOp(f1)
≤
(p(α1) = v1∧p(α2) = v2∧. . .∧p(αk) = vk),Π)
= Sat(¬( ⋁
(v1,...,vk)∈Π
x,AOp(f1)
≤
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk)),Π)
Let now P ′ ∈ Sat(¬(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)≤
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk)),Π). This
means that P ′ ∈ Sat(⊺,Π) ∖ Sat(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)≤
(p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) =
vk),Π). Hence, for every P
′, P ′(α1)∗1P
′(α2)∗2 . . .∗k−1P
′(αk) > x and therefore P
′ ∈ Sat(f1 >
x,Π). Given the previous result, this means that Sat(f1 > x,Π) = Sat(¬(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)≤
(p(α1) =
v1∧p(α2) = v2∧. . .∧p(αk) = vk)),Π). Hence,Φ⊫Π f1 > x iffΦ⊫Π ¬(⋁(v1,...,vk)∈Πx,AOp(f1)≤
(p(α1) =
v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = vk)).
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• Soundness for the proof rules 3 to 5 is obtained in the same way as for rule 2. For rule 3, we observe
that ifΠ
x,AOp(f1)
< = ∅, then based on the properties ofΠ, x = 0 and eitherAOp(f1) = () or for no ∗i,
∗i = −. If AOp(f1) = (), then f1 ∶ p(α1) ≥ 0 is a tautology based on the basic rules (and is therefore
equivalent to ¬). If for every ∗i, ∗i = +, then we can observe that p(α1) ≤ p(α1) + . . . + p(αk),
hence Sat(p(α1) + . . . + p(αk) ≥ 0,Π) = Sat(⊺,Π) = Sat(¬). Similar observations can be made
for rule 5.
The soundness of the subject rules can be easily proved by using Proposition 4.6.
We now consider the probabilistic rule. We can observe that for any probability distribution P and
terms α,β ∈ Terms(G), P (α ∨ β) = P (α) + P (β) − P (α ∧ β). This can be easily checked by analyzing
the definition of the probability of a term. Thus, it holds that Sat(p(α ∨ β) − p(α) − p(β) + p(α ∧ β) =
0,Π) = Dist(G,Π). Since for any set of probabilistic formulae Φ, Sat(Φ,Π) ⊆ Dist(G,Π), it holds that
Φ⊫Π p(α ∨ β) − p(α) − p(β) + p(α ∧ β) = 0.
We now consider the propositional rules.
• Assume Φ ⊫Π φ1 and .... and Φ ⊫Π φn and {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊢ ψ. So for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Sat(Φ,Π) ⊆ Sat(φi,Π). Furthermore, based on the definition of Sat, if {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊢ ψ, then it
holds that Sat({φ1, . . . , φn}) ⊆ Sat(ψ). Hence, Sat({φ1, . . . , φn},Π) ⊆ Sat(ψ,Π) as well. There-
fore, Sat(Φ,Π) ⊆ Sat(ψ,Π). Hence, Φ⊫Π ψ.
• AssumeΦ ⊢ ϕ. Consequently, Sat(Φ) ⊆ Sat(ϕ). Hence, Sat(Φ,Π) ⊆ Sat(ϕ,Π) as well. Therefore,
Φ⊫Π ϕ.
We have therefore shown that every rule in our system is sound. Hence, the system is sound as well.
In order to prove Proposition 4.9, we also consider the following intermediate results:
Proposition 9.2. Let # ∈ {=,≠,≥,≤,>,<} be the set of inequality relationships, let Π be a reasonable
restricted value set, and let Πx# = {y ∈ Π ∣ y#x} be the subset obtained according to the value x and
relationship#. Let AComplete(G) = {c1, . . . , cj} be the collection of all argument complete propositional
formulae for G and TΠv,k = Π
v,(+,...,+)
= s.t. the length of (+, . . . ,+) is k − 1 be the collection of k–tuples of
values from Π that sum up to v ∈ Π. The following hold, where ⊢ is propositional consequence relation,
Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π), φ,ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π) and x ∈ Π:
1. for consistent formulae α1, . . . αm ∈ Terms(G), if for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤m s.t. i ≠ j it holds that αi ∧αj ⊢
, then Φ ⊩Π p(α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αm) = x iff Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ1,...,τm)∈TΠx,m(p(α1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αm) = τm)
2. Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ1,...,τj)∈TΠ1,j (p(c1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = τj)
Proof. 1. We prove this property by induction. We show the cases for m = 1 and, for clarity, m = 2,
and then prove that if the property holds form = k, then it holds form = k + 1 as well.
• Let us start with m = 1. Since TΠv,1 = Π
v,()
= , the rule states that Φ ⊩Π p(α1) = v iff Φ ⊩Π
p(α1) = v, which is clearly true.
• Let m = 2. We start with the left to right direction. By derivable rule 18, it holds that Φ ⊩Π
p(α1 ∨ α2) = x iff Φ ⊩Π p(α1 ∧ α2) − p(α1) − p(α2) = x. By enumeration rule E1, this is
equivalent to Φ ⊩Π ⋁(v1,v2,v3)∈Πx,(+,−)= (p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ p(α1 ∧α2) = v3) (we note
that based on Proposition 3.9 and the properties of Π, Π
x,(+,−)
= ≠ ∅). Since α1 ∧ α2 ⊢  by
assumption, then based on derivable rule 4 and P1 we can observe that for any (v1, v2, v3) ∈
Π
x,(+,−)
= s.t. v3 ≠ 0, (p(α1) = v1∧p(α2) = v2∧p(α1∧α2) = v3) is equivalent to . Thus, using
the propositional rule P1 once more, this is equivalent to Φ ⊩Π ⋁(v1,v2,0)∈Πx,(+,−)= (p(α1) =
v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2 ∧ p(α1 ∧ α2) = 0). Since p(α1 ∧ α2) = 0 is a tautology, then again by P1,
it holds that Φ ⊩Π ⋁(v1,v2,0)∈Πx,(+,−)= (p(α1) = v1 ∧ p(α2) = v2), which is exactly Φ ⊩Π
⋁(τ1,τ2)∈TΠx,2(p(α1) = τ1 ∧ p(α2) = τ2). The right to left direction can be shown in a similar
fashion.
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• Assume that for m = k our property is true, i.e. if our assumptions hold, then Φ ⊩Π p(α1 ∨
. . . ∨ αk) = x iff Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ1,...,τk)∈TΠx,k(p(α1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τk). We need to show
that for m = k + 1, if our assumptions hold, then Φ ⊩Π p(α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αk+1) = x iff Φ ⊩Π
⋁(τ1,...,τk+1)∈TΠx,k+1(p(α1) = τ1 ∧ . . .∧p(αk+1) = τk+1). We focus on the left to right direction
first. By derivable rule 18, it holds that Φ ⊩Π p(α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αk+1) = x iff Φ ⊩Π p(α1 ∨ . . . ∨
αk) + p(αk+1) − p((α1 ∨ . . . ∨αk) ∧ αk+1) = x. By enumeration rule E1, this is equivalent to
Φ ⊩Π ⋁(v1,v2,v3)∈Πx,(+,−)= (p(α1∨. . .∨αk) = v1∧p(αk+1) = v2∧p((α1∨. . .∨αk)∧αk+1) = v3)
(we note that based on Proposition 3.9 and the properties of Π, Π
x,(+,−)
= ≠ ∅).
Given that for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, αk+1 ∧ αi ⊢ , then based on derivable rule 4 and propositional
rule P1 we can observe that for any (v1, v2, v3) ∈ Π
v,(+,−)
= s.t. v3 ≠ 0, (p(α1 ∨ . . .∨αk) = v1 ∧
p(αk+1) = v2∧p((α1∨. . .∨αk)∧αk+1) = v3) is equivalent to . Thus, using the propositional
rule P1 once more, our formula is equivalent to Φ ⊩Π ⋁(v1,v2,0)∈Πv,(+,−)= (p(α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αk) =
v1∧p(αk+1) = v2∧p((α1∨ . . .∨αk)∧αk+1) = 0). Since (α1∨ . . .∨αk)∧αk+1) is equivalent
to , then p((α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αk) ∧ αk+1) = 0 is a tautology. Thus, again by P1, our formula is
equivalent to Φ ⊩Π ⋁(v1,v2,0)∈Πv,(+,−)= (p(α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αk) = v1 ∧ p(αk+1) = v2), which is the
same as Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ1,τ2)∈TΠx,2(p(α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αk) = τ1 ∧ p(αk+1) = τ2). Since the proposition
holds form = k by assumption, then our formula is equivalent to:
Φ ⊩Π ⋁
(τ1,τ2)∈TΠx,2
(( ⋁
(τ ′1,...,τ
′
k
)∈TΠ
τ1,k
(p(α1) = τ
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′
k)) ∧ p(αk+1) = τ2)
Now, as Π is finite, then so is TΠx,2. Let us assume that T
Π
x,2 is of the form {(τ1,1, τ2,1),
(τ1,2, τ2,2), . . ., (τ1,p, τ2,p)}. Our formula can therefore be rewritten as
Φ ⊩Π (( ⋁
(τ ′1,1,...,τ
′
k,1
)∈TΠ
τ1,1,k
(p(α1) = τ
′
1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′
k,1)) ∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,1)
∨ . . .∨
(( ⋁
(τ ′1,p,...,τ
′
k,p
)∈TΠ
τ1,p,k
(p(α1) = τ
′
1,p ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′
k,p)) ∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,p)
Now, as Π is finite, then so is every TΠτ1,i,k for i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Assume that ∣T
Π
τ1,i,k
∣ = li and
therefore that every TΠτ1,i,k is of the form {(τ
′1
1,i, . . . , τ
′1
k,i), . . . , (τ
′li
1,i, . . . , τ
′li
k,i)}. Thus, our
formula can again be rewritten as:
Φ ⊩Π (((p(α1) = τ
′1
1,1 ∧ . . .∧p(αk) = τ
′1
k,1)∨ . . .∨(p(α1) = τ
′l1
1,1 ∧ . . .∧p(αk) = τ
′l1
k,1))
∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,1)
∨ . . .∨
(((p(α1) = τ
′1
1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′1
k,1) ∨ . . . ∨ (p(α1) = τ
′lp
1,p ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′lp
k,p
))
∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,p)
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which by propositional rule P1 is equivalent to
Φ ⊩Π (p(α1) = τ
′1
1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′1
k,1 ∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,1)
∨ . . .∨
(p(α1) = τ
′l1
1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′l1
k,1) ∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,1)
∨ . . .∨
(p(α1) = τ
′1
1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′1
k,1 ∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,p)
∨ . . .∨
(p(α1) = τ
′lp
1,p ∧ . . . ∧ p(αk) = τ
′lp
k,p
∧ p(αk+1) = τ2,p)
We can observe that every conjunctive clause we obtain is in fact a combinations of values
from TΠx,k+1. Furthermore, if (v1, . . . , vk+1) ∈ T
Π
x,k+1 then (v1 + . . . + vk, vk+1) ∈ T
Π
x,2 – since
v ∈ [0,1] and we are dealing with addition only, then v1 + . . . + vk ∈ Π as well. Thus, for every
combination from TΠx,k+1 we can also find a conjunctive clause associated with it, and our
formula is in fact equivalent to Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ ′′1 ,...,τ ′′k+1)∈TΠx,k+1(p(α1) = τ
′′
1 ∧ . . .∧p(αk+1) = τ
′′
k+1).
Since all of our transformation were using syntactical equivalences, the right to left direction
of our proof can be shown in a similar fashion.
2. Based on derivable rule 3, Φ ⊩Π p(⊺) = 1. We can observe that c1 ∨ . . . cj ⊢ ⊺ and ⊺ ⊢ c1 ∨ . . . cj .
Furthermore, every ci is consistent and for every i, k s.t. i ≠ k, ci ∧ ck ⊢ . Thus, Φ ⊩Π p(c1 ∨
. . . cj) = 1, and by the previous point of this proof, Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ1,...,τj)∈TΠ1,j (p(c1) = τ1∧ . . . ∧p(cj) =
τj).
Proposition 4.9. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set, Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π) a set of epistemic
formulae and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π) an epistemic formula. Then Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ϕ, where ϕ is the
distribution disjunctive normal form of ψ
Proof. We now show that Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ϕ, where ϕ is the distribution disjunctive normal form of
ψ. Let AComplete(G) = {c1, . . . , cj} be the collection of all argument complete terms for G. First of
all, we can observe that for any term α ∈ Terms(G), we can find an equivalent formula that is either 
if α is inconsistent, or which is equivalent to c′1 ∨ . . . ∨ c
′
k , where C
′ = {c′1, . . . , c
′
k} ⊆ AComplete(G) is
a nonempty collection of argument complete terms. This form of α is called the full disjunctive normal
form, and can be easily found by e.g. constructing (propositional) DNF using the truth table method. Let
α′ be this form of α. Through the use of derivable rule 15, it is easy to show that Φ ⊩Π p(α) = x iff
Φ ⊩Π p(α′) = x. It therefore suffices to focus on α′ in the remainder of this proof.
Let us consider ψ ∶ p(α′) = x. Since {α} ⊢ α′ and {α′} ⊢ α, then by derivable rules 15 and 16 it
holds that Φ ⊩Π p(α) = x iff Φ ⊩Π p(α′) = x. We can now observe that α′ is either a propositional
contradiction (), tautology (c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cj), or neither. Under various values x, the probabilistic atom
p(α′) = x can become or remain a contradiction, tautology, or neither. We can therefore distinguish the
following cases:
1. α′ ∶ c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cj and x = 1
2. α′ ∶ c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cj and x ≠ 1
3. α′ ∶  and x = 0
4. α′ ∶  and x ≠ 0
5. remaining cases, i.e. α ≠  and α ≠ c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cj
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Let us start with the most complicated, last point (i.e. point e). Since all argument complete formulae
are consistent and for each two different formulae c′i, c
′
l it holds that c
′
i ∧ c
′
l ⊢ , then by using (proof of)
Proposition 9.2, we can show the following:
Φ ⊩Π p(α
′) = x iff Φ ⊩Π ⋁
(τ ′1,...,τ
′
k
)∈TΠ
x,k
(p(c′1) = τ
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(c
′
k) = τ
′
k)
Let D = {d′1, . . . , d
′
f} = AComplete(G) ∖ C
′ be the collection of argument complete formulae not
appearing in α′. If D = ∅, then all of the argument complete terms appear in our formula, which means
that α′ ∶ c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cj . Consequently, depending on the value of x, please see the analysis of points a and
b which is explained below. If D ≠ ∅, then we can observe that every conjunctive clause in our formula is
a partial description of (possibly more than one) probability distribution. We can therefore use the second
point of this proposition, which in fact enumerates all possible restricted probability distribution on G, to
“complete” our partial descriptions. Using the propositional rules and (proof of) Proposition 9.2, we can
show that
Φ ⊩Π ⋁
(τ ′1,...,τ
′
k
)∈TΠ
x,k
(p(c′1) = τ
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(c
′
k) = τ
′
k) iff
Φ ⊩Π ( ⋁
(τ ′1,...,τ
′
k
)∈TΠ
x,k
(p(c′1) = τ
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(c
′
k) = τ
′
k)) ∧ ( ⋁
(τ1,...,τj)∈TΠ1,j
(p(c1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = τj))
Let V = {(τ1, . . . , τj) ∈ T
Π
1,j ∣ f((τ1, . . . , τj)) ∈ T
Π
x,k}, where f((τ1, . . . , τj)) returns a sub–tuple
(τ ′1, . . . , τ
′
k) of (τ1, . . . , τj) s.t. if c
′
g
∼∼∼ ch then τ ′g = τh, be a collection of tuples in T
Π
1,j that preserve the
assignments from TΠx,k. Using the propositional rules, the second formula can be equivalently rewritten as
Φ ⊩Π ⋁
(τ1,...,τj)∈V
(p(c1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(ck) = τj)
if V ≠ ∅ and as Φ ⊩Π  otherwise. We have therefore obtained an epistemic formula in (propositional)
DNF s.t. it is either , or every conjunctive clause is built out of atoms of the form p(β) = x where β
is an argument complete term and such that for every argument complete term β′ there is a probabilistic
atom p(β′) = x′ in the clause. Let us refer to this formula as ψ′. Based on the presented procedure
and the fact that our system is sound (see Proposition 4.8), we can show that Sat(ψ,Π) = Sat(ψ′,Π).
Hence, if ψ′ ∶ , then Sat(ψ,Π) = Sat(ψ′Π) = ∅, and it is easy to show that ψ′ is indeed the DDNF
of ψ. Therefore, let us focus on the case where ψ′ is not , and enumerate the conjunctive clauses as
ψ′1, . . . , ψ
′
p. Let ϕ ∶ ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕr be a DDNF of ψ. We will now show that ψ
′ and ϕ are equivalent under
commutativity. By Proposition 3.14, it holds that Sat(ψ′,Π) = Sat(ϕ,Π). Hence, by the properties of Sat,
Sat(ψ′1,Π)∪. . .∪Sat(ψ
′
p,Π) = Sat(ϕ1,Π)∪. . .∪Sat(ϕr,Π). We can observe that everyψ
′
i ∈ {ψ
′
1, . . . , ψ
′
p}
and ϕs ∈ {ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕr} is in fact an epistemic formula associated with a single unique probability
distribution. Consequently, for every ψ′i we can find a formula ϕs s.t. Sat(ψ
′
i,Π) = Sat(ϕs,Π) and vice
versa. Given the form of these formulae, it therefore has to follow that ψ′i ⊢ ϕs and ϕs ⊢ ψ
′
i. Hence, ψ
′ is
a DDNF of ψ, and we have shown that for ψ ∶ p(α) = x, Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ψ′.
Let us now consider point a, i.e. where α′ ∶ c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cj and x = 1. We can observe that by the
construction of α′, this means that α′ (and α) are equivalent to ⊺. By repeating the procedures for the last
point, we can show that for α′, Φ ⊩Π p(α′) = 1 iff Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ1,...,τj)∈TΠ1,j (p(c1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = τj).
Given that p(⊺) = 1 is a tautology (see derivable rules), we can use derivable rule 13 to show that p(α′) = 1
is a tautology as well. Hence, it is easy to check that the obtained formula is indeed a DDNF of ψ. Please
note that the same formula can also be obtained through the use of the propositional rules, basic rule B3
and the second point of this proposition.
Let us now consider point b, i.e. where α′ ∶ c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cj and x ≠ 1. Based on derivable rule 15,
Φ ⊩Π p(α′) = x iffΦ ⊩Π p(⊺) = x. Using derivable rules 3 and 17, we can show this to be a contradiction.
Hence,  is indeed the DDNF of ψ.
Let us now consider point c, i.e. α′ ∶  and x = 0. By combining basic rules B3 and B4 we can
observe that Φ ⊩Π p() = 0 iff Φ ⊩Π p(⊺) = 1. We can therefore show that Φ ⊩Π p() = 0 iff
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Φ ⊩Π ⋁(τ1,...,τj)∈TΠ1,j (p(c1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = τj). Given that Sat(p() = 0,Π) = Dist(G,Π) =
Sat(⋁(τ1,...,τj)∈TΠ1,j(p(c1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = τj)), it is easy to verify that the obtained formula is indeed
the DDNF of ψ.
Finally, consider point d, i.e. where α′ ∶  and x ≠ 0. Based on the derivable rules 4 and 17, we can
observe that Φ ⊩Π p() = 0 and that for x ≠ 0, Φ ⊩Π p() = 0 ∧ p() = x iff Φ ⊩Π . We therefore
observe that Φ ⊩Π p(α) = x iff Φ ⊩Π  in this case. Given that Sat(p() = x) = ∅ for x ≠ 0, it is easy to
see that  is indeed the DDNF for ψ.
We can therefore conclude that for all ψ of the form p(α) = x, Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ϕ, where ϕ is the
DDNF of ψ.
We now also consider ψ ∶ ⊺ and ψ ∶ . If ψ ∶ ⊺, then we can, for example, use basic rule B3 along with
the previous parts of the proof to show that ⋁(τ1,...,τj)∈TΠ1,j (p(c1) = τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ p(cj) = τj) is the DDNF of
ψ. If ψ ∶ , then we can observe that it is already in DDNF.
Let us therefore consider more complex epistemic formulae ψ. We first bring ψ to its (propositional)
negation normal form. We then replace every negated epistemic atom with a positive one using the deriv-
able rules 5 to 10. Based on enumeration rule E1, every epistemic atom using # ∈ {>,<,≥,≤,≠} can be
equivalently expressed a disjunction of atoms using only equality or . Hence, ψ can be transformed into
ψ= that uses only positive equality atoms or  and s.t. Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ψ=. Every term in an epistemic
atom can be transformed into  or a disjunction of certain argument complete formulae. Furthermore,
every epistemic atom containing a term equivalent to  can, depending on the value x contained in the
atom, be replaced by an epistemic atom  or ⊺ through the use of the propositional and basic rules. In a
similar fashion, every epistemic atom containing a term equivalent to ⊺ (i.e. one using all possible argu-
ment complete formulae) can, depending on the value of x, be replaced by an epistemic atom  or ⊺. The
resulting epistemic formula can be transformed into a minimal (propositional) conjunctive normal form
and if required, various additional derivable rules and the propositional identity and domination laws10 can
be used to further simplify it. We therefore obtain a formula ψ′ s.t. ψ′ ∶ ⊺, or ψ′ ∶ , or ψ′ ∶ ψ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψ
′
a
where a ≤ 1 and every ψ′i ∶ p(αi1) = xi1 ∨ . . . ∨ p(αin) = xi,n s.t. every αik is a disjunction of certain
argument complete formulae and is not equivalent to neither  nor ⊺. Given the used syntactical rules, we
can observe that Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ψ′. If ψ′ = ⊺ or ψ′ = , then we refer the reader to the previous part
of this proof concerning how ψ′ can be transformed to appropriate DDNF. We therefore focus on the case
where ψ′ = ψ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ψ
′
a.
For every ψ′i = p(αi1) = xi1 ∨ . . .∨p(αin) = xin , every p(αik) = xik can be brought to DDNF formula
ϕik using the previous parts of this proof. Through the use of associativity, every ψ
′
i can be equivalently
written down as a disjunction of epistemic formulae ϕi1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕini where each formula ϕik is associated
with a probability distribution and s.t. Φ ⊩Π ψ′i iff Φ ⊩Π ϕi1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕini . Without loss of generality,
we can assume that every two ϕik and ϕil formulae are different - otherwise the idempotent law can be
used to remove duplicate formulae. We now therefore have that Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π (ϕ11 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ1n1 ) ∧
. . . ∧ (ϕa1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕana ). Using the propositional rules and the derivable rule 17, we can show that for any
two formulae ϕik , ϕml ∈ {ϕ11 , . . . , ϕ1n1 , . . . , ϕa1 , . . . , ϕana } associated with probability distributions,
if ϕik /
∼∼∼ ϕml then Φ ⊩Π ϕik ∧ ϕml iff Φ ⊩Π . Using this and the distribution laws, we can bring
(ϕ11 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ1n1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ (ϕa1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕana ) into minimal (propositional) disjunctive normal form γ s.t.
it is either  or every conjunctive clause is an epistemic formula associated with a distribution. Due to the
nature of the syntactic rules we have used, we can observe that Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π γ. Since our system is
sound, it holds that Φ⊫Π ψ iff Φ⊫Π γ. By using the same argument as in the case of ψ ∶ p(α) = x in the
previous parts of this proof, we can show that γ is indeed the DDNF of ψ.
We can therefore conclude that for all ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π), Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊩Π ϕ, where ϕ is the
DDNF of ψ.
Proposition 4.10. Let Π be a restricted value set. For Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π), and ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π),
Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ⊫Π ψ.
Proof. We have shown that our system is sound in Proposition 4.8. We now need to show that the system
is also complete, i.e. that if Φ ⊫Π ψ then Φ ⊩Π ψ.
10Recall that the identity and domination logical equivalence laws state that q ∧ ⊺ ≡ q, q ∨  ≡ q, q ∨ ⊺ ≡ ⊺ and q ∧  ≡ .
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Let Φ = {φ1, . . . , φm} and φ ∶ φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φm. By using the propositional rules we can easily show
that Φ ⊩Π φ and for every formula γ ∈ Φ, {φ} ⊩Π γ. Furthermore, it clearly follows from the definition
of Sat that Sat(Φ,Π) = Sat(φ,Π). Consequently, for the purpose of this proof, it suffices to show that if
{φ}⊫Π ψ then {φ} ⊩Π ψ. If Φ = ∅, then it is easy to see that we can set φ to ⊺.
Let Sat(φ,Π) = {P1, . . . , Pk} and Sat(ψ,Π) = {P
′
1, . . . , P
′
l }. Let ϕ
φ and ϕψ be the DDNFs of φ
and ψ. Based on Proposition 3.14, Sat(ψ,Π) = Sat(ϕψ ,Π) and Sat(φ,Π) = Sat(ϕφ,Π). Therefore,
{φ} ⊫Π ψ iff {ϕφ} ⊫Π ϕψ . By definition, {ϕφ} ⊫Π ϕψ iff Sat(ϕφ,Π) ⊆ Sat(ϕψ ,Π). If k = 0, then the
DDNF of φ is  and therefore through the propositional rule P2, we can show that {φ} ⊩Π ψ for any ψ. If
k ≠ 0 and l = 0, then it cannot be the case that Sat(ϕφ,Π) ⊆ Sat(ϕψ ,Π). Therefore, it cannot be the case
that {φ} ⊫Π ψ either and we reach a contradiction. Hence, let k ≠ 0 and l ≠ 0. Let ϕφ and ϕψ be of the
formsϕφ ∶ ϕP1∨ϕP2 . . .∨ϕPk andϕψ ∶ ϕP
′
1∨ϕP
′
2 . . .∨ϕP
′
l . Since Sat(ϕφ,Π) ⊆ Sat(ϕψ ,Π), then for every
Pi there exists P
′
j s.t. Pi = P
′
j and therefore for every ϕ
Pi there exists an equivalent ϕP
′
j . Consequently,
by using the propositional proof rule P1 it is easy to show that if {ϕφ}⊫Π ϕψ then {ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ . We can
now use Proposition 4.9 to show that {φ} ⊩Π ψ. We can therefore conclude that if Φ ⊫Π ψ then Φ ⊩Π ψ
and our system is complete.
Proposition 4.11. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set. For Φ ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π) and ψ ∈
EFormulae(G,Π), Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ∪ {¬ψ} ⊩Π .
Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we introduce a shorthandϕ ∼∼∼ ϕ′ stating that the two formulae have the
same syntactical features under commutativity and associativity (so, for example, (A∨B)∧C ∼∼∼ (A∨B)∧C,
(A ∨ B) ∧ C ∼∼∼ (B ∨ A) ∧ C, but (A ∨ B) ∧ C /∼∼∼ (A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ C)).
We want to show that Φ ⊩Π ψ iff Φ ∪ {¬ψ} ⊩Π . Let Φ = {φ1, . . . , φm} and φ ∶ φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φm. By
using the propositional rules we can easily show that Φ ⊩Π φ and for every formula γ ∈ Φ, {φ} ⊩Π γ.
Furthermore, it clearly follows from the definition of Sat that Sat(Φ,Π) = Sat(φ,Π). If Φ = ∅, then it is
easy to see that we can set φ to ⊺. Let nowϕφ and ϕψ be DDNFs of φ and ψ. Based on Propositions 4.8 and
4.9 and the definition of DDNF, we can observe that for the purpose of this proof, it suffices to show that
{ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ iff {ϕφ∧¬ϕψ} ⊩Π . Without loss of generality, let us assume that we have an ordering over
arguments, and if a given DDNF is not , then the atoms in every subformula associated with a probability
distribution are ordered according to the set of argument complete terms AComplete(G) = {c1, . . . , cp} of
G and that the terms themselves are also ordered. We can use this assumption due to derivable rule 15 (i.e.
two probabilistic atoms with same constants and argument complete terms equivalent under commutativity
are themselves equivalent) and propositional rules (commutativity law).
Let us focus on the left to right direction first. Assumeϕφ ∶ . Then it is easy to see that {ϕφ∧¬ϕψ} ⊩Π
 independently of the nature of ¬ϕψ . We can also observe that if ϕψ ∶ , then as {ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ , ϕφ ∶  as
well. Thus, based on previous remarks, the property still holds.
Let us therefore consider the situation in which none of the DDNFs are  and let ϕφ and ϕψ be of the
forms ϕφ ∶ ϕφ
1
∨ . . . ∨ ϕφm and ϕ
ψ ∶ ϕψ
1
∨ . . . ∨ ϕψn for m,n ≥ 1. We can observe that due to the nature
of DDNF, every ϕ
φ
i and ϕ
ψ
j is an epistemic formula associated with a (single) probability distribution.
Therefore, if {ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ , then based on the ordering assumption we have made, it has to be the case that
{ϕφ1 , . . . , ϕ
φ
m} ⊆ {ϕ
ψ
1 , . . . , ϕ
ψ
n}. Thus, for ϕ
φ
i
there exists a ϕ
ψ
j
s.t. ϕ
φ
i
∼∼∼ ϕ
ψ
j
. Using the propositional rule,
we can show that for such formulae, {ϕφ
i
∧¬ϕψ
j
} ⊩Π . Using this, we can now prove the following. Using
propositional rules, {ϕφ∧¬ϕψ} ⊩Π ϕφ∧¬ϕψ which is {ϕφ∧¬ϕψ} ⊩Π (ϕ
φ
1
∨. . .∨ϕφm)∧¬(ϕ
ψ
1
∨. . .∨ϕψn),
which in turns is equivalent to {ϕφ∧¬ϕψ} ⊩Π (ϕ
φ
1
∨. . .∨ϕφm)∧(¬ϕ
ψ
1
∧. . .∧¬ϕψn) and to {ϕ
φ∧¬ϕψ} ⊩Π
(ϕφ
1
∧ ¬ϕψ
1
∧ . . . ∧ ¬ϕψn) ∨ . . . ∨ (ϕ
φ
m ∧ ¬ϕ
ψ
1
∧ . . . ∧ ¬ϕψn). Based on the previous explanations and
propositional rules, for every ϕ
φ
i , {ϕ
φ
i ∧ ¬ϕ
ψ
1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ϕ
ψ
n} ⊢ . Hence, using propositional rules once
more, {ϕφ ∧ ¬ϕψ} ⊩Π  ∨ . . . ∨  and therefore {ϕφ ∧ ¬ϕψ} ⊩Π . This concludes the left to right
direction of our proof.
Let us now focus on the right to left direction of our proof, i.e. that if {ϕφ ∧¬ϕψ} ⊩Π  then {ϕφ} ⊩Π
ϕψ . Assume ϕφ ∶ . Then clearly, {ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ based on propositional rules. Now assume ϕψ ∶ . Then
¬ϕψ is equivalent to ⊺ through the use of propositional rules and our property holds easily and it is easy to
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argue that if {ϕφ ∧ ⊺} ⊩Π  then {ϕφ} ⊩Π .
Let us therefore consider the situation in which none of the DDNFs are  and let ϕφ and ϕψ be of
the forms ϕφ ∶ ϕφ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
φ
m and ϕ
ψ ∶ ϕψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
ψ
n for m,n ≥ 1. Assume that it is not the case that
{ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ . Therefore, using the previous analysis and the properties of DDNFs, we can show that
there must exist ϕ
φ
i
∈ {ϕφ
1
, . . . , ϕ
φ
m} s.t. ϕ
φ
i
∉ {ϕψ
1
, . . . , ϕ
ψ
n} (i.e. there exists a probability distribution
satisfying ϕφ and not satisfying ϕψ , and therefore a formula associated with that probability present in
ϕφ and not present in ϕψ). Therefore, we can reuse the previous reasoning to show that it cannot be
the case that {ϕφ
1
∧ ¬ϕψ
1
∧ . . . ∧ ¬ϕψn) ∨ . . . ∨ (ϕ
φ
m ∧ ¬ϕ
ψ
1
∧ . . . ∧ ¬ϕψn} ⊩Π  and therefore it cannot
be the case that {ϕφ ∧ ⊺} ⊩Π . We reach a contradiction with our assumptions. Hence, we conclude
that if {ϕφ ∧ ¬ϕψ} ⊩Π  then {ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ . Given the previous results, we have therefore shown that
{ϕφ ∧ ¬ϕψ} ⊩Π  iff {ϕφ} ⊩Π ϕψ .
Lemma 4.12. Let Π be a reasonable restricted value set. There is a set of propositional formulae Ω with
Λ ⊆ Ω, and there is a function f ∶ EFormulae(G,Π) → Ω s.t. for each {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ EFormulae(G,Π),
and for each ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π),
{φ1, . . . , φn} ⊩Π ψ iff {f(φ1), . . . , f(φn)} ∪Λ ⊢ f(ψ)
Proof. For every P ∈ Dist(G,Π) we create the epistemic formula ϕP associated with it. For every such
formula, we create a proposition dP . To every formula ψ ∈ EFormulae(G,Π), we assign its DDNF, i.e. if
Sat(ψ,Π) = ∅, then f(ψ) = , and if Sat(ψ,Π) = {P1, . . . , Pm} for m ≥ 1, then f(ψ) = d
P1 ∨ dP2 ∨
. . . ∨ dPm . We can observe that for two different P,P ′ ∈ Dist(G,Π), ϕP ∧ ϕP
′
is equivalent to . Thus,
we add rule dPi ∧ dPj ↔  for i ≠ j to Λ. Assuming that Dist(G,Π) = {P1, . . . , Pk}, we also add rule
dP1 ∨ dP2 ∨ . . . ∨ dPk ↔ ⊺ to Λ, following the result in Proposition 9.2.
Let us consider the left to right direction. Assume that for a formula φi, its DDNF ϕ
φi is ϕP1,i ∨ . . . ∨
ϕPmi,i (or  ifmi = 0) and that for a formula ψ, its DDNF ϕ
ψ is ϕP1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
P
l (or  if l = 0). We observe
that under the restricted epistemic consequence relation, {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊩Π ψ iff {ϕφ1 , . . . , ϕφn} ⊩Π ϕψ .
Hence, {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊩Π ψ iff {ϕP1,1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
P
m1,1
, . . . , ϕP1,n ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
P
mn,n ⊩Π ϕ
P
1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
P
l . Due to
the nature of DDNFs and ⊩Π, we observe that the long formula holds iff every distribution formula (and
conjunctive clause at the same time) ϕP that is present in all ϕφi , is present in ϕψ or, if n = 0 (i.e. our set
of assumptions is empty), ϕψ is the DDNF of ⊺. If it is the first case, then {f(φ1), . . . , f(φn)}∪Λ ⊢ f(ψ)
easily from properties of propositional logic or the  rule we have added to Λ. If it is the other, then it holds
easily through the second rule we have added to Λ.
The right to left direction can be proved in a similar fashion based on (proof of) Proposition 4.9 and the
presence of propositional rules in the proof system.
Lemma 4.13. LetΩ be a propositional language composed from a set of atoms and the usual definitions for
the Boolean connectives. There is a restricted epistemic language EFormulae(G,Π) where Π = {0,1} and
there is a function g ∶ Ω → EFormulae(G,Π) s.t. for each set of propositional formulae {α1, . . . , αn} ⊆ Ω
and for each propositional formula β ∈ Ω,
{α1, . . . , αn} ⊢ β iff {g(α1), . . . , g(αn)} ⊩Π g(β)
Proof. We assume that Π = {0,1}. First, we provide the following translation, and then show the equiva-
lence. For each propositional formula α, let g(α) be defined as follows:
• if α is an atom, then g(α) is p(α) = 1
• if α is negation of the form ¬α′, then g(¬α′) = ¬g(α′).
• if α is conjunction of the form α1 ∧ α2, then g(α1 ∧ α2) = g(α1) ∧ g(α2).
• if α is disjunction of the form α1 ∨ α2, then g(α1 ∨ α2) = g(α1) ∨ g(α2).
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We can observe that there is a correspondence between the propositional proof rules P1 and P2 and the
proof rules for classical propositional logic under this translation. Hence, it is straightforward to show by
induction on the structure of the propositional formulae in α1, . . . , αn and β that {α1, . . . , αn} ⊢ β iff
{g(α1), . . . , g(αn)} ⊩Π g(β).
Proposition 4.14. The restricted epistemic language with the restricted epistemic consequence relation is
equivalent to the classical propositional language with the classical propositional consequence relation.
Proof. Follows easily from Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13.
Proposition 5.6. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, A ∈ Nodes(G) be an argument and
F = Nodes(G) ∖ {A} be a set of arguments. The following hold:
• If A is default covered in X , then it is partially and fully covered w.r.t. any set of arguments G ⊆
Nodes(G) ∖ {A}, but not necessarily vice versa
• If A is fully covered in X w.r.t. F , then it is partially covered in X w.r.t. F , but not necessarily vice
versa
Proof. The properties hold straightforwardly from the definitions of default, full and partial coverage. For
counterexamples showing that the relations hold only one way, please consult Examples 20, 22 and 23.
Proposition 5.7. Let X = (G,L,C) and X ′ = (G′,L′,C′) be consistent epistemic graphs s.t. Sat(C) =
Sat(C′). An argument A ∈ Nodes(G) is default (partially, fully) covered in X (and w.r.t. F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖
{A}) iff it is default (partially, fully) covered inX ′ (w.r.t. F ).
Proof. We can observe that if Sat(C) = Sat(C′), then Nodes(G) = Nodes(G′). Furthermore, from this
it also holds that C ⊫ ϕ iff C′ ⊫ ϕ for a given formula ϕ. Hence, if C ⊫ p(A) ≠ x for an argument
A ∈ Nodes(G) and value x ∈ [0,1], then C′ ⊫ p(A) ≠ x and vice versa. Therefore, an argument A is
default covered inX iff it is default covered inX ′. Remaining forms of coverage can be shown in a similar
fashion.
Proposition 5.10. Let X = (G,L,C) be a consistent epistemic graph, Z ⊆ Closure(C) be a consistent
set of epistemic constraints, F ⊆ Nodes(G) ∖ {B} and G = F ∖ {A} be sets of arguments. Let (A,B) ∈
Nodes(G) ×Nodes(G). The following hold:
• If (A,B) is strongly effective w.r.t. F , then it is effective w.r.t. F , but not necessarily vice versa
• If (A,B) is strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), then it is semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), but not neces-
sarily and vice versa
• If (A,B) is effective w.r.t. F , then it is semi–effective w.r.t. (C, F ) and vice versa
• If (A,B) is strongly effective w.r.t. F , then it is strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (C, F ) and vice versa
• If Z ≠ C and (A,B) is semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), then it is not necessarily effective w.r.t. F
• IfZ ≠ C and (A,B) is strongly semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ), then it is not necessarily strongly effective
w.r.t. F
Proof. • Follows straightforwardly from the definition. To see that the relation is one way, consult
Example 25.
• Follows straightforwardly form the definition. To see that the relation is one way, consult Example
27.
• Follows straightforwardly from the definition.
• Follows straightforwardly form the definition.
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• Consult Example 27.
• Consider the set of constraints C = {p(A) > 0.5, p(A) > 0.5→ p(B) < 0.5} and assume that the (A,B)
relation is present in the graph. It is easy to see that it is neither effective nor strongly effective w.r.t.
F = {A}. However, given Z = {p(A) > 0.5 → p(B) < 0.5}, we can show that (A,B) is strongly
semi–effective w.r.t. (Z,F ).
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